Université de Montréal

A Mediated Presence:

Uncovering Nietzsche in Art History from its Foundations to Contemporary Anglo-American Curricula

par Natalie Vansier

Département d'histoire de l'art et d'études cinématographiques
Faculté des arts et des sciences

Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures
en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise des Arts (M.A.)
en histoire de l'art

Août 2015

Résumé

La pensée de Nietzsche a joué un rôle déterminant et récurrent dans les discours et les débats qui ont formé et continuent de façonner le domaine de l'histoire de l'art, mais aucune analyse systématique de cette question n'a encore vu le jour. L'influence de Nietzsche a été médiée par divers interlocuteurs, historiens de l'art et philosophes, qui ont encadré ces discussions, en utilisant les écrits du philosophe comme toile de fond de leurs propres idées. Ce mémoire souhaite démontrer que l'impact de Nietzsche dans le champ de l'histoire de l'art existe mais qu'il fut toujours immergé ou éclipsé, particulièrement dans le contexte anglo-américain, l'emphase étant placée sur les médiateurs de ses idées en n'avouant que très peu d'engagement direct avec son œuvre. En conséquence, son importance généalogique pour certains fondateurs de la discipline reste méconnue; sa présence réellement féconde se traduit plutôt comme une absence ou une présence masquée. En vue de démontrer ce propos, nous regardons donc le contexte nietzschéen qui travaille les écrits de certains historiens de l'art, comme Jacob Burckhardt et Aby Warburg, ou des philosophes et d'écrivains ayant marqué la discipline de l'histoire de l'art (plus particulièrement dans le cadre de l'influence de la « French Theory » sur l'histoire de l'art anglo-américaine depuis la fin des années 1970) : Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze et Georges Bataille. Nous examinons certaines voies par lesquelles ses idées ont acquis une pertinence pour l'histoire de l'art avant de proposer les raisons potentielles de leur occlusion ultérieure. Nous étudions donc l'évolution des discours multiples de l'histoire comme domaine d'étude afin de situer la contribution du philosophe et de cerner où et comment ses réflexions ont croisé celles des historiens de l'art qui ont soit élargi ou redéfini les méthodes et les structures d'analyse de leur discipline. Ensuite nous regardons « l'art » de Nietzsche en le comparant avec « *l'art de l'histoire de l'art* » (Preziosi 2009) afin d'évaluer si ces deux expressions peuvent se rejoindre ou s'il y a fondamentalement une incompatibilité entre les deux, laquelle pourrait justifier ou éclairer la distance entre la pensée nietzschéenne sur l'art et la discipline de l'histoire de l'art telle qu'elle s'institutionnalise au moment où le philosophe rédige son œuvre.

Mots clés : Nietzsche, histoire de l'art, historiographie, Aby Warburg, Jacob Burckhardt, transmission culturel, anachronisme, French Theory, philosophie de l'art.

Abstract

Nietzsche's philosophy has played an active role in many recurring art historical debates that have permeated the discipline since its inception, yet there exists no systematic analysis of his impact. His influence has been mediated through various interlocutors, art historical and other, that have framed these discussions, while using his writings as an intellectual backdrop to their own ideas. This thesis attempts to show that Nietzsche's engagement with art history has been submerged or overshadowed by an emphasis on the mediators of his thought with little direct engagement with his work, particularly so in the Anglo-American context. The consequence of this is that his genealogical importance for many of the founders of the discipline is left unacknowledged; hence, his actually potent presence is translated as an absence or oversight. In order to demonstrate this, we explore the Nietzschean heritage that informed the works of art historians like Jacob Burckhardt and Aby Warburg, and that of philosophers and writers who have marked the art historical discipline (particularly so with the surge of "French Theory" in Anglo-American art history as of the late 1970s): Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Georges Bataille. Once we have identified some of the trajectories on which his ideas have gained relevancy for art history, we look at the potential reasons for their subsequent occlusion. In order to do this, we begin by examining the evolving methodologies in historiography so as to situate his contribution to this domain of study and see where these reflections have intersected with those of art historians who either broadened or reshaped the methods and analytical structures of their own discipline. We finally compare Nietzsche's 'art' to the "*art of art history*" (Preziosi 2009) and determine whether these two expressions can be bridged or whether there is a fundamental incompatibility that may explain the discrepancy between his treatment of art and that which concerned art history at the moment of its contemporaneous institutionalisation.

Keywords: Nietzsche, Art History, historiography, Aby Warburg, Jacob Burckhardt, cultural transmission, anachronism, French Theory, philosophy of art.

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List of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used for citations of Nietzsche's writings, taken from *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, http://www.psupress.org/journals/jnsstyle.htm, accessed August 3, 2015. See Bibliography for editions and publications:

- BGE = Beyond Good and Evil
- BT = The Birth of Tragedy
- D = Daybreak
- EH = Ecce Homo
- GM = On the Genealogy of Morality/Morals
- GS = The Gay Science
- HH = Human, All Too Human
- KGW = *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks)
- TI = Twilight of the Idols
- UM = Untimely Meditations
- WP = The Will to Power
- Z = Thus Spoke Zarathustra

Acknowledgements

It is with particular gratitude that I thank my supervisor, Dr. Johanne Lamoureux, for her untiring support on this project from its inception; likewise my heartfelt appreciation to Dr. Amelia Jones, who encouraged my pursuit of this subject and directed me to the right place and person to make it happen. I also extend my gratitude to the department of Art History and Cinematic Studies of Université de Montréal, as well as to the financial support of the SSHRC. It is with upmost sincerity that I thank Nick Sakoyannis, whose ideas are everywhere hidden behind my own. In a similar spirit, I thank François LeTourneux, whose work on 'stylistic heterogeneity' stimulated my curiosity in these matters, my parents Libby Parker and Daryl Vansier, whose trust and respect encouraged me to attempt this and all valuable things I have ever endeavored to pursue, and with love to Tereza and Matus Racek, on whose friendship I depend deeply.

Introduction

Despite the lack of systematic analysis on the subject, Nietzsche's thought engages many recurring art historical debates that have long permeated the discipline, some dating back to its inception in Europe and others to its more recent manifestations in North America. Nietzsche frequently discusses many of the earliest builders of art history's structural frameworks, notably Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717 - 1768), and their counterparts in the field of aesthetics such as Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831). Despite the propensity to find these thinkers in Anglo-American curricula even today, the philosopher's views on them have only ever been referred to marginally, in brief references by Jacob Burckhardt (1818 - 1897), and with more prolonged treatments by Aby Warburg (1866 – 1929). In situations like these, his presence is mediated through various interlocutors, art historical or not, that have fuelled art historical discussions, using his ideas as an intellectual backdrop to their own. Rarely though, in the legacies of these thinkers, is Nietzsche's involvement acknowledged, the emphasis being on the mediators of his thought, with little actual direct engagement with his own work. The consequences of this are that his genealogical importance for many of those who have been a potent presence in art history is left unacknowledged, and the role of his thought is left as an oversight or (forcibly) marked as an absence. In more contemporary contexts, we see this with the recurrence of texts by philosophers and writers like Walter Benjamin, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Georges Bataille and Judith Butler (to name a few), all of whom bear an avowed connection to Nietzsche and have marked the evolving historical methodologies of art history - particularly those of Anglo-American departments. Once we have proposed some avenues on which his concepts may have acquired relevancy for this domain of study, we can examine the potential reasons for their subsequent occlusion.

Context

As we will see throughout the paper, art history has a tendency to frame itself based on the rhetorical and theoretical strategies of other fields, while at the same time stressing its

autonomy from these same parent and sibling disciplines. While this is understandable historically as its practices needed to disentangle themselves from others in the social and humanistic sciences (or disciplines that bridge both, like archaeology) in order to situate the parameters of its evolving discourse, it can induce a problematic pattern of borrowing ideas that lacks a clear understanding of the intellectual, cultural and social soils from whence these ideas first sprouted. Given this interdisciplinary ambivalence, Nietzsche's vast influence and simultaneous omission becomes understandable. For example, while Heideggerean philosophy and poststructuralist thought have received significant coverage in Anglophone art historical forums of the last decades (spearheaded by the creation of *October* magazine in 1976 by Rosalind Krauss and Annette Michelson, among other notorious publications like *Semiotexte*, founded two years prior), Nietzsche's widely known influence on Heidegger and poststructuralist thinkers is mute, despite these figures being explicit about the Nietzschean frameworks to which they refer, deviate from and eventually rework. While *October* magazine, for instance, featured texts by authors like Bataille who do discuss Nietzsche directly (see the Spring 1986 issue, "Georges Bataille: Writings on Laughter, Sacrifice, Nietzsche and Un-Knowing"), when art historians themselves reference Nietzsche, it is principally mediated through a discussion of another thinker, like Heidegger or an artist and/or artistic movement, like Asger Jorn and the Situationists International (see Hal Foster's "Creaturely Cobra" in the Summer 2012 issue, pp. 4-21), so that the mention is incidental or anecdotal, but never central to the content. It therefore becomes important to ask whether this anomaly may be symptomatic of a larger paradox in art history: how can a discipline so rich for its references to other fields of study and inquiry be so prone to a forgetfulness or lack of interest in the nuances and complexities that these other lines of questioning offer?

Existing Scholarship

Current scholarship on Nietzsche's ideas relating to history and art has so far taken place outside of (anglophone) art history in history, philosophy, history of aesthetics, political science, economics, classical studies, biology and various permutations of postmodern theory. What is interesting for our present study is that these subjects

(art/history) in Nietzsche's thought and those he influenced are by no means unexplored, yet they have never been looked at for their contextual relatedness to art history, a domain that synthesizes these two objects of study. One notable exception is Georges Didi-Huberman, who has done a great deal of work on integrating Nietzsche's thought into academic art history, but usually in the context of a discussion of Bataille and/or Warburg (see *La ressemblance informe*, 1995 and *L'image survivante,* 2002) and rarely with Nietzsche as the central point of inquiry. However, the majority of his work is not translated into English, and hence does not significantly contribute to anglophone art historical discourses in relation to Nietzsche. Furthermore, even in his own geo-academic territory of Paris, Didi-Huberman's work is far from unanimously embraced, where there exists a long maintained theoretical rift between the art historical practices of his own teaching institution, the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (where Derrida, Lacan and Barthes also taught) and those of the Université de Paris. Still, we will return to his treatment of Nietzsche's work in the context of Burckhardt and Warburg, as well as making use of his disciplinary critiques of art history more generally.

Beyond this contribution, many books that focus expressly on Nietzsche's thought on art situate it in the evolution of 'aesthetics', which, as we will see, is a misunderstanding of his ideas both in terms of his own expression of them and in the context of their reworking by thinkers such as Heidegger and Derrida (who are often mistakenly grouped into this same evolution). The latter locate Nietzsche's position vis-à-vis aesthetic philosophy as one of contrast at best, and at worst, complete antagonism (for examples of other aesthetic readings see: Matthew Rampley's *Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity,* 1999, Nicholas Martin's *Nietzsche and Schiller: Untimely Aesthetics,* 1996, and Jacques Sojcher's *La question et le sens: esthétique de Nietzsche*, 1972). The question remains (one that we will attempt to answer through a Nietzschean lens throughout the paper): what is a philosophy of art that is not aesthetics? Has art history mistakenly understood all philosophers of art to be aestheticians? Would it perhaps be preferable to understand the role art plays in their larger structures of thought not as a topical deviation but as either central or fundamentally related to their most recurring concepts?

There are some art theory books that explore Nietzsche's various treatments of art, such as his ideas about art as life and truth, his work on the Apolline and Dionysian forces of

artistic creation in Greek tragedy from *Birth of Tragedy* (1872) and his conceptions of the artistic temperament, but these texts still do not link these ideas to the complex existing debates in art history in both historical and contemporary forums (such as Philip Pothen's 2002 *Nietzsche and the Fate of Art*, and Philippe Choulet and Hélène Nancy's 1996's *Nietzsche, l'art et la vie*, etc.). There still, then, remains no explicit bridge between art historical knowledge and Nietzsche's ideas about art, the artist and history.

(Inter-)Disciplinary Context

Nietzsche is characterized as a thinker that metamorphoses depending on the disciplinary context that harnesses his thought. In political forums, he is shown as an anti-democratic thinker who believes society should be concerned with the preservation and encouragement of its higher – and rarer – types, and hence sometimes criticized as a proto-fascist thinker of individual excess along with Machiavelli, as well as being associated with both anarchist and anti-anarchist movements (he explicitly tended more towards the latter) (for example Bruce Detwiler's *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*, 1990, Fredrick Appel's *Nietzsche contra Democracy,* 1999 and Dombowsky's *Nietzsche's Machiavellian Politics*, 2004). In economic theory, he is known for providing an individualist alternative to bids for collectivism like Marxism in promoting the health of a society and culture (as in Hugo and Erik Reinert's 2006 article "Creative Destruction in Economics: Nietzsche, Sombart, Schumpeter"); in biology and philosophy of science, he is seen as a thinker who challenged (or reinvigorated) the progressive evolutionary arguments of Charles Darwin, suggesting that a will to power drove species and organism mutation, not an instinct towards pure adaptivity and self-preservation in the face of environmental conditions (found in John Richardson's *The New Darwinism* and *Nietzsche Contra Darwin,* 2004 and 2002 respectively, and Dirk Robert Johnson's *Nietzsche's anti-Darwinism,* 2010). In classical studies, while not being the first to utilize the concept Dionysian nor its dichotomy with the Apollonian (see p. 60), he is one of the foremost thinkers to philologically establish the important role of Dionysus in the pantheon of Greek gods, and to stress the presence of a more pessimistic and tragic worldview in classical civilization over an idealized and sterilized one (see Walter Otto Friedrich's *Dionysus: Myth and Cult,* 1965 and Max

Baeumer's "Nietzsche and the Tradition of the Dionysian," 1976). In history, he is singled out for his mythologizing of history and for his critique of the fetishization of the past and its accompanying archival sources under the guise of a detached historical objectivity (see Joseph Mali's *Mythistory: The Making of Modern Historiography*, 2003, and Michel Foucault's *Nietzsche, genealogy, history*, 2001). In philology, his work is known for its controversially poetic and expressive interpretations of ancient literary sources versus a tone of scientific certainty and deduction (one example, James Porter's *Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future,* 2000). In psychoanalysis, he is often discussed in terms of Freud's identification of him as having a "more penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who ever lived or was ever likely to live" (cited from Ernest Jones' *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud,* 1953 in Kaufmann, 1992: 266, and in addition Paul-Laurent Assoun's *Freud and Nietzsche,* 1980), as well as being a general forerunner to medical conceptions of the unconscious in psychology. Nietzsche was also a primary influence on the founder of individual psychology and psychotherapy, Alfred Adler, whose notion of the inferiority complex is based on Nietzsche's work on power dynamics (Jacob Golomb, 1999: 235), and was a significant reference point for the work of Carl Jung, who posited the Dionysian character of Zarathustra (*Z,* 1883–1885) as the necessary compensation for what he considered a lack in Christian culture and his own upbringing (much in the same way that he saw his idea of the collective unconscious compensating for people's limited views as determined by socio-cultural conditioning) (as we see in Jung's 1934-9 seminars on Nietzsche's Zarathustra, 1988, and the 1995 *The Dionysian Self: C.G. Jung's Reception of Friedrich Nietzsche*, by Paul Bishop). In sociology, the development of Max Weber's foundational theories are known to stem from a Kantian bid to non-arbitrary freedom, governed by Nietzsche's post-metaphysical view of the modern world (one such comparison is found in Mark Warren's "Max Weber's Liberalism for a Nietzschean World," 1988). In theology, he is credited with announcing the "death of god" through the mouth of a madman in a public marketplace and spawning a wide range of permutations of atheism, as well as numerous forms of resistance to it (as a renunciation of nihilism or relativity) (for example, Thomas Altizer and William Hamilton's *Radical Theology and the Death of God*, 1966). In literary theory, he is linked to important avant-garde modernist writers like James Joyce (for one example, Nathan Miller's "Reading Nietzsche in James Joyce's *Ulysses,*" 2011) and in

philosophy, he is known as favouring vitalist, intuitive and life-affirming approaches to knowledge and understanding over rationalist ones, as we also find with Henri-Louis Bergson (a comparison of their modes of thought – particularly Bergson's *élan vital* and Nietzsche's will to power is found in Arnaud François' *Life and Will in Nietzsche and Bergson,* 2007). And finally, feminist, race and identity theorists have critiqued Nietzsche for misogyny, ethnic categorization, and narcissism while simultaneously celebrating his emancipatory work on the truth of the *particular* body (*against* essentialism) and its self affirmation through language, an approach often labelled 'feminine' in the face of patriarchal systems of objectification and classification (in the 2004 article "Combating Misogyny? Responses to Nietzsche by Turn-of-the-Century German Feminists," Barbara Helm shows how Nietzsche was both condemned as 'anti-feminist' as well as being appropriated by numerous feminist doctrines).

What is important for our understanding is not to disentangle all the myriad interpretations of Nietzsche that occur in different fields by such highly variegated protagonists, which is in any case impossible to summarize in a thesis of this length. Rather, we will use this heterogeneous history of reception as a springboard for asking: what aspects of Nietzsche's thought are important for art history, 'then' and 'now'? Still, to remain true to Nietzsche's thought, one cannot completely distil his work to fit a single disciplinary paradigm. Bataille suggested that Nietzsche's ideas had been dissected by different fields in an 'instrumentalization' of his thought rather than an integrated understanding of it (1980: 3); how then, can we both extract a specified knowledge as it pertains to the history of art while also integrating these ideas into a more synthetic approach to his thought that isn't governed by disciplinary divisiveness?

Contribution to Discourse

What is novel about the way we will be approaching Nietzsche here is not necessarily that we will be attempting a radical rereading of existing interpretations of his work; rather, we will be exploring the ways in which these varied appropriations and rejections of his thought operate differently depending on disciplinary specificity and their associated value systems. Simultaneously, we will have to stress that the logic of

disciplinarization is incompatible with the nexus of his thought, as it is for many of his successors, and hence difficult to organize along these borders. Still, it will be necessary to look at the ways in which various disciplinary interpretations frame his work and inversely, to distil the uses and applications his ideas may provide in these contexts. We will soon find that despite the propensity for flexibility in his philosophy to fit different theoretical paradigms, art – art as action, as knowledge, as creation – recurs as of the highest order, higher even perhaps than the philosophical enterprise itself or else akin to it in its purest state, just as "art [is] the supreme task and the truly metaphysical activity in this life" (BT: 13). If as Philippe Pothen suggests, aesthetic theory had primarily been concerned with the artwork as the "*fons* and *origo*" of most discussions about art, Nietzsche found this focus limiting, precluding larger reflections about life as an aesthetic phenomenon with "ourselves as the works of art" (2002: 38). With art history primarily concerned with the materiality of art in terms of its objects, the records of the artists who produced them, and the historical frameworks used to understand the context of their creation and reception, we can see how Nietzsche's use of art in the widest sense may not have had nor yet have a place in art historical discourse, inasmuch as his claims are deemed too metaphysical, abstract, poetic, controversial and personal, and so *untouchable* for art history's more pragmatic science.

Yet it remains that psychoanalytic, Marxist and poststructuralist frameworks have overtly contributed to the methodological paradigms of art history in recent decades, particularly in post-1960s North America, revealing a strong tendency toward the appropriation of new theoretical approaches from other fields, particularly those coming from Europe into the U.S. In the earlier stages of art theory (and arguably still today), philosophers of aesthetics before Nietzsche like Kant and Hegel were customary pathways to introduce and historicize these critical frameworks, so that one could, for instance, produce a Hegelian, Marxist or Freudian reading of an artwork. In this context, the lack of a 'Nietzschean' methodology or structural support is cause for curiosity, one that will surely not be satisfied nor resolved in this paper (nor perhaps would it be desirable to again 'close' the inquiry in this way), but that may bring us closer to understanding the potential implications and permutations of this investigation. Ultimately, we are asking whether a mode of thought that does not restrict itself to a single disciplinary logic can still be *useful* or productive for art history, and if so, what barriers or obstacles may lie in the way of its

conscientious integration. If a form of knowledge does not lend itself to the analysis of particular objects, its makers and an epoch of creation and/or reception, can this be considered a valid source in a discipline that looks for specialized knowledge and particular methodological applications? Despite the wealth of critical and interpretive theories that exist in contemporary art history, it seems that Nietzsche's philosophy has not tended to assist in the reading of particular artworks and their makers, nor in more theoretical contexts, where we find his aforementioned peers (Marx and Freud) in what Paul Ricoeur named the 'school of suspicion', and the proliferation of those figures gathered under the rubric 'French Theory', so popular in Anglo-American curricula as of the late 1970s.

The Problem of Methodology

The problem of representing Nietzsche's work methodologically in the context of an un-disciplinarization of knowledge should by now be evident. Much of the content of Nietzsche's philosophy focuses on a de-systematization of structures of thought, and so doesn't lend itself well to a single interpretive framework. In his notebooks of 1886-87, he writes: "There are no facts, only interpretations," summarizing his theory of perspectivism (KGW: 139). As we will see in the second chapter, perspectivism differs from aesthetics in that it doesn't allow for a fixed relation between subject and object (in the form of an aesthetic paradigm between viewer/artwork), or between subjects; it also raises the question of whether a single methodological approach is adequate to grasp things as nuanced as art, truth and perception. Art is not just an object of study or appreciation, but a vital force that creates new possibilities of experience, and hence, perspectives (truths): "Without art we would be nothing but foreground and live entirely in the spell of that perspective which makes what is closest at hand and most vulgar appear as if it were vast, and reality itself" (GS: 79). Perspectivism is too unstable or un-static to be consolidated into an approach that can be easily *applied* onto a given structural base. As a method, it would have to be allowed to appear in its different guises, taking different approaches depending on the context, and never promising constancy between its various positions. That is not to say that Nietzsche didn't allow for some analogical unity between even heterogeneous expressions and

arguments, but we are forced to consolidate a multiplicity of tones in his work into a single style of expression here.

Given that this is an academic paper, and hence, abides to a standard of scientific legitimacy to maintain its relevancy in certain forums, I cannot take a perspectivist approach despite how much the content seems to demand it. Nonetheless, to seek to academicize Nietzsche – who became one of the youngest tenured professors in history at the age of twenty-four, was forced to retire on pension at the age of thirty-two due to ill health, and then was ostracized the remainder of his life by academic institutions for his 'eccentric' (un-scientific) work – is itself paradoxical, particularly in the light of his overt critique of academic limits to knowledge and those thinkers who depended on consensus with institutional powers or other larger publics. Still, it provides an intriguing challenge to attempt an academic analysis of the potential incompatibility of Nietzsche's thought with traditionally scholarly conventions of research and writing, in light of his assessment of much of what calls itself 'scientific' as being another personal bias disguised in a lab coat. Therefore while no single methodology will shape this paper, the different interpretive contexts (philosophical, historical etc.) will be looked at in their historical, cultural and theoretical contingencies and in terms of the methodological supports suggested by their respective disciplinary frameworks.

Paper Structure

The paper will be divided into three parts, each one taking on one aspect of art history in its relation to Nietzsche: history, art and art history as a synthetic unity. In the first chapter on history, we will look at the linked histories of historiography and the beginnings of an art history proper. We will begin by asking what we mean by history and how various uses of the term connote different things depending on disciplinary context, for example: history vs. historicism vs. historiography and social history vs. political history etc. We will particularly situate the professionalization of history occurring in 19th century Germany and its becoming the meta-discipline of European academia throughout the century. A myriad of intertwined and conflicting historiographical approaches will emerge from a discussion of this period of the popularization and legitimization of historical study, ranging from those of

Ranke to Burckhardt, with a particular focus on the latter's theological revelations which led him from a Christian worldview combined with an empirical ethic to a conception of myth as history. This combination of an affirmation of allegory, legend and myth and a rigorous attention to detail in historical sources becomes characteristic not only of Burckhardt, but of his two most adamant successors: Nietzsche and Warburg. We will here be able to compare what features are common and distinct amongst these understandings of history with their respective views of its potency, its proper manner of transmission and its relevancy for contemporary culture and knowledge. While these three thinkers are all united in some degree by the serious consideration they give to myth, we will see how their ventures into the annals of narrative, legend and mystical knowledge did not run equally deep. The degree to which each kept a distance from these almost esoteric insights will be shown in relation to their personal legacies, hence, the associations of madness in Nietzsche and Warburg as symptomatic of their unrestrained engagement in the mythical realities of ancestral and 'other' cultures. We will not dwell on that note too long, however, as Georges Didi-Huberman undertook this comparative analysis quite successfully in *L'image survivante* (2012), a book which we will allude to briefly. Of particular importance is the combinatory effort of these thinkers to introduce the 'Dionysian' into art historiographies, united in their repudiation of Winckelmann's view of antiquity as 'quietly contemplative and serene' (and so, as we will see, symptomatic of Apolline traits), a classical idealist view widely disseminated and upheld in 18th and 19th century Germany and beyond.

Lastly, we will look at their varying "*myth*istories" (Mali 2003) in terms of *Bildung,* a German term and widespread tradition that associates self-cultivation and learnedness with an immersive understanding of representational traditions in art and literature, and one that also highlights the tension between a drive to unleash one's individual (solitary/personal) potential tempered by a concern for communal health both culturally and intellectually, and hence, encourages certain social ideals that are to be replicated through education. This term/ideal provides a useful measuring device to compare historiographical approaches that touch on Nietzsche's borrowings from various German idealistic traditions, as well as his nurturing a counter-movement to them, revealing finally the *Bildung* framework as one so strongly rooted in German humanistic values that even those thinkers who did their best to

do away with its old constructions seemingly found it seeping back into their newly upheld value systems.

The second chapter looks at art as an umbrella term for issues relating to artistic identity, art in relation to other forms of expression and knowledge, art as object(s), art as experienced from the creator and the viewer, art's position in society in various historico-cultural-political contexts etc. Essentially, we will look at what art most concerned Nietzsche, recurring prominently in his larger body of work, and ask whether this meta-definition of art is accessible to or compatible with art history's more applied approach to works of art, artist biographies, artistic movements, periods, and stylistic trends etc. We will begin by situating Nietzsche's archetype of the artist in its myriad forms, each with its own historico-cultural precedent, culminating in the heterogeneous thinker/artist embodied by the duality of Christ and Dionysus. From here we will see what characterizes the tension between these seemingly opposing traditions, and with the help of Heidegger, be better able to situate why Nietzsche is not to be considered an 'aesthetician'. What, then, is the art of aesthetics vs. the history of art vs. a philosophy that puts art higher than reason? As an attempt to undertake this investigation, we will contrast Nietzsche's conception of art with that of the 'art/artworks' of art history and ask whether there are cross-sections between these varying definitions and approaches where we may identify common concerns. These could relate to, among other things, issues of form and content, creator/viewer, subject/object, stereotypes of the artist and artistic creation, art for art's sake etc.

The third chapter will treat art history in its consolidated form, in other words, as we tend to refer to it in the conventional sense as a discipline in university programs and curatorial institutions that suggests a diverse group of experts on various aspects related to the artist, artworks, periods of art creation, dissemination and criticism, and a history of these evolving trends. In recent ('post-modern') years, art history has also come to be known as an auto-critical discipline that is constantly re-examining its own paradigms of artistic analysis and the value systems inherent to these different approaches. As we find in the title of Donald Preziosi's anthological text of art historical criticism, *The Art of Art History* (2009), art history has begun to recognize its own *artistry* in constructing its interpretive positions, and does not merely hide behind an objective view that observes and evaluates. In this context, Nietzsche's in depth emphasis on the 'subjectivity' (everything *personal*,

desiring, coloured by individual experience) of the scholar seems not only relevant to existing art historical debates that have broached this issue, but is seemingly called upon by these evolving expectations of the discipline.

The range of subjects that can stem from these discussions of Nietzsche is extremely varied: issues of form, content and style (in the artist *and* the scholar), the identity of the artist and genius both as self-fabrication and popular conception, the inter-reliance of the art object, subject and act of interpretation, the problem of disciplinarity and specialization and their limitations on knowledge, the challenge of assessing or evaluating what is historically receded from the vantage point of the present, art's relationship to other ways of knowing, art as language/knowledge, etc. Even more largely, other concerns that art history has been for a long time confronting yet not deemed traditionally its domain are part of the discussions of Nietzsche's work in this context: the idealization of truth and proofs in academia and the inevitable bias of the scholar, problems of gender, race, and religion, and their ideological impact on the subject matter under study, creation and knowledge in and out of the institutions of the university and the museum, the question of a historical methodology, the thinker as artist and vice versa, issues of hierarchy in taste and valuation, and many other spheres of questioning that are essential to a self-conscientious discipline of art history. Taken in this context, Nietzsche's work becomes a very useful tool for art history to evaluate itself both from within and without its historically articulated boundaries. Beyond that, once we have evaluated his overt or implicit impact on and engagements with some of the most potent contributors to the discipline, it shall, we hope, become clear that the omission of a distinctive and comprehensive discussion of this impact thus far has been a profound oversight.

Art History as History

Does not every science come in the end to a kind of mythology?

Sigmund Freud to Albert Einstein (Mali 2003: 18).

Against positivism, which halts before phenomena – "There are only facts" – I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact "in itself": perhaps it is only folly to want to do such a thing.

"Everything is subjective," you say; but even this is interpretation. The "subject" is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is. – Finally, is it necessary to posit an interpreter behind the interpretation? Even this is invention, hypothesis.

In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable *otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. – "Perspectivism."*

It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm.

(WP #481: 267).

What is History?

There is no other way to define history than by broaching its self-referentiality: it denotes past events and documents of those events, while also referring to the various approaches used to understand that documented past. Essentially, it is history as we have come to know it generically: a past that we can not access directly but have evidence of, while also more broadly signifying historiography, a term for any number of methods of gleaning information from this near or distant past and the analysis of such methods. Increasingly, history has come to refer more to its own means of transmission and reception than to bids for its 'facthood'; this nearly conflates it with the definition of historiography as a "study of the way history has been and is written- the history of historical writing… When you study "historiography" you do not study the events of the past directly, but the changing interpretations of those events in the works of individual historians" (Furay and Salevouris 1988: 223). While a lot of historical practice is 'scientific' in the sense of actively pursuing new sources of information and re-evaluating existing interpretations of sources, it is also centered on inquiries into *how* and *why* to transmit this information of the past into the gateway of the present, inevitably raising questions about the *value* of historical study. Beginning with a brief reference to the earliest known historians of the Western European tradition, we will then see how history as a discipline has been ridden with this dual association since its professionalization in the 19th century in Europe, particularly in Germany. Right at the heart of this critical tension between the factual *knowability* of history and the *motivation* behind its research we find Burckhardt and Nietzsche, and not too far after, Warburg.

The Occidental history of history begins in Ancient Greece with Herodotus of Halicarnassus (c.484-425 BC) hailed by Cicero as the 'father of history'. His major work, *The Histories*, fought hard to distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources of historical narrative, while occasionally allowing for the role of a divine interpretation of events. He travelled extensively to garner a vast diversity of first-hand sources and is explicit about faithfully relating what others said in his "direct observation and research"; yet, he reminds the reader that these findings are from his "own eyes" and are being recounted as "the views [he] formed from them" (Herodotus 440 BC: 132). This historian

who spoke in the first tense and overlaid moral imperatives onto historical events, is unlike the majority of the historians who came after him, particularly so once Thucydides (c.431-355 BC) popularized a rationalistic interpretation of history based on eye-witness accounts that eliminated the possibility of divine causality or meaning.[1]

This 'secularization' of history continues in the Enlightenment with the influence of Voltaire (1694-1778) who shifted attention away from political or military (usually nationalistically motivated) histories to ones that looked at the "history of the arts, of commerce, of civilization – in a word, – of the human mind" (Nemeth 2008: 47). In Diderot's *Encyclopédie,* Voltaire writes: "One demands of modern historians more details, better ascertained facts, precise dates, more attention to customs, laws, mores, commerce, finance, agriculture, population" (Adler 2013: 77). Interestingly, the necessity for precision does not here conflict with an attention to the *mores* of peoples at different times, hence, to their beliefs, their forms of expression, their myths, their habits etc.

Professionalization of History

In the 19th century we see a furtherance of this concern for socio-cultural context in critical historical interpretation, such as with Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893) who analyzed literature in its contingency with *race, milieu* and *moment*. With the philosophy of Hegel in Germany (1770-1831), this shows itself as a sort of environmental determinism with the concept of *Zeitgeist,* or in his own words, *der Geist seiner Zeit* (the spirit of his time), in which each work of art or individual endeavour is revealed as a product of the 'time's spirit' in its inevitable particularity. The subject of history then becomes the evolution of this spirit's "consciousness" at different historical moments, suggesting a successive continuum of distinct but interdependent periods of time. We can not here go into the full complexity of this aspect of Hegel's thought in relation to its interpretive tradition as dialectical progression (thesis/antithesis/synthesis), an interpretation that is nonetheless debated (for instance, in Walter Kaufmann's *Hegel: A Reinterpretation,* 1978), but it is important to note

[1] Nietzsche had taught courses on Thucydides, knowing and liking his work well, and calling him the "perfect expression of "*realist culture*"" (Brobjer 2007: 170), which will be discussed more in the second chapter; despite Nietzsche's identification with philosophy, he preferred the realist empiricism of the historians to the idealist philosophers, the latter who began with the idea, then moved to the particular.

[2] "For Hegel the climax and final goal of the world process coincided with his own existence in Berlin (...) In

that there is a sense in Hegel's thought that certain conditions are more favourable for creating something of absolute value, a value that reaches beyond its own historically articulated boundaries. This school of thinking gets aligned with 'historicism' whereby a historical event, monument or document is identified with its 'locality' so that its meaning is *extracted from* and *explainable by* its sets of conditions. It also sets the stage for his positing the [or his] current moment – with its potentiality for the philosophical refinement of previously dogmatic concepts – as *the* enlightened age, and hence, the endpoint of a historical timeline of progressive improvement.[2]

In contrast to this deterministic outlook is the empiricist approach of Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), known to be one of the originators of the professionalization of a scientific history in his post at the University of Göttingen. His source-based historiography did not extrapolate teleological or metaphysical value from chosen sources (like literature), but rather assigned value to the diversity of sources itself, including civil documents and other archival information that had often been dismissed as banal or irrelevant. This is sometimes called 'historism' (or *Historismus* in the German tradition) whereby historical change has no final meaning, but is rather to be understood in terms of the current circumstances of different times, and not to be judged by contemporary standards which label one period as superior to the other. Karl Popper (1902-1994) later criticized both positions, the first (historicist) for seeking laws and absolute rules which 'explain' various historical moments, the other (historist) for not distinguishing between the merit of different subjects of historical study, and both for looking at history either teleologically (with a prediction of its future based on the past) or with a hindsight bias that assigns logical 'sense' to a past where there is/was none, or on the other hand, for treating historical variation with a kind of relativism (each moment is different hence incomparable).[3]

[2] "For Hegel the climax and final goal of the world process coincided with his own existence in Berlin (...) In fact, he should have said that all things to come after him would essentially be nothing more than a musical coda to the world history's rondo, indeed that they were to be regarded as superfluous. He did not say this, instead he has instilled in the (...) generations after him, made sour by his philosophy, an admiration for the 'power of history' which in effect turns (...) into an unconcealed admiration of success and to the worship of reality, of the way things are" (*Untimely Meditations* cited by Annette Wittkau-Horgby in Koslowski 2005: 68).

[3] See: *The Poverty of Historicism* (1944) and *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945).

Despite various claims to the *correct* manner of approaching history, there is no doubt that 19th century Germany was the dawn of history as *the* European meta-discipline[4]:

> … history became *the* science above all others. Everything was treated historically, and history and classical philology achieved enormous status and became primary in education and at schools. History was for the first time placed above philosophy. The historical bent had its focus and major developments in Germany (Brobjer 2007: 156).

The history we are discussing is grounded in this context, not in a polarized relationship to any of these positions, but ingrained with its complexities and nuances. Nietzsche, who is generally known for his outspoken criticism of this historiographical boom in the essay "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life" (1874) from *Untimely Meditations,* was nonetheless hired as a professor of philology (no doubt for his exceptional abilities in this domain, given his young age), a discipline based on the close reading and interpretation of sources, and had also recognized the historical achievements of his contemporaries. In a note from the summer of 1885, he praises "the German scholars by whom the sense of 'history' was discovered" and in *Human All Too Human* (1878), he claims that "a lack of historical sensibility is the original failing of all philosophers," suggesting his contemporaries had a more refined historical sense than earlier idealist philosophers (Kant and Leibniz, among others), and were less prone to 'mummifying' the past by rendering it abstract or generalized "*sub specie aeterni,"* – thus, *dehistoricized* (cited from Brobjer 2007: 160). He even equated philosophical practice with a form of historical study: "Philosophy, the way I alone regard it, as the most general form of history, as an attempt to somehow describe and abbreviate in symbols the Heraclitian becoming" (2007: 160). Nonetheless, the desire to evade abstract philosophical notions by contextualizing texts and ideas in their socio-historical specificity was still tempered in Nietzsche by a desire for history to be *relevant* for current reflection and cultural productivity, rather than be "the *goal* of culture" itself (2007: 15).

[4] It is important to note that most accounts of 19th century historiography in Europe, particularly Germany, focus on the events and aftermath of the French Revolution as the main catalyst for this invigoration of historical study, as peoples across Europe sought to make sense of what happened and under what conditions, looking critically to determine causal and structural factors in relation to the events, and not merely chronicling them. Due to the limited space to discuss this period of historiographical development, however, I can only allude to this context here (see Mali 2003, for one example).

We find the beginning of this critique of history as an *absolute* value in Burckhardt (1818 -1897) who claimed about his own method: "our theme is not so much the study of history as the study of the historical" (West 2007: 29). He was the first to be recognized as creating a historiography that focused primarily on culture, yet that also looked at different historical moments in their *totality* based on details of their works of art, their social conditions, their political and economic circumstances, their festivals and traditions etc. In 1835-38, the Swiss Burckhardt was a young theology student at the University of Basel under the tutelage of Wilhelm De Wette, when "modern theology was rocked by the most turbulent controversy of the century," the publication of David Strauss' 1835-6 book, *Das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet* (*The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined)*, in which Jesus is presented 'stripped of myth', so essentially, mortal (Mali 2003: 15). Strauss had aimed "to show not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact," and yet suggested that Christianity remained important as a *moral* faith which helped encourage emulation of an 'ideal Christ' (2003: 15). This interestingly had a twofold impact on Burckhardt: the breaking of the unconscious spell of Christian dogma and the ensuing respect for the importance of myth, the latter a departure from Strauss' conclusion.[5] When he writes, "bit by bit I am acquiring really mythical eyes, perhaps they are those of an old man approaching childhood?," we see how in Burckhardt, erudition shares common ground with a kind of innocence (2003: 91).

The transition from the Gospels to myth was not an easy one: "for the moment I cannot look the ruins of my convictions in the face," he writes in 1838 before leaving the vocation of theology two years later for that of history, and eventually art history (2003: 92). Ranke was his professor of history at the University of Berlin before Burckhardt had left to

[5] Many considered Strauss a heretic but he was still appointed chair of theology in Zurich, which caused a major uprising, the *Straussenputsch,* leading to the collapse of the liberal government in 1839 (2003: 92). Despite the impact on Burckhardt, he did not abide by Strauss' perspective, which he saw as an over-simplifying and vulgar liberal 'realism'. The young Nietzsche had also read it as a student of theology during his last year at secondary school in Schulpforta and "it led to his rejection of the Christian faith and his refusal, at Easter 1865, to take Communion" (J.P. Stern's Introduction to *David Strauss, the confessor and the writer*, UM: xiv). Still, he vehemently criticized the work for its bourgeois, philistine and scholarly sensibilities (UM: xiv). Stern argues that his tirade against the author was in part a fulfillment of a personal agenda on Wagner's behalf (who was engaged in a public polemic with him at the time); Nietzsche used a tone so harshly critical that he almost immediately regretted it upon hearing of Strauss' death (UM: xiv).

pursue cultural history and found himself somewhere midway between his theological roots and his empiricist training. He found he was now able to un-hypocritically embrace Jesus Christ as being composed of both the historical Jesus and the mythical Christ (2003: 92). Mali writes: "Burckhardt lost his faith in the historical validity of the events but discovered the historical validity of their impressions and images. This history of images, he then came to see, is the true history, that which exists even above and beyond the history of the events" (2003: 94-5). He studied art history at the University of Bonn in 1841, before becoming a professor at the University of Basel in 1843 until his retirement in 1893 (with a short three-year stint at ETH Zurich), teaching art history exclusively as of 1886.

Burckhardt, in contrast to his teacher Ranke, did not teach history as a *"*science of history, *Geschichtswissenschaft*, in all its *gigantische Grösse"* (monumentality), in which only 'factual' information about events was considered valid, and myth and legend were deemed unreliable sources unless revealing of the 'subjectivity' of their perpetuators. Burckhardt was not so much concerned with the 'proof' of a source, but rather "under what historical and psychological conditions certain modes of comprehension were necessarily created, what higher metaphysical truths they served, and ultimately, why they still persisted in our collective imagination" (2003: 94-5).[6] This guides us towards an understanding of what Burckhardt meant by the 'historical', aided by William N. West's definition of it in "Jacob Burckhardt's Untimely Observations": ""History" here suggests an object or narrative that could be grasped; "the *historical,*" in contrast, suggests a qualitative field that must be traversed or surveyed and thus that is also shaped by this interaction" (2007: 29). What Burckhardt did retain from Ranke was a direct engagement with sources, rather than a borrowing of other historians' interpretations, much to the chagrin of the "*viri eruditissimi* in their professional chairs" whose training and knowledge of ancient Greek sources far surpassed his own, and he quipped, perhaps even that of the Greeks themselves (Mali 2003: 124).

The growing tendency in the social sciences and humanities (particularly its meta-discipline history) to seek to eradicate the weeds of dogma and belief, legend and narrative,

[6] This approach is not without precedent in the ancient world, but is in fact grounded in it. One of the earliest historians of the Roman Empire, Tacitus (c. AD 56 – after 117), used ancient hymns to understand the past of the Romans, as they are the "only style of record or history that they possess" (Mali 2003: 97).

and plant only fresh seeds of certainty and demonstrative proofs was to Burckhardt a vulgarization of knowledge and experience, despite his own loss of faith. Mali explains that, "he saw nothing valuable in liberalism that consisted in secular humanism and other modern doctrines that destroyed all metaphysical commitments and duties and, moreover, encouraged men to pursue only their physical desires and interests" (2003: 103). This places Burckhardt in an interesting position of uniting historical dichotomies prevalent in his own epoch: he doesn't abide by teleological or backward-looking inferences that demand a firm causality or a metaphysical 'making sense' of origins, but prefers to look at a myriad of details about the organization and behaviour of a given society as a whole and in its intricate specificity. Yet because he posits culture as the defining characteristic of a society, myth, folk narrative and artistic expressions are given such a decisive role as historical sources, that they in turn become 'events' regardless of their calculable *verifiability*.

Burckhardt and Nietzsche: Untimely Historians

The relationship between Burckhardt and Nietzsche is usually defined as a mentorship, with Burckhardt reluctantly allowing a young Nietzsche his eager discipleship. While this was in no doubt true to an extent, lasting until the end of Nietzsche's sanity in 1889, it obscures the beginnings of their interactions (West 2007: 40-41). When Nietzsche gained his professorship in 1869 at the University of Basel, where Burckhardt (then fifty-one) was teaching history and was "already famous for his *Cicerone* (1855) and *Culture of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860)," Burckhardt took interest in the young scholar and attended his inaugural lecture on Homer (Pletsch 1991: 114). He was impressed with Nietzsche's readings of Greek civilization and continued to attend his lectures, and in turn Nietzsche began to attend his on *The Great Men of History* (1870), also vividly impacted by what he heard.[7] Their first mentions of each other in their correspondences date to 1870 when they

[7] Nietzsche writes of his experience attending a first lecture of Burckhardt's to his friend von Geersdorff in November 1870: "Yesterday evening I had the pleasure which I would have liked you above all people to have shared, of hearing Jacob Burckhardt lecture. He gave a lecture without notes on Historical Greatness which lay entirely within the orbit of our thoughts and feelings. This very unusual middle-aged man does not, indeed, tend to falsify the truth, but to conceal it … I am attending his weekly lectures at the University on the study of history, and believe I am the only one of his sixty hearers who understands his profound train of thought with all its strange circumlocutions and abrupt breaks wherever the subject fringes on the problematical" (cited in Mali 2003: 116).

both enthusiastically praise the insights of one another to their friends, and boast of their mutual interest in the work of Arthur Schopenhauer (Burckhardt called him "our philosopher" in his correspondence with Nietzsche (Mali 2003: 11). It is noted that Nietzsche's lectures inspired Burckhardt to begin lecturing on Greek civilization in 1872 (until 1885), leading to the unfinished magnum opus, *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* (*Greek Cultural History*), begun the same year Nietzsche published his first book (BT), which according to Nietzsche, had really resonated with his older colleague (2003: 11). In his later work, *Twilight of the Idols*, written in 1889, the year of his mental breakdown, Nietzsche demonstrates that his esteem for Burckhardt had not lessened with the maturation of his philosophy despite his long-maintained disdain for the German education system. In a chapter in which he criticizes university scholarship called "What Germans Lack," he laments "the *despiritualizing* influence of [our] contemporary scientific pursuits" but provides Burckhardt as "the rarest of exceptions" to this deflating scene, calling him the "profoundest student of Greek civilization now living" (TI: 73, 75).

Interestingly, philologist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf criticized both thinkers for being "unwissenschaftlich" (unscientific) on separate occasions, twenty-seven years apart: Nietzsche, after the release of *Birth of Tragedy*, and Burckhardt, after the posthumous publication of *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* (c.1900). The reception of these texts in the historiographical community at the time of their respective publications was largely negative, more obvious in the case of Nietzsche who was ostracized by the university community for the majority of his lifetime, but less expected in the case of Burckhardt, who continued teaching until soon before his death. As we will see in the next section, inasmuch as Wilamowitz' accusation assumes their approach was neglectful, incidental and unconscious, it is almost amusing when viewed in the context of their shared outspoken critique of reducing history to scientific reasoning. Still, German historiography eventually came to revere these thinkers, nearly as much or more as their rationalist counterparts, a turn that largely stemmed from a 1947 lecture "Ranke and Burckhardt" at the German Academy of Science in Berlin given by Friedrich Meinecke (1862–1954). Meinecke asked "whether, in the end, Burckhardt [would] not have greater importance than Ranke for us as well as for later historians," the latter focusing on "great events," and the former, "in contrast, concentrated on the personal subjects of history, on what Meinecke (echoing Nietzsche)

called “the human-all-too-human – in history”” (Mali 2003: 131). After the disillusionment of the Second World War (despite Meinecke’s being openly anti-Semitic), this lecture reflected a growing realization that a “cultural renaissance” may be more urgent for the health of a nation than “political restoration” in the attempt to understand one’s own time and those historical events that may be on the horizon in a future one (2003: 130). Given this overlapping history of reception, we will now look at where Nietzsche and Burckhardt’s views of history met and informed one another’s, and eventually diverged, before looking at how Warburg picked up on and made use of this shared legacy in a new way, particularly of relevance for art history.

Culture as the 'End' of/for History

It is perhaps inaccurate to try and remove any teleological framework from the historical philosophies of Burckhardt and Nietzsche as both emphatically returned to the necessity of the humanistic sciences to serve culture as its end. They were not rigidly explicit in how the health of a culture could be brought about, though they offered a lot of reflection to this regard. Referring to the Renaissance (particularly, 15th century Italy), Burckhardt sees a model for other societies where political philosophy has taken on too much importance: “the good state ought to be formed and governed by culture, not the other way around” (Mali 2003: 104). Nietzsche also suggests that culture is the “main thing” and can never serve the state, nor will the two ever thrive together:

> Culture and the state – one should not deceive oneself over this – are antagonists: the ‘cultural state’ is merely a modern idea. The one lives off the other, the one thrives at the expense of the other. All great cultural epochs are epochs of political decline: that which is great in the cultural sense has been unpolitical, even *anti-political*… In the history of European culture, the rise of the ‘Reich’ signifies one thing above all: *a displacement of the centre of gravity.* The essential thing has gone out of the entire system of higher education in Germany: the *end* as well as the *means* to the end. That education, *culture*, itself is the end – and not ‘the Reich’ – that *educators* are required for the attainment of this end – and *not* grammar-school teachers and university scholars – that too has been forgotten… (TI: 74).

The Greeks provide the exception, because they did not forfeit their myths and cultural richness to their advancements in science, law, politics etc. In *The Greeks and Greek Civilization*, Burckhardt writes: “Here then, was a nation which vigorously defended its myth as the ideal basis of its existence, and tried at all costs to make connections between that myth and practical life” (cited in Mali 2003: 127). It is important to note that his tone

was not unanimously positive in this respect, for he saw a tendency for romanticism in the Greeks where others perceived classicism, in that the Greeks were not concerned with their recent history, but rather with their self-representation mythologically.[8] Still, he makes it clear that he admired this vision of life.

This insistence on strengthening myth is not to be confused with a self-deluding belief system that obscures rather than enlightens; in fact, Burckhardt had believed the ancient Greek and Roman world was essentially secular, but that the Greeks "concealed it under beautiful images and tales and thereby made it both memorable and bearable" (2003: 127). Christians and Romans, on the other hand, had disguised the tragic under the pretence of "immortality and [a] world to come" while "Homer had not sweetened and humanized the conception" (Burckhardt in Mali: 127). The Greeks supported the endurance of myth as an "original image of reality that could not be fully analyzed, allegorized, or rationalized into 'higher' truths, as was the case, for example, in Christianity" (2003: 125). This allowed for a literary completeness of their age that survived the decay of their institutions, with their expressions of human experience having permeated historical boundaries, so that even now "we see with their eyes and use their phrases when we speak" (2003: 128). For Burckhardt, it was because of the Ancient Greeks that the Western tradition or 'historical evolution' was possible, as they secured "through the survival of their culture, continuity in the development of the world; for it is only through the Greeks that different epochs, and our interest in them, are linked and strung together. Without them, we would have no knowledge of early times, and what we *might* know without them, we would feel no desire to know" (Mali 2003: 128). The sustainably circular transmission of myth allows for a continuity that transcends 'periods of time' and historical circumstances, uniting diverse contexts around shared symbolic references.

[8] Nietzsche was similarly critical of Romanticism in certain historiographical contexts (namely German idealism, like that associated with Hegel) and praised some contemporary historians and philosophers for their 'classical' tendencies: "The best that Germany has given – critical discipline – Kant, F.A. Wolf, Lessing, Niebuhr etc. The defense of skepticism. – Stronger and more determined courage, the confidence of the hand which moves the knife, pleasure in saying no and analyzing. The opposite movement: Romanticism" (from summer 1885) (in Brobjer 2007: 169).

"*Mythistory*"[9]

Nietzsche was the foremost critic of a lack of myth in modern culture:

> Without myth every culture loses the healthy natural power of its creativity: only a horizon defined by myths completes and unifies a whole cultural movement … The images of myth have to be the unnoticed omnipresent demonic guardians, under whose care the young soul grows to maturity and whose signs help the man to interpret his life and struggles. Even the state knows no more powerful unwritten laws than the mythical foundations that guarantee its connection with religion and its growth from mythical notions (BT: 135).

Directly connected to this lack of myth was the insatiable appetite for facts about the past, a (particularly German) hunger for searching the archives for truths and proofs:

> And here stands man, stripped of myth, eternally starving, surrounded by every past there has ever been, digging and scrambling for roots, even if he must dig in the most remote antiquities. The tremendous historical need of our unsatisfied modern culture, the accumulation of countless other cultures, the consuming desire for knowledge – what does all this point to, if not the loss of myth, the loss of the mythical home, the mythical maternal womb? (from BT*,* cited in Mali 2003: 15).

A historical philosophy that adheres to a linear structure of events as 'explainable' given their place in a successive periodization operates from the assumption (or as Nietzsche would call it, a 'belief') of a chronology, literally a making-logical of time (the original meaning of *logos* in Greek also denotes a story or account which made its sense more flexible than modernized interpretations of it as scientific). Burckhardt is explicit in distinguishing himself from the teleological and progressive view of history espoused by Hegel and those "philosophers of history who regard the past as a contrast to and preliminary stage of our own time as the full development. We shall study the *recurrent, constant, and typical* as echoing in us and intelligible through us" (Mali 2003: 101). Myth, in some sense, is not temporally defined by fixed boundaries of origin or destination and 'end'; it sees rather what is past in the present, and as such, resembles a synchronous (simultaneous, repeating), rather than, diachronic (successive, progressing) view of time.

The Critique of Causality

In Burckhardt's *The Culture of the Renaissance in Italy,* he situates the Renaissance as a period that had no direct historical, political or artistic precedent that explained its

[9] This title is taken from Joseph Mali's book (2003), which is cited throughout the chapter.

occurrence- it was essentially *acausal* (Mali 2003: 30): "The origin or, better, the point of departure, for Burckhardt's history of the Renaissance, is thus the ahistoricity of the Renaissance within the historical system as a whole" (2003: 31). In his posthumously published introduction to historical study, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen: Über geschichtliches Studium* (vol. 4 of *Gesammelte Werke* 1910) he writes: "We can dispense with theories of origins, and no one can expect from us a theory of the end… the study of any other branch of knowledge may begin with origins, but not that of history" (in 2003: 31). Similarly, Nietzsche praised Burckhardt as the only historian who could "survey things and events without being humbugged by the stupid theories of [progress]" (2003: 117) and was himself explicitly critical of "that rule of chance and accident that has hitherto been called 'History'," a causal inference that assumed that a latter event could be justified, explained by or reduced to a prior occurrence:

> One ought not to make 'cause' and 'effect' *into material things,* as natural scientists do (and those who, like them, naturalize in their thinking), in accordance with the prevailing mechanistic stupidity which has the cause press and push until it 'produces an effect'; one ought to employ 'cause' and 'effect' only as pure *concepts* that is to say as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation, mutual understanding, *not* explanation. In the 'in itself' there is nothing of 'causal connection', of 'necessity', of 'psychological unfreedom'; there 'the effect' *does not* follow the cause, there no 'law' rules. It is *we* alone who have fabricated causes, succession, reciprocity, relativity, compulsion, number, law, freedom, motive, purpose; and when we falsely introduce this world of symbols into things and mingle it with them as though this symbol-world were an 'it itself', we once more behave as we have always behaved, namely *mythologically* (BGE: 51).

We see here mythology at work not only in legend, oral culture, superstition and other forms of narrative, but as operational in the scientific history that bases itself on the idea of a stabilized past and present, as if one could exist independently of (or conversely, as entirely interdependent with) the other, and hence provide a basis of mutual explanation. Burckhardt was distancing himself from the newly fashionable inductive fields of the social sciences including biology, psychology, and sociology by referring to art works in the place of empirical data as historically informative: "history finds in poetry not only one of its most important, but also one of its purest and finest sources" (Mali 2003: 100-1). In a letter to Karl Fresenius dated June 9, 1842, he writes:

> A man like me, who is altogether incapable of speculation, and who does not apply himself to abstract thought for a single minute in the whole year, does best to try and clarify the most important questions of his life and studies in the way that comes naturally to him. My surrogate is contemplation [*Anschauung*], daily clearer and directed more and more upon essentials. I would not believe me how, little by little, as a result of this possibly one-sided effort, the *facta* of history, works of art, the monuments of all ages gradually acquire significance as witnesses to a past stage in the development of the spirit. Believe me, when I see the present lying quite clearly

> in the past, I feel moved by a shudder of profound respect … This is where I stand on the shore of the world – stretching out my arms towards the *fons* and *origo* of all things, and that is why history to me is sheer poetry, that can be mastered through contemplation. You philosophers go further, your system penetrates into the depths of the secrets of the world, and to you history is a source of knowledge, a science, because you see, or think you see, the *primum agens* where I only see mystery and poetry (2003: 99).

Burckhardt describes a fable from Sienna as an "old story – one of those which are true and not true, everywhere and nowhere," and "that could happen and be true anywhere" (2003: 101-2). This is not to be confused with a historical relativism that sees no difference between various socio-cultural climates; rather the history at work in legend or poetry is 'doubly instructive' to that found in the archives, insofar as "*Historia scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum…*" (Quintillian's *De Institutione Oratoria,* Book X, Chapter I: 31, c. 95 AD, in Mali 2003: 123); Burckhardt continues:

> One great advantage of studying cultural history is the certainty of the more important facts compared with those of history in the ordinary sense of narrated events – these are frequently uncertain, controversial, coloured, or, given the Greek talent for lying, entirely the invention of imagination or of self-interest. Cultural history by contrast possesses a primary degree of certainty, as it consists for the most part of *material conveyed in an unintentional, disinterested or even involuntary way by sources and monuments*; they betray their secrets unconsciously and even, paradoxically*, through fictitious elaborations, quite apart from the material details they may set out to record and glorify, and are thus doubly instructive for the cultural historian* (my italics). (*The Greeks and Greek Civilization,* in Mali 2003: 123).

The cultural historian also values his or her sources, but not based on their 'objectivity'; we hear here an *avant-la-lettre* valorization of unconscious behaviours and attitudes as the most informative sources to understanding a person, event or movement, prior to Freud's presenting this argumentation in psychoanalysis. Felix Gilbert explains that "the cultural historian does not want to learn from his sources the 'facts' of the past; … It does not matter, therefore, whether they are factually correct, whether they lie or indulge in exaggeration or inventions. Even misleading statements may tell us something about the mind of a former age" (from *Histories* (1989), cited in Mali 2003: 112). Burckhardt writes: "Desires and assumptions are, then, as important as events, the attitude is as important as anything done… But even where a reported act did not really occur, or not in the way it is said to have occurred, the attitude [that] assumes it to have occurred, and in that manner, retains its value by virtue of the typicality of the statement" (2003: 112). Similarly, Nietzsche questioned the value of facts as the unique inspiration for historical knowledge, likely referring directly to Ranke: "*Facta! Yes, Facta facta!* – A historian has to do, not with what actually happened, but only with events supposed to have happened: for only the latter

have *produced an effect*. Likewise only with supposed heroes… All historians speak of things which have never existed except in imagination" (in Brobjer 2007: 172). These statements point to a "*historia altera*" to the one that fetishizes the 'exact', as was the dominant tendency in nineteenth century European historical scholarship (Mali 2003: 127).

Historical Anachronism or the Ahistorical…

It is this *other* history that Nietzsche devotes himself to in *Untimely Meditations,* in which he asks the reader to meditate on whether "the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture" (UM: 63).[10] The unhistorical is inevitable for Nietzsche in that all history stems from the current desire, drive and perspective of the historian, a fact which his fellow historians are eager to ignore: "These historical men believe that the meaning of existence will come more and more to light in the course of its *process*, and they glance behind them only so that, from the process so far, they can learn to understand the present and to desire the future more vehemently; they have no idea that, despite their preoccupation with history, they in fact think and act unhistorically, or that their occupation with history stands in the service, not of pure knowledge, but of life" (UM: 65). The personal bias of the historian is not to Nietzsche a projection to avoid or correct, he rather affirms it by drawing attention to it.

In line with his theory of perspectivism, whereby an object is viewable from many perspectives at once so that its 'reality' changes depending on the various perspectives that apprehend and engage it - not merely appearing different but *being* so, object and subject now collapsed into a single encounter -, Nietzsche suggests that history can not be unearthed in its objectivity, even if it were desirable. For those who *contributed* to history were not reduced to the descriptions and explanations historians would one day come to adduce to their actions; habitually, 'history-makers' were *not reflective* of the norms and customs of their respective cultures. Being inconsistent with the status quo of their historical context,

[10] In *On the Use and Abuse of Ancient Greece for Life* (2003), Glenn Most suggests that Nietzsche likely came across this title through Burckhardt's *The Culture of the Renaissance in Italy*, a book which he repeatedly praised in the *Untimely* essay, and in which Burckhardt deals extensively with Leon Battista Alberti, who in 1428 published the treatise *De commodis litterarum atque incommodis,* translated as *on the advantages and disadvantages of literature*.

their actions then became viewed as 'deeds', normalized through the perpetuation of legacies. History is not a passive looking back, but an *act* of perception and interpretation that can not be neutralized or 'de-subjectified':

> *If you are to venture to interpret the past you can do so only out of the fullest exertion of the vigour of the present:* only when you put forth your noblest qualities in all their strength will you divine what is worth knowing and preserving in the past. Like to like! Otherwise you will draw the past down to you. Do not believe historiography that does not spring from the head of the rarest minds; (…) To sum up: history is written by the experienced and superior man. He who has not experienced greater and more exalted things than others will not know how to interpret the great and exalted things of the past. When the past speaks it always speaks as an oracle: only if you are an architect of the future and know the present will you understand it (UM: 94).

Nietzsche doesn't merely see in his contemporaries' minds doomed to be common, but something like a cultural symptom that oppresses the mind by confining it to an indentured servitude to knowledge. What emerges from this is a distrust of one's senses, curiosity and impulses; one "no longer dares to trust himself but involuntarily asks of history 'How ought I to feel about this?'" (UM: 86), foregoing the potential to contribute to a living history in a self-affirming way. Herein lies the contrast between Burckhardt and Nietzsche as to the question of history's value for life and for the individual: while university education to some degree presupposes the need for institutional consensus or legitimacy (whether with regards to form, style or content appropriateness), learning in its simplest sense for Nietzsche doesn't need to be driven by a *given* aim or structural support, but is rather a function of the curiosity which allows it to materialize.

The Absolute Value of History for Contemporary Society

Burckhardt had said of history that "only the study of the past can provide us with a standard by which to measure the rapidity and strength of the peculiar movement in which we live," which suggests an almost moral imperative to govern one's current actions according to an understanding of that which came before (Mali 2003: 117). In the following quotation, we see what is common in the historiographical perspectives of Nietzsche and Burckhardt, and where they finally diverge. The first sentence points to the need to value history based on its life-affirming qualities through a vital engagement with it in the present and the second sentence shifts the inquiry to the question of history's 'absolute value':

> Insofar as it stands in the service of life, history stands in the service of an unhistorical power, and thus subordinate, it can and should never become a pure science such as, for instance,

> mathematics is. The question of the degree to which life requires the service of history at all, however, is one of the supreme questions and concerns in regard to the health of a man, a people or a culture. For when it attains a certain degree of excess, life crumbles and degenerates, and through this degeneration history itself finally degenerates too (UM: 67).

For Nietzsche, the study of the past is valuable insofar as it is a tool for creative productivity, but not when used as a model to be emulated and revered in *itself*. This juncture brings us directly into confrontation with the brand of classicism that had been predominant in Germany for nearly a century: the one affiliated with Johann Joachim Winckelmann who precisely argued in *Reflections on the Imitation of Greeks Works in Painting and Sculpture* that "the only way for us to become great or, if this is possible, inimitable, is to imitate the ancients" (Preziosi 2009: 27). This phrase is itself paradoxical as it suggests that the highest greatness is inimitable, while simultaneously asserting that the only way to achieve greatness is through imitation of it, which has already been declared an impossible feature of greatness. Nietzsche characterizes this as the attitude of the *monumental* historian when he lists the three kinds of historiographical approaches or "species" he sees driving the historiographies of his time (the other two being the *antiquarian*, and the *critical*), particularly in the academic departments of philology, history, and philosophy (UM: 67). While we cannot here elaborate on the particular qualities and examples he gives for each of these historiographical 'species', we can touch on his critique of the monumentalist approach in the case of Winckelmann. He suggests that monumental historians make an enemy of what is current and so go against:

> … the strong artistic spirits, that is to say [against] those who alone are capable of learning from that history in a true, that is to say life-enhancing sense, and of transforming what they have learned into a more elevated practice. Their path will be barred, their air darkened, if a half-understood monument to some great era of the past is erected as an idol and zealously danced around, as though to say: 'Behold, this is true art: pay no heed to those who are evolving and want something new!' This dancing mob appears to possess even the privilege of determining what is 'good taste', for the creative man has always been at a disadvantage compared with those who have only looked on and taken no part themselves (…) (UM: 71).

This is antithetical to the historicist argument that a person is formed by their historical circumstances and thus limited by the potential of their 'period', echoing Darwin's theory of the adaptability of species to environmental conditions as the basis for evolutionary change, which Nietzsche also sought to disprove. Winckelmann had suggested a form of environmental determinism when he posited climate, custom, geography and ritual as

explanations for the flourishing culture of ancient Greece, the one necessarily growing out of the other. Burckhardt critiqued this glorification of *conditions*:

> By an optical illusion, we see happiness at certain times, in certain countries, and we paint it with analogies from the youth of man, spring, sunrise, and other pictures. Indeed, we imagine it dwelling in a beautiful part of the country, a certain house, just as the smoke rising from a distant cottage in the evening gives us the impression of intimacy among those living there… (cited in West 2007: 47).

Nietzsche cannot abide by this reduction of cultural achievement to the favourability of the individual's circumstances inasmuch as many of the figures who are later deemed 'historical greats' were not only not reflective of the customs and society of their current times, but were often even in conflict with (or victims of) them. The death of Socrates provides a vivid example when the Athenian government put him on trial in 399 BC for impiety and 'corrupting the youth', namely for having introduced new gods and failing to acknowledge those of the city. The philosophy that was later seen to have given shape to Western rationalism with the writings of Plato was by no means in harmony with its existing social codes and habits, and was either to land Socrates into a life in exile, or as he chose it, death (see Plato's account of Socrates' defence speech and trial in *The Apology*). This is just one example of a historical figure whose long-term significance rides on what he or she did *in spite of* historical circumstances, and not as a product of them.

It is important to note, however, that some have shown the influence of Winckelmann on Nietzsche with respect to how certain factors like climate, geography and culture can be more or less conducive to acts of creation, intellection and forms of existence (for one example, Harloe 2013). Winckelmann and Nietzsche both refer to the particular combination of circumstances that allowed for the unique manifestation that was ancient Greece (climate, political etc.), though their interpretations of what constitutes the high point of Greek civilization differ. Nietzsche sees Platonism as spurring a decline in art and thought, while Winckelmann views it as the peak of cultural and intellectual achievement. What Nietzsche retained most explicitly from Winckelmann's historicist tendency was revealed in his personal writings: he frequently discussed how he travelled to different geographic areas and climates depending on the seasons and was attentive to different diets to the degree to which each improved or worsened his health conditions and resultant mental/creative capacities:

> Most closely related to the question of nutriment is the question of *place* and *climate.* No one is free to live anywhere; and he who has great tasks to fulfil which challenge his entire strength has indeed in this matter a very narrow range of choice. The influence of climate on the metabolism,

> its slowing down, its spending up, extends so far that a blunder in regard to place and climate can not only estrange anyone from his task but withhold it from him altogether: he never catches sight of it (EH: 24).

Still, for Nietzsche *mimesis* was not the correct use or goal of the study of history nor was 'greatness' something imitable or bound by social consensus and convention. On this last issue, Nietzsche was critical of Burckhardt, for in not publicly declaring his loss of Christian faith and revealing how radical his reflections in fact were, he was aligning himself with the dominant social codes of the education system and the public of which he was a part (Mali 2003: 127). This sense of discretion, however, reversely expressed itself in Burckhardt's reported distaste for the "publicity stunt" Nietzsche had become as a result of his views being increasingly counter-current to dominant sensibilities throughout his career (2003: 120).

'Bildung' in Burckhardt, Nietzsche and Warburg

It is necessary here to bring up Aby Warburg, an outspoken 'student' of Burckhardt and Nietzsche, and arguably the most potent bridge between their relationship and the domain of art history. Aby Warburg (1866-1929) is perhaps best described as a 'thinker of images', whose work has more often been referred to by himself and by his followers as an 'anthropology of the image' than characteristic of the domain of 'traditional art history' (Careri 2003: 44). Despite the *a posteriori* title of art historian attributed to him after his recent surge of popularity in university curriculums and research, and his being credited with the creation of the iconographical method so important to art history, his work as well as that at the Warburg Institute he established (which moved from Hamburg to London in 1933 for safety due to the war) reveals that his ideas are located somewhere at the cross-section of anthropology, art history, aesthetics, history of the sciences, literature and the genealogies of other cultural practices, like astrology, etc. (2003: 41). Kurt W. Forster describes how between Warburg's lifetime and the past three to four decades, he "occupied only a modest place in the annals of art history" and "stood somewhat aloof from a discipline preoccupied with professional reputation and methodological stringency" (Warburg 1999: 1). Warburg's intricately detailed way of looking at the transmission of visual forms of pathos (*Pathosformeln*) and their endurance across vast historical and spatial change (*Nachleben*)

was for the greater part of the 20th century usurped and overshadowed by the "iconographic method [which] stressed inherent system and total decodability," the approach popular of his successors, like Erwin Panofsky, who were often seen as "the true representatives and perfecters of Warburg's ideas" (1999: 2). While we will continue to return to Warburg's work in greater detail throughout the paper, we will only briefly introduce him here to situate his historiographical relation to Burckhardt and Nietzsche.

As we saw with Nietzsche and Burckhardt, Warburg looked at history as recurring and to some degree, ever-contemporaneous, aligning these three thinkers with a cultural history that is less a systematic *Wissenschaft* (science) than *Bildung*: "literally … a configuration or realization of images in life and history" (Mali 2003: 102). *Bildung* comes from the root word *Bilder* (images/pictures), with etymological roots that connote both the appearance of an individual (from *Gestalt*, Latin *forma*), and the ability to give form (*Gestaltung*, formation) (Kontje 1993: 1). It is the common German term for 'education' as self-formation through cultural, intellectual, and humanistic pursuits, and is further described by Thomas Mann in 1923 as "introspectiveness; an individualistic cultural conscience; consideration for the careful tending, the shaping, deepening and perfecting of one's own personality, or in religious terms, for the salvation and justification of one's life" (Bruford 1975: vii). The Bildung narrative begins at the turn of the sixteenth century with the Pietistic tradition of self-cultivation according to the *image* of God, before it transitioned into an increasingly secular humanist ideal signifying "the development or unfolding of certain potentialities within an organism" by thinkers like Paracelsus (1493-1541), Jakob Böhme (1575-1624), and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716). This meaning was then carried forward in the 1784 essay "What is Enlightenment?" by the leading thinker of the Jewish Enlightenment Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), where it came to be equated with enlightenment itself (Eldridge 2013: 1). Gradually, into the late eighteenth century, pedagogical theorists like Joachim Heinrich Campe (1746-1818) targeted this self-formation to the aims of the "development (*Ausbildung*) and education (*Bildung*) of the citizenry," and it continued to take on broader political, philosophical and social implications, so that the potentialities of the individual were now geared toward the breadth of the collective (2013: 1). Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803), "the most influential disseminator of this new concept of *Bildung,*" extended this collective to the German *Volk* with nationalist (rather

than elitist) connotations of collective enrichment (Schmidt 1996: 630).[11] From his influence, Goethe wrote the first "Bildungsroman" (novel of self-formation or coming-of age story of a young man), *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* (1795–96), which W.H. Bruford has emblematized as "the very essence of German humanism," wherein cultivation stems from a refinement of one's capacities as internally driven not as a product of external imitation, and yet ultimately ends in the harmonization of the individual's aims with those of his or her society (Kontje 1993: 2). In sum:

> The German *Bildung* tradition, philosophy and education are virtually synonymous terms that designate an ongoing process of both personal and cultural maturation… Harmonization of the self is achieved through a wide variety of experiences and challenges to the individual's accepted beliefs; in Hegel's writings, these challenges entail agonizing alienation from one's "natural consciousness" that leads to a reunification and development of the self…Most explicitly in Hegel's writings, the *Bildung* tradition rejects the pre-Kantian metaphysics of being for a post-Kantian metaphysics of experience that eschews speculation about timeless realities. Learning requires a passionate search for continual growth, *tempered by reason that is developed through intense study of one's intellectual tradition***.** Fulfillment comes through practical activity that promotes the development of one's talents and abilities as well as development of one's society. Rather than acceptance of the socio-political status quo, *Bildung* includes the ability to engage in immanent critique of one's society, challenging it to actualize its own highest ideals (my italics) (Eldridge 2013: 10).

Interestingly, the humanistic ideal and an implicit critique of it are both present in this *Bildung* tradition, insofar as one must not accept even a cherished intellectual tradition as given and stable.[12] For many, like Schiller, the ideal of Bildung had strong aesthetic and artistic implications, which is the focus of his book *Über die äesthetische Erziehung des Menschen* [On the Aesthetic Education of Humanity] (1795). Kontje describes the

[11] Herder's range of influence is as diverse as it is far reaching: Goethe redirected his literary work after an encounter with Herder leading to the beginnings of the *Sturm and Drang* movement in German literature and music, alongside Schiller. Defining a movement away from Enlightenment rationalism toward the expressive emotionalism and interiority of the individual, he had a direct impact on Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) whose work defined the nascent phase of the linguistic discipline, and he played a pivotal role in the development of the study of hermeneutics which Schleiermacher (1768-1834) turned into the emerging field of modern Biblical scholarship (Schmidt 1996: 630). His work also contributed to the methodological foundations of anthropology and scientific history, exerting a primary influence on Wilhelm Dilthey, Hegel and Nietzsche. The titles of Herder's works are revealing for their humanistic tone: *How Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the People* (1765), *This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity* (1774), *Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Humanity* (1784-91), and *Letters for the Advancement of Humanity* (1793-1797). The object of study is then *the study* of humanity itself which explains why Herder "sought to displace academic philosophy with philosophical anthropology" (1996: 630). Nietzsche also refers to him throughout his work in such contexts, particularly his influence on authors like Goethe.

[12] A troublesome aspect worth noting in relation to Nietzsche is the implication of disciplinary restriction in *Bildung* cultivation, so that the individual's potential is unleashed to the degree that he or she becomes *specialized*; Goethe writes through his *Bildungsroman* Meister character: "To know and practice one thing well yields higher *Bildung* than imperfection in hundreds of things" (Kontje 1993: 6). This kind of educational ideal was problematic for Nietzsche (and later Warburg), which we will elaborate upon later.

connection between Bildung and art: “In the ideal work of art, form and content stand in perfect harmony; contemplation of such a work reconciles conflicting drives in human beings and thereby completes the *Bildung* of the individual and helps to establish the utopian community of the aesthetic state” (1993: 5). Burckhardt was also focused on 'aesthetic education' as the central aspect of *Bildung*, part of the human need for *Anschauung* (visual contemplation), “trusting that the contemplation of the chaotic scenes of human reality, through the beautiful forms that they assume in the great works of art might enable man to perceive the ideal in the real, to subsume the contingent occurrences of history and thus to reconcile individual ambition with tradition” (Mali 2003: 105). Burckhardt had been resistant to “the very German conception of the 'genius [*Genie*]'” characterized by the Faustian artist or scientist, who was at odds with convention and common levels of comprehension; he thought rather that the “end which Providence has set before mankind is the conquest of selfishness and the sacrifice of the individual for the sake of the universal,” an ethic of selfless reciprocity (for the good of the collective) that was fit for a “great teacher” but certainly not for Nietzsche.

While Nietzsche would have agreed that reality *was* most accessible through the contemplation of “images of the eternal” rather than through mere conceptions of it (as found in Hegel) (2003: 105), he differed from Burckhardt on the degree to which the humanistic tradition was the central gateway for such self-cultivation (2003: 106). Mali writes: “Whereas Nietzsche saw in all academic renditions of Greek mythology a deceitful inversion of its elemental truths, Burckhardt acknowledged the vital role of academic writers and other practitioners of 'rhetoric and its collateral sciences' in the preservation of certain aesthetic norms of classical antiquity” so creating a “great spiritual continuity” between classical, Christian, and modern times (2003: 119). Somewhat paradoxically, Nietzsche’s idea of self-formation was governed by a historical realism that didn’t project anachronistic 'absolutes' or expectations onto the past, but also beckoned toward a greater degree of forgetfulness and *dis*continuity with historical precedents. His form of 'immersion' came as a *participation* in history as an artist or a philosopher, while Burckhardt’s more distanced outlook resembled a surveyor of vast historical movements and shifts. Warburg gave a lecture on Burckhardt (and as a corollary, on Nietzsche) in 1927 which begins by situating their similarity/difference:

> We must learn to see Burckhardt and Nietzsche as the receivers of mnemonic waves, and we have to see that what they possess as world-consciousness, they grasp in completely different ways… Both are very sensitive seismographs, which shake in their foundations when they receive and have to retransmit the waves. But there is a huge difference: Burckhardt received the waves from the region of the past; he felt the dangerous trembling and therefore took care that his seismograph's foundation was strengthened. He never fully and unhesitatingly affirmed the most extreme oscillations, though he suffered them (Johnson 2012: 142).

Here Warburg shows how his image of these thinkers is not characterized by a figure laboriously bent over the archives of history, but rather, by the seismographic historian whose sensitivity is acutely, and perhaps painfully, attuned to the deeds of the past, with their reverberations in and implications for the present. He used the same metaphor to describe himself while institutionalized for a schizophrenic breakdown in 1923 at the Kreuzlingen sanatorium, as a seismograph that "allow[s] the signals that I have received to be released from me," aligning himself with the two thinkers in the form of the same historical/interpretive tool or symbol (Mali 2003: 144). It is in his suggestion of the *inseparability* of the subject and his or her object of study or aesthetic contemplation, however, that Warburg so often gets referenced to Nietzsche, often with the negative connotations of Nietzsche being the precursory visionary whose "unconditional dedication" made him the "victim of his own ideas" (Warburg cited in Mali 2003: 182). Warburg saw this tendency as what led to Nietzsche's collapse and feared this spectre over his own fate; with Burckhardt, in contrast, he saw a balance between empathy and detachment that was better suited to a researcher's constitution (Warburg 2003: 18). When Nietzsche broke down into tears and madness in a Turin square after hugging a horse who was being beaten, he returned to his home and wrote one of his final letters, which he addressed to Jacob Burckhardt with the phrase: "In the end I would much rather be a Basel professor than a God," suggesting even he had intimations of the toll his approach to knowledge had taken on him, while his older and more practical colleague's productivity was to continue for many years after (Sloterdijk 1989: 98).

This commonality between Nietzsche and Warburg should not be reduced, however, to mental illness nor should it be seen as merely incidental; both historians were explicit in *not* taking on a tone of clinical certainty, rather *playing out* or enacting their subject matters, stylistically and methodologically. Philippe-Alain Michaud elucidates (indicated in the original French language, as English translation was unavailable):

> *On y comprend que l'historien de l'art ne va pas jusqu'au bout de son travail s'il se contente de décrire et, même, d'expliquer les faits … Il faut, pour cela, que le savant entre lui-même en mouvement, déplace son corps et son point de vue, procède à une sorte de transfert par lequel le "timbre de ces voix inaudibles – on pourrait dire tout aussi bien, paraphrasant Benjamin* : l'inconscient de la vision – *transparaîtrait soudain… – on ne* connaît *pas le symptôme – le* pathos *antique, le geste inconscient de la Nymphe – sans le* comprendre. *Comprendre ? Prendre avec* – (1998: 20).

Nietzsche had written in essay and prose, but also dithyramb, aphorism and verse, while Warburg literally re-configured images in his art historical project, *Mnemosyne Bilderatlas* (atlas of images), which he began in 1926, just after his two-year stay in psychiatric care, and left unfinished at his death in 1929 (Johnson 2012: 8). On sixty-three wooden boards measuring 150 x 200 cm, Warburg put into constellation images of *Pathosformeln* (loosely described as formal patterns of pathos expressed visually in body postures, movements and poses) from vastly different historical epochs, with images ranging from fourth century BC artworks to contemporary advertisements on a single panel (2012: 9). Johnson shows how like Nietzsche, Warburg's work was a *Lebensphilosophie* (philosophy of life), but while in Nietzsche this expressed itself as "an originary, but always repeatable "*Nervenreiz*" (roughly, nerve stimulus)," for Warburg it uncovered "the "process" by which the originary "*Wucht*" (force) and its attendant engrams are converted into "life in motion," into those human gestures whose pathos art is forever finding new ways to express (2012: 151). While for Burckhardt, Nietzsche and Warburg, their interest in the legacy of images lay "not in anatomizing the legends into their primary elements, but, precisely, in the drift of the amplification they received" (Burckhardt in Mali 2003: 126), the latter two were in some sense, artists and authors *as* they were historians, their own method never divorced from the historical images their participation helped to *revive* and reconfigure.

Towards a Dionysian Historiography?

Nietzsche's main role as precursor to Warburg came in his dismantling of the classicist tradition centered on the "cheerful [*heitere*] vision" of Greek culture, which had taken its most acute form in Winckelmann but "had been circulating in eighteenth century European discussions of art," upheld by a majority of German classicists (Richter 1992: 16). To Nietzsche it was a "*niaiserie allemande*" (originally written by him in French) that saw only perfection and "beautiful souls," in Hellenism, "admiring in them such things as their

repose in grandeur, their ideal disposition, their sublime simplicity," while playing down the tragic and pathic forces of their culture (TI: 118). Nietzsche writes: "We are affected quite differently when we probe the concept "Greek" which Winckelmann and Goethe constructed for themselves and find it incompatible with that element out of which Dionysian art evolved – the orgy" (TI: 120). Joseph L. Koerner describes in his preface to a 2003 print edition of Warburg's presentation *Le Rituel du Serpent : Récit d'un voyage en pays pueblo* (originally delivered in 1923) how Warburg wasn't merely concerned with tearing apart the German classicist/romantic ideal that had in any event already began to lose fervour by his own time, but rather he questioned whether classical revivalisms of the Renaissance were seen as nobly contemplative and serene by the artists *themselves*, and beyond that, by the Greeks they referenced (Warburg 2003: 38). Kurt Forster prefaces a 1914 presentation by Warburg, "The Emergence of the Antique as a Stylistic Ideal in Early Renaissance Painting," with the following:

> Referring to an excavation report written in 1488, which expresses admiration of a *Laocoön* group precisely on the grounds of its extreme intensity of emotive expression – diametrically opposed to Winckelmann's view of the essence of antiquity – the speaker called for the present-day world to adopt a similarly unprejudiced approach to the dual nature of the rich inheritance of antiquity. As modern historians of religion had shown, a tragic sense of "classical unrest" was basic to the culture of Greco-Roman antiquity, which might be symbolized by a "double herm of Apollo-Dionysus" (Warburg 1999: 273).

Nietzsche's in-depth introduction of Apollo and Dionysus in *Birth of Tragedy* as the competing tensions co-existent in Greek art will be touched upon in the next chapter on art, particularly with reference to this example of the *Laocoön*, but for now suffice it to say that the breed of classicism characteristic of Winckelmann was identified (by him most explicitly) with the composure and formal perfection of Apollo. With Nietzsche then with Warburg, classical art was no longer an ideal of noble restraint as Winckelmann had suggested, but equally an affirmation of all that was 'unreasonable' and unmeasured in existence. Warburg noted that records from the Quattrocento showed that, unlike what was thought by Winckelmann, the people of that time knew how to appreciate the double richness of these two deities of art, seeing them as two branches of a common trunk (here he calls the *apollinische* ethos and the *dionysische* pathos) (Didi-Huberman 2002: 151). Nietzsche describes how he came upon the idea of the tragic force in Greek art: "the psychology of the orgy as an overflowing feeling of life and energy within which even pain acts as a stimulus provided me with the key to the concept of *tragic* feeling, which was

misunderstood as much by Aristotle as it especially was by our pessimists" (TI: 121). Claiming himself the "first to take seriously that wonderful phenomenon which bears the name Dionysus as a means to understanding the older Hellenic instinct" (the pre-Socratic one), he credits only Burckhardt for having devoted a section of his *Culture of the Greeks* to this deity (TI: 119). Burckhardt recognized the Dionysian presence in ancient culture, but it was Warburg who discovered its sustained influence on Renaissance art.

Koerner suggests that what defined Warburg as an art historian was his ability to identify ruptures and gaps, as well as continuities, in the transmission of *Pathosformeln* in their historical re-occurrence (vs. uninterrupted continuity) as they take on new or altered meanings (Warburg, 2003: 38). He recounts how Warburg was able to reconstruct the interior of the *Santissima Annunziata* church in 15th century Florence with the help of untouched documents that described the enormously cumbersome number of hanging life-size wax figures representing their patrons, dislodging the conception of the Renaissance as a timeless incarnation of 'order and beauty' while also thwarting Burckhardt's conception of it as an idealized revival of an existing classical tradition (2003: 38). Warburg sought out these contradictions and nuances in symbolic meaning rather than attempting to resolve them, gravitating to sources that would not simply offer a 'confirmation bias' to existing constellations of cultural images and signs:

> Warburg, in contrast [to Burckhardt], held to a Nietzschean, agonistic conception of "tradition." His early confrontation with the ritual commandments of his own Jewish tradition (…) alerted him to the racial and other primitive superstitions that always lurk in that and any other tradition that pretends to convey a continuous and homogeneous message from antiquity to modernity. His later historical investigations into the origins and transformations of European civilization showed that its Christian tradition was equally prone to irrational fixations, even though, in his view, it was ultimately more successful than Judaism in the sublimation of such atavistic tendencies as blood sacrifice into the sacramental rite of the Eucharist. This acute attention to the essential tension between magic and logic in his own Jewish-Christian tradition enabled Warburg to discern the signs of disruption that the fusion of antagonistic psychic orientations and religions – Dionysian and Apollonian, pagan and Christian – brought into the "classical tradition" (Mali 2003: 169-70).

Instead of exploring the ruptures in visual and mythic traditions, Burckhardt had suggested it was the responsibility of the educator "to perfect and complete, as well as they can, the picture of the continuity of the world and mankind from the beginning" (Mali 2003: 121). As we will elaborate on in the next chapter, Warburg's work observing the Hopi natives in Arizona did not reduce their cultural symbols to interpretive codes that assumed

an essentialized primitivism dictated by custom and ancestry, and so mapped on a progressive evolutionary scale from homogeneous to complex symbolism:

> Lévi-Strauss recherchait les structures non-contaminées mais Warburg, comme certains anthropologues autocritiques d'aujourd'hui, s'intéresse précisément aux failles de son matériel, aux ruptures au sein de l'ordre symbolique qui, mieux que les continuités, révèlent les forces qui engendrent ce code… Loin de rejeter ces traits comme autant de traces de contamination, Warburg les recherche activement: "Mon désir d'observer directement les Indiens sous l'influence du catholicisme officiel fut favorisé [par les circonstances]" (Koerner's introduction to Warburg, 2003: 32).

Warburg explicitly did not share the perspective of many cultural anthropologists that so-called 'primitive' societies represented an earlier version of humanity less 'contaminated' by technological advancement and Western religion and hence closer to some abstractly human origin. He sought rather to see the past in the present, and vice versa; he writes:

> All mankind is eternally and at all times schizophrenic. Ontogenetically, however, we may perhaps describe one type of response as prior and primitive, though it continues on the sidelines. At the later stage the memory no longer arouses an immediate, purposeful reflex movement – be it one of a combative or religious nature – but the memory images are now consciously stored in pictures and signs. Between these two stages we find a treatment of the impression that may be described as the symbolic mode of thought (Mali 2003: 135).

In Burckhardt's continuum of symbolic thought (where human history arguably has some coherent filiation in its development and is not schizophrenic), he mapped the Baroque as an inferior period to the Renaissance because of its vulgar naturalism too motivated by innovation in technique and content, while too unconcerned with tradition. In his last book, *Recollections of Rubens*, published posthumously in 1898, he does however praise the Baroque artist Rubens as "the mightiest herald and witness of that great tradition. His vast power of invention was essentially occupied in an ever-fresh response to it and ever-new expression of it" (2003: 122). Even though he is here suggesting that ever-new responses can come from engagement with a symbolic tradition, the valorization of particular artists and periods as inherently superior would have been seen by Nietzsche as a conservative tendency to idealize and render 'static' (and consecutively comparable) certain cultural moments, finding as he did the quick dismissal of Baroque art "presumptuous" (HH: 246). Warburg too had questioned the value of periodization stating, "such an attempt to set up purely chronological divisions can yield no reliable, obvious principles of classification" (Warburg 1999: 27). Nietzsche and Warburg had rather attempted to un-idealize the Renaissance (just as often singing its praises as a unique time in history), by not over-simplifying its merits based on a perceived classical standard (or simplistic revivalism) or

over-valuating the *continuity* and *consistency* of tradition: "Does anyone at last understand what the Renaissance was?" Nietzsche, asks, "the transvaluation of Christian values, the attempt undertaken with all means, all instincts and all genius to make the opposite values, the noble values triumph" (Mali 2003: 118). That is not to say that Nietzsche did not esteem certain epochs or individuals as offering a greater cultural contribution to the history of humanity, which he almost certainly did with pre-Platonic Greece and the Renaissance for instance. His critique of periodization rather took objection with the assumption that the boundaries of a certain period were self-contained, as if such a time existed a priori or could be returned to through willful imitation and idolization. He instead saw particular individuals inform and sway the values of their time, so that a great artist could exist in an environment of cultural decay or vice versa, as we see when he credits Plato with the downfall of Hellenic society, otherwise flourishing at his time of writing. The 'Greek spirit' Nietzsche praised could in this sense return at any moment, recreated by the contributions of a particular artist or thinker who would revive and renew this great tradition on their own terms, and not through a fetishization of the past or the assumed chronology to which it belongs. Whereas for Winckelmann and Burckhardt the greatness of the Renaissance was an active preservation of a past ideal – a greatness that could be participated in and remembered through *mimesis* of it as a model (or more precisely in Burckhardt, a *furthering* of an *existing* tradition), Nietzsche and Warburg saw the greatness of the ancients *return* in a new form (not reborn as the same) in the Renaissance, as it were, for the first time.

Didi-Huberman asks if an art history can exist beyond idealization, periodization and imitation, and so beyond value-laden judgments disguised as theoretical objectivity:

> *Et précisons les enjeux actuels de la question, au regard d'un héritage winckelmannien si unanimement revendiqué. Quant à « l'analyse des temps », d'abord : n'y aurait-il pas un temps des images qui ne soit ni « vie et mort », ni « grandeur et décadence », ni même cette « Renaissance » idéale dont les historiens ne cessent de transformer les valeurs d'usage à leur fins propres ? N'y aurait-il pas un temps pour les fantômes, une revenance des images, une « survivance » (*Nachleben*) qui ne soit pas soumise au modèle de transmission que suppose « l'imitation » (*Nachahmung*) des œuvres anciennes par des œuvres plus récentes ? N'y aurait-il pas un temps pour la* mémoire *des images – un obscur jeu du refoulé et de son éternel retour – qui ne soit pas celui que propose cette histoire de l'art, ce récit-là ? Et quant à l'art lui même : n'y aurait-il pas un « corps » d'images qui échappe aux classifications mises en place au dix-septième siècle ? N'y aurait-il pas un genre de ressemblance qui ne soit pas celui qu'impose « l'imitation de l'idéal », avec le rejet du* pathos *qu'elle suppose chez Winckelmann ?* (2002: 26).

In the next chapter we will attempt to approach this question by seeing how Nietzsche and Warburg sought to take the history of art beyond an aesthetics of beauty and *mimesis,*

philosophical idealism or historical reductionism, by introducing the Dionysian (tragic) force in art.

Art History as Art

Every age can see only those Olympic symbols which it can recognize and bear through the development of its own inner visual organs. We, for instance, were taught by Nietzsche a vision of Dionysius.

Aby Warburg in 1908 (cited by Mali 2003: 168)

But you don't mean to say that you seriously believe that Life imitates Art, that Life is in fact the mirror, and Art the reality?

Oscar Wilde (2002: 26)

Which 'Art'?

The presumption that would seem most likely in answering the question of why Nietzsche is so often excluded from art historical discourse given his participation in many of its central themes (through many of the central players) would be that his 'art' is not art history's 'art'. Philosophy deals with abstract notions, discusses art as one thing among others in human existence, and asks questions about life, value and the nature of knowledge (seemingly, 'general' questions). Art history is a more practical science: it deals with specific works of arts, artists, documents, and analyzes existing scholarship to discern certain facts, alter existing interpretations etc. While this distinction is no doubt present to some extent, it obscures some of the beginnings of art history, which when looked at more closely, are more comingled with our ideas about philosophical notions than one might have initially deduced. Didi-Huberman asks us to look more closely at Winckelmann's introduction to his *Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums* ("History of Ancient Art", 1764), where he explains his historical approach as one that begins with specificities of art in different historical moments, then offers a system (*Lehrgebaüde*) to explain art's various transformations, with an ultimate aim to discuss *the essence of art itself* (*das Wesen der Kunst*) (2002: 19). Herder observed that Winckelmann had set up a system that was structured around ideas about art as 'grand and eternal', something like a Platonic analysis of the essence of beauty, and asked whether this should be the goal of a history of art or whether other approaches were more advisable (2002: 20). He had apparently recognized however, the importance of Winckelmann bringing a 'system' to art history that wasn't merely the 'collection' of historical data as we found in Pliny, Pausanias or Philostratus (2002: 20).

Didi-Huberman asks how Winckelmann could have worked from a 'real contemplation of objects' as he had claimed to, when the actual objects of his studies had long perished, along with the ancient Greek civilization from which they had emerged (2002: 20). This begs the question: how is aesthetics, which is generally regarded as a systemized theory of aesthetic experience centered around 'fixed' principles, different from art history, which apparently works from *particular* objects and not general rules?

'Birth of Tragedy out the Spirit of Classicism'

Many classicists, writers and art historians after Winckelmann perpetuated his general principles about beauty in ancient Greek culture, among them Goethe and Lessing, who Nietzsche criticized for being idealistically romantic in their conceptions of a 'classical ideal' (Del Caro 1989: 592). In *Laocoön* (1766), Lessing likewise argues the Greeks were only concerned with the representation of ideal 'beautiful' bodies and that the vulgar beauty of lesser genres of representation was to them merely incidental or recreational (1990: 48). In other way, Nietzsche had also worked from general principles on ancient art, particularly so in *Birth of Tragedy,* where he suggests that two poles represent the competing tensions that intermingle in ancient Greek art, the gods Apollo and Dionysus:

> To the two gods of art, Apollo and Dionysus, we owe our recognition that in the Greek world there is a tremendous opposition, as regards both origins and aims, between the Apolline art of the sculptor and the non-visual, Dionysiac art of music. These two very different tendencies walk side by side, usually in violent opposition to one another, inciting one another to ever more powerful births, perpetuating the struggle of the opposition only apparently bridged by the word 'art'; until, finally, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic 'will', the two seem to be coupled, and in this coupling they seem at last to beget the work of art that is as Dionysian as it is Apolline – Attic tragedy (BT: 14).

With Nietzsche singling out Attic tragedy as the playing field for these two basic forces in Greek art, he is raising the question of genre or medium in discussing artistic principles. Winckelmann had constructed his history of ancient art primarily around sculpture and painting, particularly idealized nudes, while Nietzsche's interest in tragedy invoked the medium's equal emphasis on visuality and sound, narrative and rhythm, idealization and devastation, celebration and pain, and piety and barbarity.[13] In his article "Winckelmann and Nietzsche on the Apollonian and the Dionysian," Luca Renzi shows how Nietzsche's dual conception of tragedy as Apollonian and Dionysian relates to Richard Wagner's conception of *Gesamkunstwerk* as "an enigmatic unity of speech, thought, rhythm, dance and song" (2000: 125), an *intermedial* artwork (engagement between multiple media in a single work of art) par excellence.[14] In this early work in which Nietzsche is still close

[13] The first recorded tragedy was a performance of a cult of Dionysus, recorded by Herodotus, and composed by Action, where a chorus of satyrs sign a dithyramb in verse (Renzi 2000: 123).

[14] Renzi shows that the polarizing of Apollo and Dionysus may not be historically viable in terms of the Greek audience to Attic tragedy: "Thus Nietzsche's sharp opposition between Apollo and Dionysus, between dream and inebriety, does not seem to find an exact equivalent in the Greek tradition which – on the contrary – offers enlightening examples of the commixture and copenetration of the two forms. Hence, Apollo's art of

allies with Wagner and Schopenhauer, he cites the latter's philosophy in distinguishing between the related but distinct arts of the Apollo/Dionysus divinities, and uses Wagner's work to illustrate the ideal of their coming-together:

> This tremendous opposition, this yawning abyss between the Apolline plastic arts and Dionysian music, became so obvious to one of our great thinkers that even without the guidance of the divine Hellenic symbols he said that music differed in character and origin from all other arts, because unlike them it was not a replica of phenomena, but the direct replica of the will itself, and complemented *everything physical in the world* with a representation of the thing-in-itself, *the metaphysical.* Richard Wagner had fixed his seal on this most important insight in the whole of aesthetics (which signals, in a serious sense, the beginning of aesthetics), establishing in this essay *Beethoven* that music obeys quite different aesthetic principles from the visual arts, and cannot be measured according to the category of beauty; although a false aesthetic, hand in hand with a misdirected and degenerate art, has grown used to demanding, on the basis of the concept of beauty that prevails in the world of the visual arts, that music should provide an effect similar to that of works in the visual arts – the arousal of *pleasure in beautiful forms.* I felt strongly compelled to approach the essence of Greek tragedy and thus the most profound manifestation of the Hellenic genius. For only now did I feel myself in possession of a charm which would enable me to go beyond the phraseology of conventional aesthetics and clearly represent to myself the essential problem of tragedy (BT: 76-7).

It is perhaps for this reason that Nietzsche rarely discusses painting and sculpture with the same breadth and enthusiasm as he does music and tragedy, the prior mediums with their more uncertain relation to Dionysian forces and characteristics. However, Nietzsche was conscious of the distinction between various media and how the Dionysian aspects of artistic experience figured into them distinctly. While not offering a resolution, he nonetheless referred to the possibility of Dionysian elements in visual art: "If we were to turn Beethoven's 'Hymn of Joy' into a painting, and not restrain the imagination even as the multitudes bowed awestruck into the dust: this would bring us closer to the Dionysiac" (BT: 17). For while "Apollonian intoxication above all alerts the eye," the Dionysian state engages the whole being and "discharges all its powers of representation, imitation, transfiguration, transmutation, and every kind of mimicry and play acting conjointly" (Nietzsche cited in Renzi 2000: 131). Del Caro explains:

> It is this metaphysical aspect of the Dionysian which makes it a qualitative or essential principle, as opposed to the Apollonian, which is concretely manifest. Music is without form and appearance, but when it is mingled with the Apollonian drive to erect things of beauty, a hybrid emerges which Nietzsche calls the concept of tragedy or the tragic myth (1981: 42).

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clairvoyance includes ecstatic-inebriate elements while Dionysus, for his part, was considered an oracle at Delphi even before Apollo: as such, he must have been considered a god of prophecy and thaumaturgic clairvoyance. Moreover, according to both Aeschylus and Euripides, Mount Parnassos was dedicated to both divinities" (2000: 124). While this perspective is worth noting, its not the focus of my paper to verify Nietzsche's claims in terms of their historical 'accuracy,' as this would be a contradictory approach to understanding Nietzsche's historical philosophy.

Winckelmann, in contrast, had situated Apollo and Bacchus as the two forms of male idealized beauty, but his attention was on their pleasing plasticity (both represented as alluring youthful bodies), emblematized by his favourite work, the *Apollo Belvedere* torso. Didi-Huberman points out how Winckelmann's neo-classical aesthetic of the *beau idéal* rested on the idea of a body in repose, steering clear of all pathos and any physicality that could deform the soul (2002: 21-22). Interestingly, there is a contradiction between the fact that Winckelmann's ideal is constant (immovable and fixed as an overarching principle that shouldn't change depending on the circumstance), refers to the perfect state of the *soul* (immaterial), but that the concept of the ideal speaks to the pleasing *plasticity* of *particular* forms, despite their generally being Roman copies that only approximate the Greek *origin*al (we are echoing here the Platonic formula of forms that engender the traits of their overarching Form-idea, of which they are merely concrete manifestations or derivations). Nietzsche mocks this idealization of beauty as the real 'deformity' of his time, whereby ideals are demanded of a past that do not correspond to current realities, nor, the original contexts to which they refer:

> If our sculptors, painters and composers want to hit off the spirit of the age, they must depict beauty as bloated, gigantic and nervous: just as the Greeks, under the spell of immorality of moderation saw, and depicted beauty as the Apollo Belvedere. We ought really to call him *ugly*! But our stupid "classicists" have robbed us of all honesty (DB: n.161).

Nietzsche points out how this kind of reduction of antiquity to 'noble simplicity' results in a historical anachronism fueled by desired projections disguised as 'classicism':

> That all ideal sculpture ought to be colorless was regarded, indeed, until recently, as an unconditional axiom of art… The polychrome vision of antique sculpture has very gradually, and contra the vigorous resistance of the super-Hellenists, started to assert itself (Renzi 2000: 130).

Using the example of the equalization of ancient art with the white marble of sculptures and friezes that we are accustomed to seeing but which in their own time were brightly painted and colourful, Nietzsche sees in the aesthetics of Apollo a neoclassicist discourse around beauty that fails to recognize its counterpoint in the tragic feeling, rather sterilizing and whitewashing the dynamic and vivacious culture of Ancient Greece. Winckelmann had helped found an art history that emphasized the composure and finitude of sculpture and painting (the 'visual' Apolline arts), while Nietzsche had attempted in *Birth of Tragedy* to reinsert the dramatic, musical and 'mobile' arts into this canon of aesthetic

knowledge. To this day, theatre, music, dance, and their hybrid forms, tragedy and opera, are still regarded as beyond the traditional sphere of art history, insofar as they do not factor into introductory courses or methodological texts of the discipline (see Preziosi, 2009 for one example). Architecture, music, theatre and poetry, once considered central to 'the arts' (more so than the visual arts) are now articulated into their own autonomous disciplines. What Nietzsche then wished to introduce into the philosophy of art was not only music per se, but movement and the pathic experience in art that exceeded the distanced satisfaction found in the 'beautiful', as defined in conventional aesthetics. As we will come to see later, his high appraisal of music and tragedy was not unanimous however, but was counter-weighted by an explicit critique of much of the music, theatre, and opera of his contemporary culture.

It remains to be stated, however, that there is a case in which Nietzsche emphasizes that the Apolline and Dionysian can be reconciled, or rather seen as "mutually intensifying one another," precisely in the work of a visual artist:

> *Raphael*, himself one of those immortal naïves, in one of his allegorical paintings depicted that reduction of illusion to mere illusion, the original act of the naïve artist and also of Apolline culture. In his *Transfiguration*, the lower half of the painting, with the possessed boy, his despairing bearers, the dismayed and terrified disciples, reveals the reflection of eternal, primal suffering, the sole foundation of the world: 'illusion' here is the reflection of the eternal contradiction, of the father of all things. From this illusion there now arises, like an ambrosial vapour, a new and visionary world of illusion of which those caught up in the first illusion see nothing – a radiant floating in the pure bliss and painless contemplation beaming from wide-open eyes. Here, in the highest artistic symbolism, we behold that Apolline world of beauty and its substratum, the terrible wisdom of Silenus, and we intuitively understand their reciprocal necessity. Apollo, however, appears to us once again as the apotheosis of the *principium individuationis.* Only through him does the perpetually attained goal of primal Oneness, redemption through illusion, reach consummation. With sublime gestures he reveals to us how the whole world of torment is necessary so that the individual can create the redeeming vision, and then, immersed in contemplation of it, sit peacefully in his tossing boat amid the waves (BT: 27).

Gary Schapiro suggests that Nietzsche was influenced by Burckhardt's extensive treatment of Raphael's *Transfiguration* (1516-1520) (Figure 1) in his 1855 *Cicerone* (2003: 97), yet what he borrowed from this and earlier interpretations of the painting was now referred to in terms of his dueling or better stated, *mutually reinforcing* gods. Shapiro explains how the rising Christ shines forth "not merely [as] a luminous apparition but as the principle of apparition itself," and so represents the coming-into-vision of representation and the powerful redemptive force of illusion (2003: 97). The agonistic scene in the lower half of the painting, centered on the gasping boy puts not only a spectator into the painting, looking upon the becoming-apparent (and becoming-divine) of Jesus, but completes the

symbolism of primordial universal suffering being 'redeemed', as it were, by the radiant apparition.[15] The healing powers of Apollo are here synonymous with the artistic act: "If Schopenhauer and the Indians speak of our being immersed in the realm of *maya,* or illusion, Nietzsche will point out the constructive or healing dimension of this illusion or shining" (Shapiro 2003: 100). Art as Apolline appearance or becoming-apparent (*Schein*, the term used by Schiller among others) can not only bring into awareness dream-like and rapturous *un-representable* states, but make them manifest in and out of itself: "the truly existing primal unity, eternally suffering and contradictory, also needs rapturous vision, the pleasurable illusion, for its continuous redemption" (Nietzsche cited in 2003: 104). From this it becomes clear that while Nietzsche did not privilege the visual arts in his conception of artistic experience, he emphasized that some artists like Raphael were able to reveal the structure of art *through* visual representation, and as such, do more than just evoke a personally expressive or universally idealized form or appearance (both to him reductionist or relativist clichés of artistic creation and viewership). Warburg continued this project of understanding how the Dionysian - as a primal surge of that which is in movement and un-representable - could simultaneously and paradoxically express itself through what is visible and, to some degree, become *fixed* by its formal finitude.

Warburg: Dionysus and the Visual Arts

By focusing on works of visual art that represent movement and overt demonstration of sentiment and sensuality in their subject matter, Warburg reintroduced music, movement, and pathos into the plastic arts. In his 1893 dissertation about the Renaissance, 'Sandro Botticelli's *Birth of Venus* and *Spring*', he shows how an "aesthetic act of 'empathy' [can be] a determinant of style" in that it is "possible to trace, step by step, how the artists and their advisers recognized 'the antique' as a model that demanded an intensification of outward movement and how they turned to antique sources whenever accessory forms – those of garments and hair – were to be represented in motion" (Warburg 1999: 89). He uses the example of a two-sided medal made for Giovanna Tornabuoni (Figure 2) by Niccolo

[15] Louis Marin importantly points out that this overcoming is not one directed towards a Christian transcendence of earthly suffering, but is rather a transfiguration of the Christian subject into the hero of tragic myth (1993: 263).

Fiorentino: on one, the *Three Graces* with the inscription *Castitas. Pulchritudo. Amor* (chastity, beauty, love) and on the other, a *Venus Virgo* with the accompanying words from Virgil's *Aeneid*, "*Virginis os habitumque gerens et Virginis arma*" ('Wearing the face and the dress of a maiden and bearing a maiden's arms'). Warburg analyzes the two faces of the medal:

> The first medal thus shows these antique goddesses as we have been accustomed to see them since Winckelmann, namely, "in the spirit of antiquity," nude and in a stable pose; but the second shows a female figure whose hair and garments again show an unexplained but agitated movement. She stands on clouds, with her head turned slightly to the right, and her hair flying on both sides. Her dress is kilted up and girdled; its hem, and that of a pelt that she wears over it, flutters in the wind. The arrow in her raised right hand, the bow in her lowered left hand, the quiver of arrows slung behind her right hip, and the short boots, identify her as a huntress (1999: 116-7).

The huntress, the animal pelt, the serpentine pattern of the hair and dress are all reminiscent of Dionysus' maenads (from μαινάδες – "raving ones"), an entourage of women followers who would ritually hunt (as literary tradition suggests, sometimes devouring animals with their bare hands), dance, sing, drink wine and engage in (undetermined) orgiastic/erotic activities. The two visual tropes that Warburg turns to continuously, as extensions of the Apolline-Dionysian duality, are the *Nympha*: youthful, light-footed, caught in the movement of swirling fabrics that seem to lift her like a spring breeze (Figure 3), and the melancholic figure embodied by Saturn: pensive, strained by contemplation and creation, and bent over or reclined into the 'thinker's pose' – best represented by the figure of the artist/inventor in Dürer's *Melencolia I* (Figure 4) (Warburg 2011). He elaborates on his indebtedness to Nietzsche for this formulation (from *Der Bilderatlas Mnemosyne,* in *Gesammelte Schriften,* vol II.1:4):

> Since Nietzsche's time a revolutionary posture is no longer needed in order to see antiquity's essence in the symbol of the dual-form of Apollo-Dionysius. On the contrary, the superficial, quotidian use of this doctrine of contraries [*Gegensätzlichkeitslehre*] in the contemplation of Pagan art makes it instead difficult to take seriously that one comprehends *sophrosyne* and *ecstasis* within the organic unity of their polar function as liminal values stamped by human expressive will [*bei der Pragung von Grenzwerten menschlichen Ausdruckswillens*] (Warburg cited in Johnson 2010: 80).

Warburg suggests that while Nietzsche's theory of a tension between opposites in art has been normalized through familiarity with this as a dichotomy in art, the ongoing engagement between representation and expression, cognition and emotion, restraint and euphoria has not yet been digested as essentially *vital* forces. Warburg continues that while artists in the Renaissance retained movement, rhythm and exuberance from ancient

predecessors, the psychology of pain and excess had become subjugated. In his analysis of the engraving *Danseuses* (approximately 1525-1540) by Jean de Gourmont (Figure 5), Warburg writes:

> *Dans son interprétation de l'Antiquité – ni solennelle, ni statique comme celle que proposera Winckelmann au XVIIIe siècle – l'artiste tend à représenter ce que Nietzsche nomme, dans* Le Crépuscule des idoles*, « la psychologie de l'orgiasme, conçu comme un sentiment de vie et de force. » Mais Gourmont écarte la composante tragique et morbide attachée aux rites dionysiaques* (Warburg 2003: 86).

The nymph, with her iconographic counterpart in the maenad, retains some formal features of the latter, but the associations with excess and savagery have been supplanted by a pleasing levity. The morbid and tragic elements have been distanced; rather than tear apart a wild animal and wear its furs, the women hold hands and face the viewer as if performing to entertain the audience – an Apollonian object of idealization (like the three Graces) with Dionysian attributes (of the huntress). This adds complexity to Nietzsche's original metaphors because the orgiastic and bestial are foregone for the celebratory, playful, pleasing movement of the nymphs, while the agonistic figure now takes form in the contemplative thinker/artist in Dürer's image, no longer represented in song and dance, but static and tormented by concepts and the burden of creation.

Apollo vs. Laocoön

This debate becomes most intensified in discussions surrounding *Laocoön and his Sons* (Figure 6)[16], known until the 16th century by its reputation as "an ideal work of art" from Pliny's description of it in *Natural History* (c.77 AD), in which he claimed it is "a work to be preferred to all that the arts of painting and sculpture have produced" (Warburg 2003: 38).[17] It was discovered 'in the flesh' on January 14, 1506 by Felice de' Freddi in his vineyard outside Rome, and "the ideal was now real" for those who had only known the

[16] This statue is a marble Roman copy of an original Greek sculpture likely made by Agesander, Athenodoros and Polydorus, according to Pliny, depicting the priest of Apollo, Laocoön, and his sons being devoured by venomous snakes, receiving the wrath of the partial Olympian gods after having warned his people of the wiles of the Greeks (Warburg 1995: 39).

[17] In *Laokoon und die Gründung Roms* (1988), Bernard Andreae argues that this is a mistranslation or misinterpretation of Pliny's statement; in ancient times *ars sculptura* exclusively denoted bronze (unlike in the Renaissance when it signified all sculpture), suggesting that the *marble* Laocoön was preferable to all other representations of the same subject in other mediums, namely, painting and bronze, and not simply the best work of art (Richter 1992: 14).

work through texts and would soon see it exhibited in the Belvedere Garden of the Vatican by Pope Julius II, after a restoration by Michelangelo among others (2003: 13). The existing discourse around this work as "the unapproachable and ideal model for imitation and aspiration," was interestingly already linked by Pliny to the mediums of painting and sculpture, before Winckelmann made it the apex of his classical ideal (2003: 13):

> Just as the depths of the sea always remain calm however much the surface may rage, so does the expression of the figures of the Greeks reveal a great and composed soul even in the midst of passion…The physical pain and nobility of the soul are distributed with equal strength over the entire body and are, as it were, held in balance with one another. Laocoön suffers, but he suffers like Sophocles' Philoctetes; his pain touches our very souls, but we wish we could bear misery like this great man…All movements and poses of Greek figures not marked by such traits of wisdom, but instead by passion and violence, were the result of an error of conception which the ancient artists called *parenthyrsos* [here defined by Preziosi as "a term used in rhetoric, signifying exaggerated, out-of-place pathos*"*]. The more tranquil the state of the body the more capable it is of portraying the true character of the soul. In all positions too removed from tranquility, the soul is not in its most essential condition, but in one that is agitated and forced (...) The portrayal of suffering alone would have been *parenthyrsos*, therefore the artist, in order to unite the distinctive and the noble qualities of soul, showed him in an action that was closest to a state of tranquility for one in such pain. But in this tranquility the soul must be distinguished by traits that are uniquely its own and give it a form that is calm and active at the same time, quiet but not indifferent or sluggish (Preziosi 2009: 30, 511).

M.L. Baumer has shown how the rhetorical principle of *parenthyrsos* is traceable to the function of *thyrsos*, the baton adorned with thyrsus leaves carried by the Dionysian maenads, therefore a "symbol of Dionysian fury" (Renzi 2000: 140). This suggests that Winckelmann's counter-ideal comes in the form of the Dionysian cult and rituals, a threat to the integrity of Greek art. In *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany,* Eliza Marian Butler aligns the Laocoön with "baroque" tendencies and finds it difficult to comprehend "the fact that Winckelmann used the terms simple and serene to characterize this complicated, intricate, naturalistic piece of work, which is so painfully realistic at close quarters; and which, seen from a distance in its niche in the Vatican, resembles a decorative, graceful, fragile arabesque, of which every part is in motion" (1935: 47). The *Oxford History of Classical Art* likewise calls it the "one of the finest examples of the Hellenistic baroque," referring to a historical precedent that associates classical art prior to 323 BC with Renaissance neoclassicism, with the spectacular and ornate Baroque art getting linked to the 'degenerate' Hellenistic period that continued until the turn of the century around 30 BC (Boardman 1993: 199).

Warburg was keen to show that pathos, movement and exuberance in art weren't restricted to the Baroque, just as Dionysian forces in music and dance were not restricted to

the non-plastic arts. In *Le rituel du serpent : récit d'un voyage en pays pueblo*, he is noted as saying in 1914 that should the Renaissance not have discovered Laocoön, they would have invented it precisely on account of its "*bouleversante éloquence pathétique*" (Warburg 2003: 114). Koerner describes how Warburg saw the Renaissance as impacted by passionate inner states, expressions and outer movements that characterized ancient works of art, but now in the support of new values:

> *Symbole antique de l'extrême souffrance, le* Laocoön *ressurgit à la Renaissance sous la figure du Christ flagellé. L'*exemplum doloris *persiste à travers les siècles, les cultures, les religions. Pour désigner cette survivance des images-types, Warburg parle de "figure de pathos" et de "dynamogrammes de l'art antique" - lesquels, comme les images du rêve chez Freud, peuvent subir "une refonte radicale (une inversion) de leur signification*" (Koerner in Warburg 2003: 115).

This change of signification is the *exemplum doloris* of Laocoön iconography being transposed onto Christian values, so that endured suffering is validated by eventual redemption in the afterlife, guaranteed by a stoic renunciation of the senses, travails and agonies of the body. "Indebted to Winckelmann," Simon Richter argues in *Laocoön's body and the aesthetics of pain*, is "the reading of Laocoön's body as the battlefield where the forces of pain and the soul wage war against each other" (1992: 21). As in Platonic philosophy, the soul gets equated with pure cognition, the body with a nature that is given, beastly, inferior: "In the masterpieces of Greek art," Winckelmann states, "connoisseurs and imitators find not only nature at its most beautiful, but also something that is beyond nature, namely certain ideal forms of its beauty, which as an interpreter of Plato teaches us, come from images created by the mind alone" (Preziosi 2009: 28). Renzi shows how Winckelmann had determined two types of beauty: the one sensuous, which imitated nature, the other 'ideal' (Plato's Forms), which overcame nature, attained "sublime" beauty and was "paradigmatically represented by the statue of the Greek god Apollo" (2000: 133). As such, the Greek artists were "at once philosophers," whose goals were presumably the same as the thinker, the victory of reason: "the noble simplicity and quiet grandeur of the Greek statues is also the true hallmark of Greek writings from their best period, the writings of the Socratian school" (Preziosi 2009: 32). Conversely, Winckelmann likens Aeschylus to a hyperbolic "tragic muse" that represents the mere infancy of the art form and who could never approach the clarity of a Heraclitus (2009: 32). The tragedian is put beneath the

philosopher, suggesting that art should take the lead from (Platonic) philosophy and be teleologically aimed towards self-restraint and composure, towards *sophrosyne.*

Nietzsche could not disagree more: "one employed festivals and arts for no other purpose than to feel oneself *dominant,* to *show* oneself dominant: they are means for making oneself feared…To judge the Greeks by their philosophers, in the German manner, perchance to employ the philistinism of the Socratic schools as a clue to what is fundamentally Hellenic! … But the philosophers are the *décadents* of Hellenism, the counter-movement against the old, the noble taste" (TI: 119). The older Hellenic instinct, "still exuberant and even overflowing," is "explicable only as an *excess* of energy," and certainly not as a repression and renunciation of it (TI: 119). Nietzsche situates the decay of this Hellenic vitality into moralized self-measurement and distrust of one's instincts as the fault of Plato, the author of the Socratian dialectic who paved the way for the Christian denunciation of the passions of the body and the ensuing expectation of metaphysical salvation:

> Plato is boring. – Ultimately my distrust in Plato extends to the very bottom of him: I find him deviated so far from the Hellenes, so morally infected, so much an antecedent Christian- he already has the concept 'good' as the supreme concept – that I should prefer to describe the entire phenomenon 'Plato' by the harsh term 'higher swindle' or, if you prefer, 'idealism', than by any other…. And how much there still is of Plato in the concept 'Church', in the structure, system, practice of the Church! – My recreation, my preference, my *cure* from all Platonism has always been *Thucydides*... For the deplorable embellishment of the Greeks with the colours of the ideal which the 'classically educated' youth carries away with him into life as the reward of his grammar-school drilling there is no more radical cure than Thucydides. … Greek philosophy as the *decadence* of the Greek instinct; Thucydides as the grand summation, the last manifestation of that strong, stern, hard matter-of-factness instinctive to the older Hellenes. *Courage* in face of reality ultimately distinguishes such natures as Thucydides and Plato: Plato is a coward in the face of reality – consequently he flees into the ideal; Thucydides has *himself* under control – consequently he retains control over things… (TI: 117).

Interestingly, he poses a *historian* in Thucydides as an antidote to Platonic idealism, the latter that seeks absolute truths in the form of ideals because the apparent and immediate truths of reality are too difficult to bear, and the former representing a call to realism that is neither rationalistic nor moralistic (TI: 117). It would be a misunderstanding to equate the tragic sense or feeling with mere suffering, negativity, nihilism or an objection to life, something that must be avoided or endured:

> Tragedy is far from providing evidence for pessimism among the Hellenes in Schopenhauer's sense that it has to be considered the decisive repudiation of that idea and the *counter-verdict* to it. Affirmation of life even in its strangest and sternest problems, the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility through the *sacrifice* of its highest types – *that* is what I called Dionysian, *that* what I recognized as the bridge to the psychology of the *tragic* poet. *Not* so as to get rid of

> pity and terror, not so as to purify oneself of a dangerous emotion through its vehement discharge – it was thus Aristotle understood it –: but becoming – that joy which also encompasses *joy in destruction*… And with that I again return to the place from which I set out – *Birth of Tragedy* was my first revaluation of all values: with that I again plant myself in the soil out of which I draw all that I will and *can* – I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysos – I, the teacher of the eternal recurrence… (TI: 117).[18]

Nietzsche here refers to Aristotle's view of art as catharsis, whereby the pain, fear or pity aroused in the viewer of tragedy is *alleviated* or better *released* through the artistic (tragic) encounter. Gadamer describes Aristotelian catharsis:

> What is experienced in such an excess of tragic suffering is something truly common. The spectator recognizes himself [or herself] and his [or her] finiteness in the face of the power of fate. What happens to the great ones of the earth has exemplary significance . . . To see that "this is how it is" is a kind of self-knowledge for the spectator, who emerges with new insight from the illusions in which he [or she], like everyone else, lives (1955: 132).

This recalls the Socratic ideal of 'know thyself', part of what composes a Platonic doctrine that teaches that life's passions (or illusions) are essentially dangerous and deceptive and divert the mind from perfect reason. Art is then directed towards the teleological function of producing *sophrosyne* in the individual as a sort of education or a morally inflected *Bildung*; Richard Janko explains in his introduction to Aristotle's *Poetics* (335 BC):

> By responding emotionally to the representation, we can learn to develop the correct emotional responses. Aristotle says precisely this about music, *in which he includes poetry*... Thus poetry undoubtedly has an educative and moral function, that is, it helps to form character. This may seem to have little to do with catharsis, but the later writers indicate it did. Thus Proclus, explicitly referring to Aristotle, says that tragedy and comedy "make it possible to satisfy the emotions in due measure, and, by satisfying them, to keep them tractable for *education*… The remarkable new text about catharsis from Herculaneum states "poetry is useful with regard to virtue, *purifying,* as we said, the [related] part [of the soul]" (1987: xix).

This is pessimism veiled in optimism insofar as it assumes the variability of emotional and sensual experience in life will essentially make a human being miserable, that self-knowledge should be directed towards restraint or purging of one's senses or emotive responses, and that art is only valuable if it leads one to *emulate an ideal* comportment that is both objectively validated and morally encoded. Art has to heal the maladies of life,

[18] Note that this is from a later work, when he had already distanced himself from the aesthetic philosophy of Schopenhauer (and Wagner), who he had deemed as having a pessimistic view about art: "Schopenhauer interprets the essence of art as a "sedative to life," that ameliorates the miseries and sufferings of life, that puts the will – whose compulsiveness makes existence miserable – out of commission. Nietzsche reverses this and says that art is the *stimulans* of life, something that excites and enhances life, "what eternally *compels* us to life, to eternal life." *Stimulans* is obviously the reverse of sedative" (Heidegger 1991: 29).

because life as it is is not affirmed. Nietzsche contrasts this with his idea of the eternal recurrence, a revelation that comes in the form of a demon announcing that everything you have lived will recur eternally the same way, and at that moment, rather than "gnash your teeth," you "*long for nothing more fervently*" (his italics) (GS: 194-5). Rather than *correct* your actions to imitate the ideal, the tragic moment is one of self-affirmation in the face of what one *is* and *does*, now and as it were, eternally.

The insertion of a pathic instability, movement and pain into the stale homogeneity of the 18th century discourse surrounding the Laocoön ultimately ruptured the meta-narrative rampant in German classicism:

> The readings of Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder, Moritz, and Goethe have produced multiple images of Laocoön. The castrato, the crucified Christ, the animal in Haller's clinic, the victim of rape or torture: these are the radically unclassical counterparts of the Laocoön, riveted together through pain. Each stands for a heterogeneous discourse that pierced the tranquillity of classical aesthetics and exposed the latter's ambivalent relation to the body and the material sign. Classical discourse may assure us that it celebrates the human body, may even boast of a manly intimacy with the body; the interpretation pursued in this study has shown that the pain of the body is at the center of the aesthetics of beauty, and that the desires of this aesthetics are responsible for the infliction of pain it seeks to hide (Richter 1992: 190).

This heterogeneous nature of the discourse 'that pierced the tranquility of classical aesthetics' corresponds to Nietzsche's conception of the tragic as "the drive of Springtime, raging and racing in mixt sensibility" (think Warburg's analysis of the nymph in Botticelli's *Primavera*), as well as speaking to the plurality in the "sequence of the different personifications of one and the same deity" in the case of Dionysus (Renzi 2000: 129).

The Serpent and Self-Overcoming

"That there is no beautiful surface without horrifying depths, Greek art has taught us," Nietzsche wrote in the *Gay Science* in 1887 (2001: 132). Warburg saw that what many historians (like Burckhardt mentioned above) were eager to pass over in their histories of art was "the spirit of evil and of temptation" epitomized by the figure of the serpent and its accompanying rituals in various societies (Mali 2003: 135). Its iconography denotes Dionysus and his followers, the violent attackers of Laocoön who inflict the "extreme human suffering" as vengeance from the gods, "a destroying force from the underworld," the harbinger of sin in the Old Testament who seduces Eden to eat from the tree of knowledge, the snakes entwined in the swirling hair of the raving bacchantes and the

Medusa, and in the case of Warburg, the locus of his interest in the rituals of the Hopi Indians (Warburg 1995: 38). Having originally visited the Pueblo territories on a trip to the U.S in 1895, it was nearly thirty years later in 1923 that he gave a conference about their snake dance at the Kreuzlingen sanatorium that, as per an agreement with Dr. Binswanger, was the ticket to his release.

In this presentation, Warburg described how during the ritual, the Hopi took venomous snakes in their mouths to regain a sense of mastery over the power they had on their sustenance, the snakes standing in for lightning (and the rain needed for crops) in an act of metonymy, and out of respect for their *actual* danger, without needing to dominate them physically (by killing them, for instance). Warburg saw in their cooperation with the threat posed by the snake a larger display of harmony and/or courage in the face of the uncontainable elements and unpredictable hazards of life. "In the end," Warburg writes, "the serpent is an international symbolic answer to the question whence come elementary destruction, death, and suffering into the world? … We might say that where helpless human suffering searches for redemption, the serpent as an image and explanation of causality cannot be far away" (1995: 50). When Warburg states that "the masked dance is danced causality" - the mask and dance both symbols of Dionysus - he is suggesting that in the realm of the 'irrational' lie many of the processes that contribute to our *making-sense* of things (Warburg 1995: 48). Koerner describes how Warburg saw in the Pueblo peoples the same tendency one would find in Europe: anxieties metamorphosed into thought through an empathetic ritual of mastery over terrifying objects, which in modern times had regrettably taken form in technological domination, the serpent/lightning now trapped inside the electric wire (Warburg 2003: 18).[19]

[19] "The American of today is no longer afraid of the rattlesnake…. Natural forces are no longer seen in anthropomorphic or biomorphic guise, but rather as infinite waves obedient to the human touch. With these waves, the culture of the machine age destroys what the natural sciences, born out of myth, so arduously achieved: the space for devotion, which evolved in turn into the space required for reflection…The modern Prometheus and the modern Icarus, Franklin and the Wright brothers, who invented the dirigible airplane, are precisely those ominous destroyers of the sense of distance, who threaten to lead the planet back into chaos…Telegram and telephone destroy the cosmos. Mythical and symbolic thinking strive to form spiritual bonds between humanity and the surrounding world, shaping distance into space required for devotion and reflection: the distance undone by the instantaneous electric connection" (Warburg 1995: 48).

Warburg also suggests that we do not mistakenly label these ritualistic cultures as 'primitive' in they're being *pre*-Western, (hence, fetishizing them); he uses the cult of Dionysus to illustrate this:

> The elementary form of emotional release through Indian magical practice may strike the layman as a characteristic unique to primitive wildness, of which Europe knows nothing. And yet two thousand years ago in the very cradle of our own European culture, in Greece, cultic habits were in vogue which in crudeness and perversity far surpass what we have seen among the Indians…In the orgiastic cults of Dionysus, for example, the Maenads danced with snakes in one hand and wore live serpents as diadems in their hair, holding in the other hand the animal that was to be ripped to pieces in the ascetic sacrificial dance in honor of the god (1995: 38).

Not only are these "magical rituals" not in a position of alterity to the history of Occidental culture, they are nearly more characteristic of the latter. Koerner recounts how Warburg saw in the Hopi rituals an incarnation of the music and dance described by Nietzsche in *Birth of Tragedy,* as well as echoes of Dionysian imagery from the Renaissance. One finds a similar symbolism around the serpent in Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, where the snake is described as a choking force whose threatening nature can potentially be overcome in an act of self-affirmation:

> A young shepherd I saw, writhing, gagging, in spasms, his face distorted, and a heavy black snake hung out of his mouth. Had I ever seen so much nausea and pale dread on one face? He seemed to have been asleep when the snake crawled into his throat, and there bit itself fast. My hand tore at the snake and tore in vain; it did not tear the snake out of his throat. Then it cried out of me; "Bite! Bite its head off! Bite!" Thus it cried out of me — my dread, my hatred, my nausea, my pity, all that is good and wicked in me cried out of me with a single cry…The shepherd, however, bit as my cry counseled him; he bit with a good bite. Far away he spewed the head of the snake — and he jumped up. No longer shepherd. No longer human — one changed, radiant, laughing! Never yet on earth has a human being laughed as he laughed! O my brothers, I heard a laughter that was no human laughter; and now a thirst gnaws at me, a longing that never grows still. My longing for this laughter gnaws at me; oh, how do I bear to go on living! And how could I bear to die now! Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z: 156-160).

The snake brings both the potential for the most severe dread and for the greatest release and healing from self-enslavement, mortal suffering and helplessness, and potentially, mediocrity. Asclepius, the Apollonian god of medicine (son of Apollo, and inheritor of his healing powers) and of "departed souls with [his] roots in the subterranean realm, where the serpent makes its home," had a winding serpent on his staff as his attribute (Warburg 1995: 42). Whereas for Asclepius the snake was emblematic of therapeutic rituals and for Dionysus the benefits to be derived from it were more ambiguous, both ceremonial functions of the serpent were essentially transformative, and revealing of a certain symbolic ambivalence, as with the Greek meaning of *pharmakon*, which indicated both the healing

powers and potentially poisonous effects of a drug. Like Dionysus whose mythical narrative comprises many births, deaths, and rebirths from his fragmented – nearly entirely destroyed – flesh, the snake "also reveals by its own ability to cast off its slough, slipping, as it were, out of its own mortal remains, how a body can leave its skin and yet continue to live," making it "the most natural symbol of immortality and of rebirth from sickness and mortal anguish" (1995: 42). While the snake represents danger and the potential to perish, it also provides the channel for potential recovery, if one can reap its healing powers.

Conversely, Richter shows how for Goethe, the Laocoön serpents provided a formal *encadrement* that gave composure and structure to the scene of violence, suggesting, like Winckelmann, that the discomfort of the content got resolved or subdued through an aesthetic of containment, rather than transfiguration: "the snakes are the visual representation of *Anmut* (grace)*, that is,* the transformation of pain into *Ruhe und Einheit*," (peace and unity) and "*Reiz* into *Reiz*" (stimulus/impulse into charming appeal) (my translations) (Richter 1992: 176). In contrast, the snake described by Nietzsche's Zarathustra is a dark and potentially mortally threatening force, symbolizing nihilism in the face of pain, or resentful passivity in the midst of struggle, but ultimately something that must be confronted beyond panic in order to become more-than-human and affirm one's life.

The symbol endures in Christian imagery, transformed from its previous connotation of evil temptation: Warburg recounts entering a Protestant church in Kreuzlingen and seeing a painting of Christ on the cross and above it an image of Moses commanding Israelites to erect a brazen serpent to protect themselves from snake bites (a double contradiction to both iconoclastic traditions, the first on the basis of superstition, the second for idolatry), showing that "the image of serpent devotion [had] become paradigmatic in typological representations of the Crucifixion itself" (Warburg cited by Johnson 2012: 33). Warburg situates the serpent as "a yardstick for the changing nature of faith from fetishism to the pure religion of redemption," (Warburg 1995: 38), remarking that the Jewish tradition (that of his background) had stopped short of an affirmation of this symbol's potency and therefore remained trapped in superstition: "whereas Greek and medieval Christian traditions managed to transform the serpent into a mythical symbol of salvation, the biblical Hebrew tradition remained magical and insisted on its physical destruction" (Mali 2003: 146). As opposed to the 'finding oneself' in our earlier description of Aristotelian catharsis (a return to

self), the aim of tragedy for Nietzsche is a "being beside oneself" wherein we approach ecstasy, and without turning back toward ourselves, we "enter instead into another being" (Renzi 2000: 130).[20] In a nearly perfect paradox, by affirming ourselves, we become *another.*

Heterogeneous Becoming in the Artist/Thinker: Christ vs. Dionysus

What is instrumental about Nietzsche as a historical figure is that it is "impossible to decide whether [he] was a poet or a philosopher," a reductionist categorization he nonetheless fought to complicate (Del Caro 1981: 51). As a "Dionysian philosopher… who recognizes the futility of a system designed to persist in the face of change," his ideas were intended to be part of an active transvaluation, and this implies that his own thought also had to undergo transformation (Del Caro 1981: 51). Nietzsche writes:

> One is *fruitful* at the cost of being rich with contradictions; one remains *young* only on condition that the soul does not surrender, does not wish for peace… Nothing has grown more alien to us than that desideratum of former times, 'peace of soul', the *Christian* desideratum; nothing arouses less envy in us than the moral cow and the fat contentment of the good conscience…One has renounced life when one renounces war… (TI: 54).

Warburg, too, identified himself as *multiple,* a unity that only apparently reconciles competing or interacting factions of the self. We discuss his interdisciplinary methodology (or more accurately, a methodology unconstrained by disciplinary concepts, if this is possible) in the third chapter, but here we refer to this phrase of self-proclamation: "*Ebreo di sangue, Amburghese di cuore, d'anima Fiorentino*" (Mali 2003: 144). Written in Italian rather than his native tongue, Warburg here limits himself neither to heritage, habitat nor occupation, while simultaneously embracing them all respectively. Platonism, like Christianity, conversely assumes not only a singular transcendent goal in the form of a redemptive afterlife, but builds this metaphysics on the presumption of a unified and irreducible subject. The passions and impulsive desires of the individual are feared for their ability to fragment the human soul from its perfect unity and harmony. The Holy Trinity makes for an interesting exception, in the sense that Christ is shown with multiple affiliations and identities: he is both Father and son, mortal (Jewish) Jesus of Nazareth and

[20] This recalls the famous phrase by Arthur Rimbaud in his letter to Georges Izambard on the 13th of May, 1871: "Je est un autre" (1998: 143).

divine Christ, victim of sacrifice and redemptive authority, and born of both the Holy Ghost and his mother's body. Similarly, Dionysus, like Christ, is characterized by being *many*, a tension between opposites: east/west, male/female, mortal/divine, having many incarnations and resurrections after total annihilation.[21]

The last published words of a text written and compiled by Nietzsche himself are those with which he signs his autobiographical book *Ecce Homo* (this title reiterates the words spoken by Pontius Pilate as he presented Christ in a crown of thorns to the Jews, taken from the St. John's Gospel) in 1888: "*Dionysos against the Crucified*" (his italics) (EH: 104). The corollary relationship between these two figures can be traced through much of Nietzsche's work, but is most concentrated in this final text before the onset of his madness, at which time he writes a few more letters ending in such diverse signatures. The apparent contradictions between the values represented by both incarnations of these different religions are obvious, but the history of their interwoven representations was certainly not novel of Nietzsche. Max Baeumer explains how the German classicist/Romantic interest in the Dionysian, its association with Christ, and even the Apollo-Dionysus binary did not begin with Nietzsche:

> Winckelmann, Hamann and Herder had already discovered, comprehended, and formulated the concept Dionysian long before him. Novalis and Hölderlin united it with Christian elements in the form of poetic inspiration; Henrich Heine and Rober Hamerling, a much read novelist in Nietzsche's time, anticipated his famous antithesis 'Dionysus vs. the Crucified One'; and in the research of the German Romantics in the area of mythology and classical antiquity the antithesis Apollonian-Dionysian had been employed for decades (1976: 166).

Dionysus is shown here as a site of identification for Christ in a particularly German Romantic tradition that seeks to revive classical mythology through Christian (Protestant/Pietist) theology (Fraser 2002).[22] He "appears in just the way the Christian imagination has come to picture Christ's triumphant second coming," particularly so in Hölderlin's famous 1800-01 poem *Bread and Wine* ("*Brod und Wein*,") where the return of the god of wine is called upon both as "Dionysian intoxication" and "Christian sacrament"

[21] See Appendix 1 for a summary of Dionysus' many names, attributes, affiliations, provenances, narratives etc., far too numerous to properly address here.

[22] Nietzsche was both conscious and critical of his indebtedness to the German Romantic tradition in many instances in his writings. In his revised preface to *Birth of Tragedy*, entitled 'Attempt at Self-Criticism', he comments on his earlier work: "Isn't this [BGE] the typical creed of the romantic of 1830, masked by the pessimism of 1850? Even the usual romantic finale is sounded—break, breakdown, return and collapse before an old faith, before the old God" (2003: 11). He is here conscious of how his own classical idealism could stem from a desire to mend a broken Christian faith or creed (Fraser 2002: 58).

(Fraser 2002: 56-7) (Appendix 2; for a contemporary example of this duality, see Appendix 3). In a 2011 article by Philippe Morel, *Inspiration dionysiaque dans l'art de la Renaissance,* the historian discusses his preparations for a new book on the presence of Dionysus in the Renaissance (*Renaissance dionysiaque : inspiration bachique, imaginaire du vin et de la vigne dans l'art européen (1430-1630),* released in France in October 2014) and focuses on a 1485-7 drawing by Giovanni Antonio Boltraffio that exemplifies a convergence of representations of Christ and Dionysus (Figure 7). Rather than delving into an iconographic analysis of the overlaps of their visual tropes, Morel points to the borrowing between their interpretive traditions. One example he gives is a Leonardo da Vinci painting of Saint John the Baptist that had such pronounced Dionysian traits, religious propriety forced its transformation into a Bacchus in the 17th century. Morel suggests, not only do Renaissance artists tend to interpret Dionysus in a Christian light, moralizing ancient mythologies by filtering them through Christian values as Pierre Bersuire had done in 1350 with his *Ovidius Moralizatus*, and Donatello by painting the *putti* from Dionysian sarcophagi as contemporarily Christian, but there is also a latent presence of Dionysus in the anthropological roots of Christianity (2011). Other scholars allude to the many accounts in late antiquity of Dionysus' life (circa third to fifth centuries AD) that are modelled after Christ's, from sacred birth to a destiny as an earthly saviour, and show that as a "bringer of joy," Dionysus was nonetheless "predestined for suffering and death – the suffering and death of a god!" (Otto 1965: 65).[23] As Del Caro puts it, both "refused to stay dead" and hence symbolized an affirmation of life even after being dealt its worse hand, death by violence and betrayal (1981: 113). We can only allude to the numerous points of convergence in the philological and representational traditions of Christ and Dionysus, beyond the obvious, fundamental, divergent historical contexts in which they belonged (see Appendix 4 for a brief iconographic analysis). Essentially, Dionysus and Christ remain emblems of multiple identity, transfiguration and resurrection/return, characteristics that often defined Nietzsche's formulations in representing himself.

It is worthwhile to explore how this plural becoming manifests in relation to Greek tragedy. In Euripides' *The Bacchae* (405 BC), those who resist Dionysus fall victim to

[23] For an extended list of these comparisons both on the Pagan and Christian sides see: David Hernandez de la Fuente, "Parallels between Dionysos and Christ in Late Antiquity: Miraculous Healings in Nonnus' Dionysicaa," in Alberto Bernabe et coll., *Redefining Dionysos*, Boston: De Gruyter, 2013.

tragedy, while those who affirm him rejoice. Agave, sister of Dionysus' dead mother, Semele, and her son Pentheus, the Thracian King, deny the divinity of Dionysus when he returns to his place of birth. When the other villagers go to the mountain and forests to celebrate him with various rituals, Agave participates, but unlike the other Thracian women, does so under involuntary *possession*. The crucial moment is when Agave returns holding up the head of her son which she just tore from his body with bare hands, and still entranced, calls to find him proudly to flaunt her hunting trophy. She is told by her father Cadmus to raise her eyes to the sky, which breaks her spell and brings her to the horrific realization that she just violently dismembered her own offspring. Dionysus' trance did not necessarily *instruct* her what to do, but a plural nature rather acted through her once she was removed from her social context, a consequence of her disavowal and impiety (perhaps an ancient metaphor for repression). The aged seer Tiresias had warned Pentheus and Cadmus before the tragic events that Agave and her son were unwise to question the powers of this god, particularly so in their fear that his rites may corrupt the women. The two older and wiser men, Tiresias and Cadmus, participated voluntarily, the former explaining how those who give themselves to the celebrations emerge without any imposed alteration to their character:

> It is not for Dionysus to force your women to be chaste, but chastity [in all circumstances and at all times] depends on their nature. You must look at all the facts. The chaste woman will not be corrupted even amid the Bacchic rites. Do you see? (1999: 53).

Earlier in the play, the women are described as "stung to frenzy from their looms and shuttles," which bids them to leave behind their domestic routines for the singing, dancing and rituals in the mountains (1999: 48). Philippe Sollers quotes Walter Otto when he says that impiety in Agave is here related to an over-identification between mother and son, hence a resistance to more porous boundaries of femininity (and masculinity) that occur in Dionysian states: "Faire sauter les liens du devoir conjugal et de la moralité domestique pour suivre sur les cimes la torche du dieu et remplir les forêts de sauvages cris d'allégresse, voilà à quoi Dionysos appelle les femmes" (2007: 213). Similarly, Christ told his disciples "if any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple" (Luke 14: 26).[24] In other

[24] "Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to turn a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law - a man's enemies will be the members of his own household. Anyone who loves his father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; anyone who loves his son or daughter more than me is not worthy

words, on the divine path one necessarily leaves behind the social and moral familiarity of one's life. Nietzsche likewise distanced himself from the collective values of heredity and lineage:

> All the prevalent notions of degrees of kinship are physiological nonsense in an unsurpassable measure. The Pope still deals today in this nonsense. One is least related to one's parents: it would be the most extreme sign of vulgarity to be related to one's parents. Higher natures have their origins infinitely farther back, and with them had to be assembled, saved and hoarded. The great individuals are the oldest: I don't understand it, but Julius Caesar could be my father – or Alexander, this Dionysos incarnate… (EH: 24).

Consensus and loyalty through affiliation – even among friends – (in more negative terms, group morality or mob mentality) are shown as inhibitors to learning: "The man of knowledge must be able not only to love his enemies but also to hate his friends" (EH: 6). It is through a self-*forgetting* (in terms of identification) that one attains a higher experience of Self (in terms of becoming).[25] This form of becoming is a contrary impulse to the idealizing *mimesis* of the 'greats' praised by Winckelmann. *Ecce Homo,* despite being filled with coy and hyperbolic self-praise, reads as a philosophical autobiography of a thinker that is aware of his immanently monumental significance to psycho-cultural history, yet suggests that the only way to participate in its vitality is to renounce him as an idealized model for emulation[26]:

> You are my believers: but of what importance are all believers? You had not yet sought yourselves when you found me. Thus do all believers; therefore all belief is of so little account. Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves and only *when you have all denied me* will I return to you (quoted from Z in final words of foreword; EH: 6).

In his introduction to the book, Michael Tanner explains that for Nietzsche "one becomes what one is not by being anyone else – something that is in any case impossible,

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of me; and anyone who does not take his cross and follow me is not worthy of me. Whoever finds his life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake will find it" (Luke 10:34-36).

[25] Needless to say, this would not be a Nietzschean point without its flavour of contradiction: within a few pages he is touting the rare values and character traits inherited from his deceased father, boasts of his noble Polish ancestry, and later, devotes an entire chapter to cherishing his now defunct close friendship with Wagner, while simultaneously expressing regret for using his own intellectual work as a mouthpiece for Wagnerian causes on the public stage. In *Zarathustra*, one detects a certain nostalgia or loyalty in Nietzsche to these intellectual and cultural forefathers, suggesting a humanistic sentiment of indebtedness to one's teachers: "Through my children I will make good my debt as child of my fathers and through all the future make good *this* present" (in Bruford 1975: 182). It is important to note, however, that as usual, this allegiance is more an active forgetfulness or a critical surpassing than a reifying attachment: "One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil" (EH: 6).

[26] Many consider this hyperbolic book as indicative of his descent into madness and therefore less credible than his previous works; however, just as many disagree with this, including Del Caro who calls it the "highest achievement of Nietzsche's philosophy" (24).

but that has not deterred most people, including all admirers of Thomas à Kempis' *Imitation of Christ,* a book for which Nietzsche felt especial distaste, from making the attempt" (EH: X). The "systematic ingratitude toward those great figures who meant most to him" is characteristic of Nietzsche, not as mere character assassination nor as an indication that he didn't take their influence seriously, but rather as revealing of an active engagement with them as "personifications of attitudes to life" (EH: X-XV). Idolizing one's predecessors is not productive to interpretations of their work: "reality has been deprived of its value, its meaning, its veracity to the same degree an ideal world has been *fabricated*" (EH: 3). The creative act always involves a preliminary destruction: existing values have to be taken apart in order for new values to be assigned meaning, not simply as a reactionary counter-balancing of existing value systems (as a polarization), but a de-systematization of "what seems natural to us," as Heidegger describes it, "presumably just the familiarity of a long-established custom which has forgotten the unfamiliarity from which it arose" (1975: 24).

Critique of Romanticism and the Art of 'Effects'

Despite the dual self-association with Christ, Nietzsche's allegiance is clearly to being "a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus," as when he states about his own legacy that he "prefer to be even a satyr rather than a saint" (EH: 3),[27] consistent with the other critiques of intellectual hagiography we've seen so far. Where in *Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche described a dualizing tension, "the new Dionysus exists in the absence of Apollo, as the sovereign entity," as we find him in Nietzsche's final work (Del Caro 1981: 12). Still, Nietzsche was explicit in distinguishing Dionysian expressiveness from unrestrained emotionalism, sensationalism and theatricality, most acutely in his critiques of Romanticism.[28] His most

[27] It is difficult here not to think of the ancient figure (and "street"-philosopher/kynic) Diogenes, but also of the satyrs themselves (men with goat features and erect penises) who were said to compose the retinue of Dionysus along with the maenads, personified by their older and drunken leader, Silenus.

[28] In this passage from *Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche revises his romantic ideas*:* "*What is Romanticism* – You see what I misjudged both in philosophical pessimism and in German music was what constitutes its actual character – its *romanticism*. What is romanticism? Every art, every philosophy can be considered a cure and aid in the service of growing, struggling life: they always presuppose suffering and sufferers. But there are two types of sufferers: first, those who suffer from a *superabundance of life* – they want a Dionysian art as well as a tragic outlook and insight into life; then, those who suffer from an *impoverishment of life* and seek quiet, stillness, calm seas, redemption from themselves through art and insight, or else intoxication, paroxysm, numbness, madness. All romanticism in art and knowledge fits the dual needs of the latter type, as did (and do)

scathing critique in this context is for the later work of his previous companion, Wagner, whose 1876 premiere of *Ring of the Nibelung* at the unveiling of the Bayreuth opera house – a project which Nietzsche had initially fiercely endorsed – led to his final break with him for personal, artistic, and ideological reasons, as well as for those of 'taste' (Förster-Nietzsche 2013, originally published in 1922). In 1888-89, Nietzsche writes:

> This music is addressed to inartistic persons; all possible means are employed by which an *effect* can be created. It is not an *artistic effect* that is achieved, but one operating solely upon the *nerves* (...) Wagner has no faith in the genuine confidence in *music*, in order to invest it with the quality of greatness, he calls to his aid related emotions. He tunes himself to the key *of others*, and first gives his listeners an intoxicating drink in order to make them believe that they have been *intoxicated by the music itself*… Apparently, Wagner wishes to create an *art for all,* which explains his employment of coarse and refined means…*Wagner* has made the *dangers of realism* very acute… (Förster-Nietzsche 2013: 276).

Roberts shows how Mallarmé and Nietzsche, originally advocates of Wagner's conception, were critical of the "seductive power of music" and were clear in calling for the necessity of "great poetry and thought" (Roberts 2011: 79). Dionysus had become for Nietzsche the *Kunstgott* (art god) who returns to mortals as a philosopher in "his courage as investigator and discoverer, his daring honesty, truthfulness and love of wisdom" (BGE: 220). When he says, "for many, abstract thinking is a toil; for me, on good days, it is feast and frenzy," he un-binds Dionysian imagery from its association with pure *un*reason (in Heidegger 1991: 5). The cult and myths of Dionysus and its literal associations with excess become "realities of a distant past," given that Nietzsche was not particularly interested in a "new comus" of the god through a revival of his rites (Del Caro 1981: 93).[29] To the critique that Nietzsche did not himself personify Bacchic traits and therefore worshipped Dionysus as a compensation for a lack (Nietzsche was notoriously modest, discrete and ascetic in his lifestyle and personal engagements, far from living a life of extravagant eroticism and flagrant disinhibition), Del Caro responds: "the fact that Nietzsche did not take part in the worship of Dionysus as an intoxicated, uncritical disciple reflects favourably upon him, and does not in the least sense constitute a 'gap between teaching and practice'" (1981: 93).

Despite the fact that "the synthesis of the arts in the service of social and cultural regeneration was a particularly German dream, which made Wagner and Nietzsche the other

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Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner, to name the most famous and prominent romantics that I *misunderstood* at the time – *not,* incidentally, to their disadvantage (GM: 234-235)

[29] "But in the nineteenth century, Dionysus himself is still conceived in different forms: from god of wine and intoxication to god of laceration and mystery" (Renzi 2000: 135).

center of aesthetic modernism, alongside Baudelaire and Mallarmé," Roberts shows how for Nietzsche, Wagner personified *the modern* artist, signaling the emergence of the actor in music and "the total transformation of art into the theatrical" (2011: 1, 5). Nietzsche saw pessimism in those went to art for *intoxication* or entertainment, not themselves capable of "thought and passion" (GS: 8, 87). Whereas formerly theatrical art was integrated into life, celebration and cultural activity, now it provided an 'escape' from daily mundanity (a foreshadowing of the culture of cinema and television):

> What do all our art of artworks matter if we lose that higher art, the art of festivals! Formerly, all artworks were displayed on the great festival road of humanity, as commemorations and memorials of high and happy monuments. Now one uses artworks to lure poor, exhausted, and sick human beings to the side of humanity's road of suffering for a short lascivious moment; one offers them a little intoxication and madness (GS: 89).

Like Burckhardt and Warburg[30], Nietzsche focused on festivals because as opposed to artistic experiences that marked a "transition from life to art," the festivals of the ancients and the Renaissance "went from art to life" (Mali 2003: 131). He vehemently criticized art as a *cause* or "art for art's sake" as "self-narcotization," and so instead asked about "an art for artists" (WP: 20). Art, as its own end, merely supplants the need for a transcendental absolute value. After Nietzsche had announced the death of God through the mouth of a madman in the market place (GS: n.125), many were now eager to fill the seat of dogma that had been left empty, much as the opera house had replaced the cathedral as *the* intermedial artistic forum. Eric Michaud expands on the displacement of this lack:

> Ever since the death of God, the religion of art of the Romantics, the new priests and seers, had entrusted to the community of artists the heritage no longer assumed by the Christian church: namely the task of winning people over by rejecting the life of this world and offering in exchange an image of a better world to come, an image able to lead people toward physical and moral perfection (Roberts 2011: 3).

Nietzsche however, did not dress up his own tastes as absolutes or metaphysical and moral ideals; for him, "thoughts [were] the shadows of our sensations – always darker, emptier, simpler" (GS: 179) so that his objections to Wagner's music were essentially

[30] "In the late fifteenth century, the antique as a source of poised and measured beauty – the hallmark of its influence as we have grown to see it since Winckelmann – still counted for comparatively little. The figures of ancient myth appeared before Italian society not as plaster casts but in person, as figures full of life and color, in the festival pageants through which pagan *joie de vivre* had kept its foothold in popular culture. The Bacchus and Ariadne in an engraving probably based on a drawing by Botticelli (Figure 3) are the perfect embodiment of antiquity as the early Renaissance saw it. This was the image of the god of earthly exuberance, as Catullus had described him, surrounded by his riotous chorus of Bacchantes – and as Florence actually saw him, enthroned on his chariot in the festive pageant for which Lorenzo De Medici himself wrote the accompanying triumphal song" (Warburg 1999: 161).

"physiological," and begged the question of why he should need to "disguise them with aesthetic formulas?" (GS: 232). *Taste* was not a principle applied or imposed unanimously across variegated contexts and peoples, nor as Kant had stated in 1790 could an "objective rule of taste by which what is beautiful [may] be defined by concepts" (Kant 2008: 62). Taste is too primary and personal an experience to be reduced conceptually and hence, *universalized* or relativized. Nietzsche shows that artistic taste is inseparable from how one *lives,* indicating where he situates meaning in the aesthetic experience or encounter: "To 'give style' to one's character – a great and rare art!" (GS: 163). G.A. Morgan explains the highest point of this art form as life-affirmation:

> In the crisis of human values Nietzsche's final position is: instead of condemning reality as not to our 'taste,' let us cultivate a taste for reality. The supreme achievement of this goal is the Dionysian relationship to existence, Nietzsche's formula for which is *amor fati* – love of fate which returns everlastingly (cited by Del Caro 1981:109).

By definition, life-affirmation is the *manière d'être* of the artist. In *Nietzsche Volume 2: Will to Power as Art,* Heidegger suggests that Nietzsche sees the "aesthetic state of the observer and recipient on the basis of the state of the creator," the experience of "*arousal of the art-creating state,* rapture" (Nietzsche in Heidegger 1995: 117). An artist sees things not as they merely *are* nor *should be*, but more "fully, simply, strongly" and with "a kind of habitual rapture" as the *modus* of their life (1995: 116). Rather than artistic experience functioning as a cathartic release or as an "appreciation of a work of art," with Nietzsche it pertains most poignantly to the state of the artist (Gardener in Gemes; Richardson: 612). In *Human all Too Human,* in a section entitled '*Against the Art of Works of Art*' [*Gegen die Kunst der Kunstwerke*], Nietzsche distinguishes between "(i) art in the sense of a 'great, indeed immense task', which is undertaken with respect to oneself and consists of a transformation of one's powers, and (ii) the quite distinct sense of 'what is usually termed art, *that of the work of art*'," only the latter of which has been given proper consideration, but is "in fact a mere *appendage*" (2003: 612). Like the historian who must know how to *participate* in history-making in order to understand it, the spectator can only really experience the work of art "to the extent that he is himself an artist as well and contributes the forms to the work" (2003: 612). In *Spurs,* Derrida expands on this shift of attention as one away from the passive (feminine) receptive consumers of art to an aesthetics of (implied, masculine) producers (1979: 75). Nietzsche saw philosophy's 'old aesthetics' as the

only one existing until his time, where in discussions of 'what is beautiful?' precisely the perspective of "*the artist [had] been lacking*" (Derrida citing Nietzsche: 1979: 75).[31] The art of the artist renews a joy in surface and foregrounds the information one derives from one's senses, more important even than the search for meaning: "The will to appearance, to illusion, to deception, to becoming and change (to objectified deception) here counts as more profound, primeval, 'metaphysical' than the will to truth, to reality, to mere appearance: the last is itself merely a form of the will to illusion" (WP: 453). This culminates in an aesthetics of creation rather than reception, or one in which the art object/subject, artist/audience encounter comes into immediate proximity. To discern a Nietzschean aesthetics surrounding art objects, historical periods, artistic movements or particular artists becomes unfeasible, inasmuch as these are to him simply *manifestations* or results of the artistic drive, but do not encompass or define it:

> If we ask how Nietzsche defines the work, we receive no answer. For Nietzsche's meditation on art – and precisely this meditation, as aesthetics in the extreme – does not inquire into the work as such, at least not in the first place. … only creation as a life-process is discussed, a life-process conditioned by rapture. (Heidegger 1991: 115).

Left with how to interpret Nietzsche's art as *truth, life,* and the highest value in existence *within* the context of art history, we turn our look to the discipline as a whole.

[31] "For the artist "beauty" is something outside all hierarchical order, since in it opposites are joined – the supreme sign of power, power over things in opposition; furthermore, without tension: – that there is no further need of force, that everything so easily *follows, obeys,* and brings to its obedience the most amiable demeanor – this fascinates the will to power of the artist" (Nietzsche in Heidegger 1991: 117).

Art History as Art History

When we catch ourselves in the act of making-sense of an artwork in this way, then we experience for ourselves that fundamental making-sense from which, for Heidegger, all genuine meaning ultimately derives.

Stanford Encyclopaedia entry on "Heidegger's Aesthetics" (Thomson 2011).

L'œuvre de Bataille, quoi qu'elle ait pu énoncer sur elle-même, sur sa propre condition solitaire et « maladive », sur son propre usage « suppliciant » de la vision, aura introduit dans la connaissance des images quelque chose comme sa – ou leur – faille constitutive : quand l'art est généralement pensé à travers sa fonction réconciliante, Bataille, lui, aura parlé du désir, de déchirure et de dissonance, voire de catastrophe, mais aussi de jeu avec la déchirure, de gai savoir de la catastrophe. Quand l'art est généralement pensé à travers sa fonction représentationnelle et sa capacité à offrir les « bonnes » ressemblances du monde, Bataille aura fait de la ressemblance un processus cruellement « dialectique ». La ressemblance informe : elle donne certes forme et crée des liens dans la connaissance ; mais elle sait aussi faire du contact une déchirure, rompre les liens et se construire dans la décomposition même des éléments qu'elle utilise ; moyennant quoi elle devient cette paradoxale ressemblance informe que Bataille n'a cessé de convoquer et de produire, dans le jeu infernal – dans l'essentielle dialectique, du semblable et dissemblable.

Georges Didi-Huberman, *La ressemblance informe: ou le gai savoir visuel selon Georges Bataille* (1995: 381).

Disciplining Art History and the Problem of Clôture

To discuss "art history," we are confirming the presumption of a consensual understanding of what this title signifies. There are various starting points for it as a discipline: one is Giorgio Vasari's *Lives of Artists* (c. 1550) which catalogued other artists like himself and their work, sometimes devotionally in the case of an idealized artist (Michelangelo) or rather disparagingly in his less-liked artists like Raphael, but was nonetheless a first attempt at an encyclopaedic survey of Western art (excluding proto-histories of art in antiquity, like Pliny's). Didi-Huberman shows how Vasari, like Pliny before him (77 CE), still undertook history in a narrative structure (as *chronique*), whereas Winckelmann *invented art history* in the 18th century to the extent that he systematized it with modern notions of history and their associations with the 'positivistic' sciences (2002: 11-13). Still, while Winckelmann to some degree schematized 'art history', using the phrase on the cover of his book and thus categorizing his own work for the reader, at the time he still would've been viewed as a philologist or a classical historian. It was not until the 19th century that art history began to discover its autonomy as expressed through its professionalization and institutionalization in academia. In the last few decades, it has splintered into many directions that each offers its revised approach on the host discipline such as visual culture, postcolonialism, gender theory, identity studies and queer theory in contemporary art, museum and curatorial studies etc., detectable by the creation of new department sub-sections and disciplines in these areas, particularly in Anglo-Saxon university curricula (this disciplinary fragmentation is less notable in France and Germany where there still exists a more rigorous distinction between critical theory, philosophy and art history departments, for example). In a sense, art history has had a very short lifespan as far as its consolidated autonomy is concerned. Erwin Panofsky (1892-1968) describes its nascent struggle to distinguish itself from other humanistic disciplines:

> Though rooted in a tradition that can be traced back to the Italian Renaissance and, beyond that, to classical antiquity, the history of art – that is to say, the historical analysis and interpretation of man-made objects to which we assign a more than utilitarian value, as opposed to aesthetics, criticism, connoisseurship and "appreciation" on the one hand, and to purely antiquarian studies on the other – is a comparatively recent addition to the family of academic disciplines. And it so happens that, as an American scholar expressed it, "its native tongue is German." It was in the German-speaking countries that it was first recognized as a full-fledged *Fach*, that it was cultivated with particular intensity, and that it exerted an increasingly noticeable influence upon adjacent fields, including even its elder and more conservative sister, classical archaeology. The

> first book to flaunt the phrase "history of art" on its title page was Winckelmann's *Geschichte der Kunst des Alertums* of 1764, and the methodical foundations of the new discipline were laid in Karl Friedrich von Rumohr's *Italienische Forschungen* of 1827. … And in the course of the years the rapidly multiplying university chairs in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland were graced by men whose names have never lost their magic: Jacob Burckhardt, Julius von Schlosser, Franz Wickhoff, Carl Justi, Alois Riegl, Max Dvorak, Georg Dehio, Heinrich Wölfflin, Aby Warburg, Adolph Goldschmidt, Wilhelm Vöge …. But the fact remains that at the time of the Great Exodus in the 1930s, the German-speaking countries still held the leading position in the history of art – except for the United States of America (1974: 322).

The transition from a Euro-centric art history to a North American one will be treated later, but for now, we will focus on "art history" as a term that first rolled off the German tongue (to stay with the metaphor just mentioned). The crystallization of the discipline was not instantaneous despite its having first whisperings in the mid 18th century with Winckelmann, rather, as Panofsky continues,

> … art history evolved into *an autonomous discipline* from the beginning of the twentieth century, and after the First World War (which terminus post quem is, of course, of portentous significance) it began to challenge the supremacy not long of the German-speaking countries, but because of the fact that its founding fathers (…) *were not the products of an established tradition* but had come to history of art from classical philology, theology, and philosophy, literature, architecture, or just collecting. *They established a profession by following an avocation*…. At the beginning, the new discipline had to fight its way out of an entanglement with practical art instruction, art appreciation, and that amorphous monster "general education" (my italics) (1974: 322).

Art history thus emerged from 'progenitors' who were trained in other fields and with the creation of new professorships cum university chairs, gradually carved out the conventional expectations of their discipline. Art history's identity is then inextricably linked to the way it has attempted to both borrow from and define itself as separate from its parent and sibling disciplines. The tendency for art history once coming into 'its own' to forget or disavow the genealogical foundations of some of its borrowed concepts is looked at by Georges Didi-Huberman in *Confronting Images* (*Devant l'image*), when he asks whether one has only to think about it to know that "the art historian, in his every gesture, however humble or complex, however routine, is always making *philosophical choices*" (2005: 5). It is precisely in that disciplinary gap or overlap in the history of art history with that of philosophy (or arguably, philology, classical studies, and historicism) that Nietzsche's presence has been overlooked, forgotten or repressed.

In one recent example of mainstream art criticism, the February 2014 issue of *Art Forum* features two separate articles entitled "Beyond Good and Evil: Jonathan Rosenbaum on Claude Lanzmann's *The Last of the Unjust*" (2014: 65) and "Eternal Return: Jeffrey

Weiss on Robert Morris' Recent Work" (2014: 175). The author of the first is a specialist on cinema (the subject is a Holocaust film) and the second is written by a senior curator at the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in New York, an adjunct professor of Fine Arts at New York University, and the author of a book on Robert Morris recently published entitled *Robert Morris: Object Sculpture* (1960-65). While both are experts in the artistic fields on which they write, neither mention Nietzsche's name, despite the first article's title being the name of one of his most well-known books, and the second one of his most renowned, yet complex and misunderstood concepts. While there may be in these articles veiled tongue-in-cheek nods to Nietzsche's philosophy or legacy, those would not be detectable to just any reader; rather, the Nietzschean references are used as catchphrases that are phonetically familiar, vaguely contextualized, but functional nonetheless as a *flavouring* that is for the most part, unrelated to the discussed content. Didi-Huberman refers to this as art history's use of "magic words":

> So the spontaneous, instrumental and uncritical use of certain philosophical notions leads the history of art to fashion for itself not potions of love or oblivion but *magic words*: lacking conceptual rigor; they are nonetheless efficacious at *resolving* everything, which is to say at dissolving or suppressing a universe of questions the better to advance, optimistic to the point of tyranny, a battalion of answers (2005: 6).

The *application* of such terms is therefore not only a conduit for making practical, useful or positivistic terms that come from an atmosphere rife with theoretical nuance and uncertainty, but also fails to apply the term in a way that would support the intellectual integrity of the idea *as a concept*. In the context of Nietzsche, this is even more poignant as he was a philosopher who constantly stressed the variability and indeterminacy of notions of truth; therefore to use his ideas in the service of a "*tone of certainty*" that looks to art for "answers that are *already given* by its discursive problematic," is of the greatest irony when referencing his work (2005: 2, 4). It is the *tone* of certainty that is more problematic than whether the facts are accurately situated or not, and begs the question: *particularly* when dealing with art – can being 'exact' mean saying *the truth*? (2005: 4).

Such meta-questions are often met with indignation by art historians, as if having to refer to other disciplinary paradigms was an insult to art history's 'autonomy'. When discussing the Kantian *tone* that pervades most art history since Panofsky – "a "Kantian syndrome" in which Kant would scarcely recognize himself" – Didi-Huberman asks coyly if "such problems are too general? That they no longer concern the history of art and should be

considered in another building on the university campus, the one off in the distance occupied by the department of philosophy?" (2005: 5). This tendency to strive for a '*reciprocal closure*' between the fields of philosophy and art history offers a situation of convenience to the art historian who can borrow freely from philosophy's bank of ideas, claim that he or she is *applying* them to a more exact (and less 'metaphysical') cultural science, and then simultaneously not need to verify these ideas within their historical and intellectual contingency (Didi-Huberman 1990: 45):

> The philosopher will remain "brilliant," which is to say pointless for the art historian, who, for his part, will justify the paucity of his problematics by telling himself that at least everything they advance is correct (he is accurate, he has found the answer). So goes the scientistic illusion in the history of art. So goes the *illusion of specificity*, with regard to a field of study nonetheless indefinable, save as a relative field, and, oh, how unstable! Perhaps art historians think they are keeping their object themselves and safeguarding it when they enclose it within what they call a specificity. But by doing so, they enclose themselves within the limits imposed on the object by this premise – this ideal, this ideology – of closure (Didi-Huberman 2005: 34).

The art historian who most lamented the enframing "border police" (Preziosi 2009: 153) or closure of his discipline (*clôture* as an enclosure or a dividing fence) was Aby Warburg, who one can not speak of without mentioning an array of other disciplines in the same breath including: classical studies, history, anthropology, natural sciences, astrology/astronomy, philosophy, psychology, visual culture, and even, art itself (Warburg 2003: 50). Fritz Saxl (1890-1948) described how in Warburg's library, the books on philosophy, astrology, magic, folklore, religion, literature, and art were all arranged in proximity, constantly undergoing new configurations and groupings (in Mali 2005: 50). In his final project, *Bilderatlas* or *Mnemosyne*: *A Picture Book for a Critique of Pure Unreason* (referencing Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* 1781), Warburg places images from vastly different cultural epochs and historical categories on a single comparative plane, regrouped by filiation around a given *Pathosformel* or visual configuration of movement. The question as to his disciplinary methodology becomes especially pertinent in this case, given the complexity we've already seen inherent in art history's (trans)disciplinary framework(s) and the fact that he's our most *immediate* art historical link to Nietzsche. It will also help us to refine the parameters of what gets deemed properly *art historical* and what does not.

As this paper too is one that deals with *interpretations*, and hence aims to provide an overview of the manifest interpretations of Nietzsche's thought that run as subterranean currents through art history, we can not afford to go into depth about all the art historians and other theorists we mention and the specificities of their work.[32] Rather, we are assuming a certain basic knowledge of art historical reference points in the reader in order to facilitate an examination of the history of his *reception*, rather than an analysis of the methodologies used by the many *receptors* of this thought. As he is one of the most direct mediators of Nietzsche's presence in the discipline, we will undertake a brief examination of Warburg's reception in art history, which has by no means been unanimous or constant. Michaud explains that despite the surge of popularity of Warburg in European and American academic contexts in the past few decades, this enhanced reception does not necessarily embrace the intricacies of his work nor its varied implications:

> *Mais le respect, la « référence-révérence», dirai-je, ne suffisent pas à dessiner un assentiment. Souvent, même, ils finissent par – ou servent à – immobiliser, stopper le mouvement. C'est une façon de se mettre à distance : soit on utilisera les notions de* Nachleben *ou de* Pathosformeln *comme des lieux communs, des formules vides, des généralités sans substance théorique ; soit on estimera qu'à l'heure du post-modernisme ces expressions sont désormais vieilles, dépassées, inactuelles* (1998: 9).

Somewhat paradoxically, some of the most instrumental figures in *obscuring* Warburg's work or overshadowing its reception with reformed approaches and discourses were in fact his most notable successors, most prominently Erwin Panofsky and Ernst Gombrich. Panofsky was Privatdozent in Art History at the recently founded University of Hamburg as of 1921 and its first full time professor as of 1927, also working in an intellectual circle centered on the Warburg Institute comprising Ernst Cassirer and Fritz Saxl, the latter with whom he wrote the monograph *Melencolia I* (1923), later reworked and translated into English with Raymond Klibansky (1964). This group had moved away from purely formalist or inversely contextual approaches to situating meaning in works of art, so that form and content were "continuous, … complex, and multilayered" rather than dualistic (Preziosi 2009: 217). Panofsky's system of 'reading' art works is structured along three

[32] In a sense, we are illustrating our own problematic by showing the restrictiveness of dealing with a discipline that has such vastly expansive theoretical potential.

stages of knowing: the first a knowledge of objects (pre-iconographical description), the second a knowledge of texts (iconography), and the third a 'synthetic intuition' or "the familiarity with the 'essential tendencies' of the human mind" in a given historical/cultural context: iconology (2009: 217). He had notoriously broken with "his mother tongue" and adopted English once moving permanently to the United States in 1934 due to Nazism, which had culminated in his dismissal from the university and the death of several dozen family members. With this change he also broke with "a whole world of thought – that of the first three decades of the century in Germany: that of Heidegger and Jung, but also of Nietzsche and Freud, of Benjamin and Ernst Bloch" (Didi-Huberman 2005: xxiv). Didi-Huberman suggests Panofsky usurped Warburg's *Nachleben* into an iconographic method to try and "disentangle 'pure reason' from 'pure unreason', and did so supported 'by the Anglo-Saxon context' which tended to emphasize clarity and pragmatism (2005: xxv)[33]:

> Where Warburg deconstructed the whole of nineteenth-century historicism by showing that the *Geschichte der Kunst* is a *(hi)story of ghosts* that stick to our skin, Panofsky wanted to reconstruct his *Kunstgeschichte* as a *history of exorcisms*, of safety measures and reasonable distancings… Panofsky brought his work to a close with a return to an iconography ever more attentive to the *identification of motifs* (isolated as entities), whereas Warburg never ceased subverting iconography through the analysis of the *contamination of motifs* (amalgamated into networks) (2005: xxiii).

Panofksy had deemed Alois Riegl's idea of *Kunstwollen* (which we will come to later) too "psychological," preferring to define it "through a concept based not on *generic concepts* obtained by abstraction from characteristic artistic phenomena, but on *fundamental concepts (Grundbegriffen)* that expose the inherent root of [the artworks] essence and reveal their immanent meaning," positing a 'universal objectivity' which he illustrates with an example from Kant's *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (2005: 105). In "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," Panofsky describes this pursuit of objectivity: "The humanist, then, rejects authority. But he respects tradition. Not only does he respect it, but he looks upon it as upon something real and objective which has to be studied and, if necessary,

[33] Didi-Huberman's dissatisfaction with Panofksy and Gombrich's reconstruction of Warburg's *Nachleben* gets turned into an accusation against him when Karl Sierek suggests that his definition of Warburg's *dynamogramme* (as a sort of 'energetic potential' of the image) weighs too heavily on his interpretation of it as the 'form of forms across time', reducing its reach to a diachronic history of the *visual* image. He suggests rather to take Warburg's idea in a synchronic way to open its applications to other mediums and theoretical paradigms: "*Seule l'intégration de recherches concernant l'appareillage et la textualité de l'image permet d'adapter aux différents médiums, avec toutes les nuances requises, le formidable potentiel analytique de l'univers warburgien*" (2009: 51).

reinstated: "*nos vetera instauramus, nova non prodimus,*" as Erasmus [of Rotterdam] puts it" (in Fernie 1995: 185). Situating the dichotomy between the artist and the historian (or humanist), Panofsky asks: "How, then, is it possible to build up art history as a respectable scholarly discipline, if its very objects come into being by an irrational and subjective process?" (1995: 15). He does allow that 'archaeological' tools (X-ray devices etc.) are complimented by "re-creative" synthetic processes that determine style (things seen and assessed with the naked eye) (1995: 16), establishing the need for both precise (empirical/deductive) and synthetic (intuitive) drives in artistic analysis.

Nietzsche had rather attempted to expose this polarization between the irrationality of the creative (or re-creative) process and the objectivity of the analyst as untenable. He repeatedly critiques the equation of creativity or re(creation) with irrationality (1878):

> 155 *Belief in inspiration* – Artists have an interest in the existence of a belief in the sudden occurrence of ideas, in so-called inspirations; as though the idea of a work of art, a poem, the basic proposition of a philosophy flashed down from heaven like a ray of divine grace. In reality, the imagination of a good artist or thinker is productive continually, of good, mediocre and bad things, but his *power of judgment*, sharpened and practised to the highest degree, rejects, selects, knots together; as we can now see from Beethoven's notebooks how the most glorious melodies were put together gradually and as it were culled out of many beginnings. He who selects less rigorously and likes to give himself up to his imitative memory can, under the right circumstances, become a great improviser; but artistic improvisation is something very inferior in relation to the serious and carefully fashioned artistic idea. All the great artists have been great workers, inexhaustible not only in invention but also in rejecting, sifting, transforming, ordering (HH: 83).

Nietzsche had not only shown that the historian was necessarily biased and always *personally* inflected (in an inexhaustible dance between reason and unreason), but he had also conversely shown that *judgment*, discrimination, and conscious analysis were instrumental to creativity. In a counter-gesture, Gombrich had like Panofsky tried to re-establish the boundaries between subjective and objective parameters in the historian's relationship to his objects (artworks/artists) of study. He had also levelled the word "psychoanalytical" as an accusation against connections made between Warburg's work on primitive symbols and his Jewish heritage (a connection Warburg had himself put forth), preferring to divorce the 'man' from his works (1995: 16). In 1970, Gombrich was director of the Warburg Institute in London when he published his biography on Aby Warburg, which many like Hans Liebeschutz argued was all-too-"intellectual" (145) and perhaps even stood in the way of Warburg's idea of *Nachleben* as [eternal] return becoming a fixture "in the back of art historians minds" (Didi-Huberman 2003a: 276):

> First, Gombrich had to invalidate the dialectical structure of survival; that is, he had to deny that a double rhythm, comprising both survivals and renascences, organize and renders hybrid or impure the temporality of image and motifs. Gombrich went so far as to claim that Warburg's survivals amount to nothing but revivals. The second gambit on Gombrich's agenda – to invalidate the anachronistic structure of *Nachleben* – demanded no more than a return to Anton Springer, to Springer's reperiodization of the distinction between survival and renascence. In other words, Gombrich sought to reduce a theoretical distinction to one more simply chronological (between Middle ages and Renaissance). He then finished the job by distinguishing the obscure "tenacity" of medieval survival from the inventive "flexibility" of imitations *all'antica*, which only a renascence worthy of the name – the Renaissance of the fifteenth century – could produce (2003a: 276).

In "Artistic Survival: Panofsky vs. Warburg and the Exorcism of Impure Time," Didi-Huberman unites Gombrich, Panofsky and Saxl in their combined effort to eradicate "all that is nonchronological or anachronistic in the polarization, the double rhythm, of classical survival and classical resurrection" in Warburg's work, basically its "structural or synchronic content" (2003a: 278). Gombrich's reworking of Warburg's thought had essentially eradicated the remnants of precisely Nietzsche's theoretical impact. While Gombrich stated in his book on Warburg (1986) that the latter was not a 'Nietzschean', scholars have criticized his position for either understating or over-rationalizing Nietzsche's influence (Iversen 1993). Gombrich himself conceded about Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* that "few students of art at the turn of the century could remain uninfluenced by that seminal book," yet he consistently played down the connections between the two thinkers (1986: 184-85). He even turned Burckhardt into a Hegelian, despite much evidence against this inclination in Burckhardt's own *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, so as to remove the "*spectre nietzschéen hors de la constellation iconologique warburgienne*" (original italics) (Didi-Huberman 2002: 143).

Considering Warburg had thought of naming his *Bilderatlas* "The Critique of Pure Unreason" (*Kritik der reinen Unvernunft*), the attempts to turn positivistic or 'objective' Warburg's intellectual legacy and conversely to eradicate philosophical undercurrents should by now seem obviously paradoxical. Particularly in the *Bilderatlas*, in which one reads *between* images in an "*iconologie des intervalles*" ("*qui ne porte plus sur des objets, mais sur des tensions, analogies, contrastes ou contradictions*"), rather than treating art *objects* as discrete entities with self-containing boundaries (Michaud 1998: 238). Didi-Huberman suggests that Warburg's *images-en-mouvement,* as images *of* movement and *in*-movement across historical boundaries, should be looked at as *mouvements-symptômes*, as

their pathic resonances are not limited to 'art' as we understand it (nor do these symptoms indicate medical or biological meanings) (2002: 288). When referring to the intervals or gaps between images illustrated by the empty spaces of black cloth-covered panel in the *Mnemosyne* project, we can ask: are these spaces really ridden with darkness, with nothingness, with the vacuous and violent obscurity of *un*reason?

Nietzsche recounts a passage in Plato of Socrates in his final moments before death, having taken the hemlock and remembering a dream in which a daemon had instructed him to make music. Having so far ignored this recurring dream, feeling secure in his choice to devote himself to philosophy as "the highest of the arts," he felt a last yearning to compose a hymn to Apollo. Putting Aesopian fable into verse, he fulfilled this sudden sense of duty, and momentarily allowed for the possibility of an "artistic Socrates" (the artist was a position he considered explicitly inferior to that of a life devoted to philosophy); he was "obliged to ask: "Is that which is unintelligible to me necessarily unintelligent?" (BT: 71). In the *Mnemosyne* Atlas, Warburg did not attempt to abridge or diminish temporal disparities ("*gomme*[*r*] [*les*] *hiatus temporels*") or to fuse the vastly different contexts of the images, such as when he showed a magazine advertisement cutout next to a Botticelli on one of the panels (Didi-Huberman 2002: 292). The atlas had rather tried "to comprehend the meaning of these expressive values preserved by memory as a meaningful, spiritual-technical function, through a more deeply penetrating social-psychological investigation" (Warburg in Johnson 2010: 79). Puzzling, then, that Gombrich and Panofsky were eager to avoid psychologizing in their own works while simultaneously touting Warburg's influence, as if the dimension of the personal could be eradicated from the historian's task and a Warburgian methodology could somehow be preserved while his own ideas about his work were filtered out.

Saxl had presented the *Bilderatlas* as "a foundational attempt to combine philosophical and art-historical modes of observation" (Johnson 2010: 84). So why were his successors so adamant in wanting to disentangle Warburg's art historical methods from those of philosophy and its 'abstract concepts', while at the same time expressing the need for objective principles, traditionally held to be the domain of philosophy? And inversely, with Panofsky positing the problem of the non-objectivity of art objects in the face of art history's legitimacy as objective, how do we reconcile the fact that Warburg chose an

explicitly visual – arguably, artistic – medium for his art historical methodology? Why, ultimately, has his interpretive legacy sought so often to mind the gaps in which the 'intelligently unintelligible' expresses itself? If we take Didi-Huberman's use of Warburg's *Nachleben* as an avenue for interpreting Nietzsche's legacy in art history, we are confronted again with its simultaneously potent presence and omission (doubled by the same anomaly in Warburg's reception), suggesting that it is not so much absent but *suppressed*: "ce qui survit dans une culture est *le plus refoulé*, le plus obscur, le plus lointain et le plus tenace, de cette culture. *Le plus mort* dans un sens, parce que le plus enterré et le plus fantomal; *le plus vivant* tout aussi bien, parce que le plus mouvant, le plus proche, le plus pulsionnel" (2002: 292). If the deliberate eradication of Nietzschean traces in Warburg and Burckhardt's interpretive traditions is any indication, Nietzsche's presence *was* indeed felt in the history of Warburg's reception, led by the latter's most popular advocates in anglophone (British/American) art history, Panosfky and Gombrich.

Vienna School

Gombrich had emerged from what is loosely referred to as the "Vienna School of Art History," an umbrella term for a group of art historians in Vienna and Austria-Hungary who built on each other's theories between roughly 1847 and 1918, when the Habsburg Empire collapsed (Rampley 2013: 1). As a 'movement' or collective group of individual actors, two common strains can be detected: the first, a focus on *Bildung* with "its beliefs in the attainment of personal and broader social progress through intellectual and cultural improvement" (a reaction, Rampley shows, to a variety of socio-economic and political factors, too intricate to list here) and a move towards a "more scientific" and "less antiquarian" method of historical study – a need for a *Kulturwissenschaft* that arose from the gradual separation of church and state after public uprisings in 1848 (Rampley 2013: 4-8). In 1847, the first Institute of Art History was founded amidst "methodological shifts" in historians across Europe (like Ranke and Niebuhr in Berlin), with cultural history becoming increasingly geared toward a direct contact with artworks, with museum professionals now holding many of the professorial positions (2013: 18-19). This reflected a movement away from normative, Winckelmannian statements about the aesthetic and historical *value* of

certain periods, towards an attitude that is poignantly expressed by one of the Vienna School's 'founders', Moritz Thausing (1838 –1884): "The best art history I can imagine is one where the word 'beautiful' never appears" (2013: 33).

Among the art historians working in this context was Alois Riegl (1858-1905) who was trained in philosophy, history, and connoisseurship at the University of Vienna, and worked for ten years as director of textiles and medieval calendar manuscripts at the *k.k. Österreichischen Museum für Kunst und Industrie*. In 1893 he published *Questions of Style* (*Stilfragen*), which looked to dislodge the materialist (focus on technical constraints) and causal (evolutionary) model of motifs posited by Gottfried Semper, (1803-1879) preferring for instance to trace "the aesthetic development of the acanthus motif as *internally* driven," something like a progression of a "creative artistic idea" (my italics) (2013: 39). Before technique, he suggests, comes the *Kunstwollen*, the drive to "create an image of nature in dead material," emerging from "that something in humans that leads us to find pleasure in beautiful form" (Riegl in Rampley 2013: 39). Amidst this was a larger debate in the humanities about *Methodenstreit,* particularly among Berlin historians Carl Menger and Gustav Schmoller, the "historical school" of political economy, about the separation of history from theory, of working from appearances or laws, or beginning from the particular or the general. Max Dvorak had initially espoused the "genetic method" which found that "every historical formation is a member of a specific historical development chain and is determined by the previous formations in the same medium," but gradually both Riegl and Dvorak departed from this "evolutionary model" and focused on discontinuities and "transhistorical" undercurrents (2013: 51).

In "The advantages and disadvantages of Art History to Life: Alois Riegl and historicism," Diana Reynolds Cordileone writes about another "'Renaissance debate' between design reformers in Germany and Vienna that had begun in 1876," in response to which Riegl had published a small essay in 1895, "Über Renaissance der Kunst" (2010: 3). With his colleagues at the museum praising the Italian Renaissance, and scholars in Germany advocating their own 'northern Renaissance' in the decorative arts, he intervened that neither culture would experience a contemporary artistic renaissance, as both were concerned with imitation and adulation of historicist models. Cordileone cites Riegl: "Art history placed an oppressive burden of the past upon contemporary artists and robbed them

of the confidence necessary to develop new forms: "art history has retarded, overgrown and smothered the development of art". The prescriptive function of the art historian fed the nineteenth-century consumer's passion for imitations and condemned the artist to a never-ending cycle of historical revivals" (2010: 6). Riegl distinguishes between the historicist and the Renaissance artist:

> Now [after Winckelmann] one observed the construction of artworks that would have been unimaginable in the entire Italian Renaissance. It has already been emphasized how the distinctive self-sufficiency of the Italians' intercourse with antiquity is demonstrated in that they never, not even once, attempted to copy an antique temple. Nowadays, however, this has happened repeatedly (in Cordileone 2010: 6).

Riegl had read Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations* as a university student, and many of the passages from his essay make this quite clear with their undeniable parallels (2010: 8). Essentially, Riegl saw an excess of art historical knowledge and hunger for imitation as responsible for and indicative of a symptom of cultural crisis with a corresponding lack of any inner stylistic inclination in the European individual. Nietzsche wrote of a pervasive cultural relativism ("historical culture") where cultural experiences were sought after for their own right, so that finally "no longer [very] much surprised at anything, finally [to be] pleased with everything—," one ended up with Riegl's conception of modern art, "which feels equally related to all and equally estranged from all" (in Cordileone 2010: 8-9). In a culture that monumentalizes artists of "some-such great epoch," Nietzsche writes, "Art is… beaten to death by art", and as the flip side of the same coin, Riegl sees in the constant quest for a "longed-for new style" the assurance that one gets no enjoyment from the work either as beholder or a creator (Cordileone 2010: 11). This critique of history as a goal in itself mirrors the debate surrounding *l'art pour l'art*, an issue that primarily came to the fore with the French creation of the *beaux-arts* in the 17th century (though the *belli arti* had already existed in Italy for some time) and signaled the 'autonomy' of art from the liberal and mechanical arts (though the distinction between artisan and artist still took a long time to establish itself) (Michaud 1998: 17).

In 1856, Théophile Gautier writes in *L'artiste* the credo of this theory: "*Nous croyons à l'autonomie de l'art; l'art pour nous n'est pas le moyen, mais le but," and in his poem L'Art written the next year, "Tout passe – l'art robuste / Seul à l'éternité, / Le buste / Survit à la cité*," echoing the historicist ideal of art. Another formalist vein of this movement expressed itself around the time of the *Salon* of 1857, where art was to be separated from the

classical tradition of *mimesis*, and from its precedent in literature, so that the artist could once again become "créateur de ses propres idées" (Castagnary in Michaud 1998: 21). Michaud compares the impulse to turn science into a social cause (as found in Saint Simon) to the desire to make art its own goal, both, as Nietzsche put it, like a 'serpent chasing its tail' (1998: 26-7). Nietzsche writes:

> *L'art pour l'art* – The struggle against *purpose* in art is always a struggle against the *moralizing* tendency in art, against the subordination of art to morality. *L'art pour l'art* means: 'the devil take morality!'- But this very hostility betrays that moral prejudice is still dominant. When one has excluded from art the purpose of moral preaching and human improvement it by no means follows that art is completely purposeless, goalless, meaningless, in short *l'art pour l'art* – a snake biting its own tail. 'Rather no purpose at all than a moral purpose!' – thus speaks mere passion. A psychologist asks on the other hand: what does all art do? does it not praise? does it not glorify? does it not select? does it not highlight? By doing all this it strengthens or weakens certain valuations… Is [the artist's] basic instinct directed towards art, or is it not rather directed towards the meaning of art, which is *life*? towards a *desideratum of life*? – Art is the great stimulus to life: how could it be thought purposeless, aimless, *l'art pour l'art*? (TI: 92-3).

It is simply interesting to note here that Nietzsche's views on art – however much they may be 'general' (in relation to life, truth, value), seem to figure into art historical debates that are more 'specialized' and 'applied', such as this one associated with Riegl's formalist and stylistic critiques. In the next instance of Nietzsche's link to art history, we are not so much starting from Nietzsche's thought on 'art' or even history, but from his philosophy as a whole, picked up in postwar France by a myriad of theorists and writers.

American Reception: 'French Theory'[34]

François Cusset sees a status for certain French thinkers in the United States of the last three decades of the 20th century as one that has hitherto only been reserved for the celebrities of "*show business*" (originally in English) (2003: 11). He cites Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser, Julia Kristeva, and Helene Cixous as among those infiltrating 1980s American culture on multiple platforms in a way that had no precedent in their home country. Cusset does his best to unite these thinkers and some others into one "*package"* based on what in the second half of the 1970s in the U.S got labeled "French Theory," though also

[34] In *American Nietzsche,* Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen provides a very interesting and informative account of how Nietzsche's earliest readers were American, representative of a fan base in the U.S and other countries during his lifetime that far preceded and exceeded the recognition and interest of those in his own country (which finally only gained momentum posthumously) (2012).

"poststructuralism," and more disparagingly, "French postmodernism," and on the French side, the "grands prêtres de l'université française" or the mythic "Pensée 68" group (see Ferry & Renault: 1985):

> *Car cette dizaine d'auteurs, à peu près contemporains, dont les émules américains et les opposants français aiment à faire une école de pensée, un mouvement unifié, ne peut être associé à ce point qu'au prix de rapprochements contestables. Quelques refrains d'époque permettent de former entre eux une communauté exclusivement négative : la triple critique du sujet, de la représentation et de la continuité historique, une triple relecture de Freud, Nietzsche et Heidegger, et la critique de la "critique" elle-même puisqu'ils interrogent tous à leur façon cette tradition philosophique allemande* (Cusset 2003: 19).

In *Penser entre les langues,* Heinz Wismann goes so far as to suggest that we can read the eruption of "mai 68" as specifically a "syndrome nietzschéen," with Heidegger as its intermediary link to German philosophy (2012: 117).[35] One New York "association-turned-publishing-house" was particularly instrumental in the American dissemination of this group of thinkers, *Semiotext(e)*, which published many books on Georges Bataille, *Anti-Oedipus* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972), and Nietzsche, as well as translations of Jean-François Lyotard among others, and held a seminal conference called "Schizo-Culture" between November 13 and 16, 1975 with William Burroughs, Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault, Lyotard and others in attendance (Lejeune & al. 2013: 22). The other key moment in this dissemination was the creation of the art historical/theoretical journal *October* in 1976 by founders Rosalind Krauss, Annette Michelson, and Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe at MIT Press, with an inaugurating article of an English translation of Foucault's "Ceci n'est pas un pipe" (1968), and in the years after, other translations of texts by Bataille, Barthes, Derrida, Lyotard and Kristeva (2013: 23).[36] Krauss had left her prior post at *Artforum* for its lack of a "framework for critical exchange, for intertextuality within the larger context of theoretical discussion," Michelson had studied both philosophy and art history before working over a decade in France and becoming film and performance editor at *Artforum* (also leaving), and Gilbert-Rolfe was a philosophy student, artist and critic who came to New York from

[35] Mai 68 loosely refers to a period of social, economic and political upheaval in France, which culminated in widespread student and worker protests, and an association with various thinkers seen to represent the movement. For a quite uncomplimentary summary of the ideals of this movement and Nietzsche's role in it, see: Ferry and Renault's *Pensée 68* (1985).

[36] There is some exchange between these American journals and *Tel Quel* and *Macula* in France, both referring to many of the same recurring contemporary thinkers, many among them self-claimed "nietzscheans" (Lejeune & al. 2013: 24).

England in 1968, but only stayed with the magazine for three issues (2013: 24). Having so far surveyed art history's gradual search for autonomy from other disciplines, we see here a renewed attempt to integrate other discourses into its interpretive frameworks.

Another prior seminal moment in this transition was the 1966 international symposium at John Hopkins University in Baltimore, "The Language of Criticism and the Sciences of Man" (translated roughly from *sciences humaines* which doesn't have an exact American equivalent, according to Cusset), which had Barthes, Derrida, Lacan, René Girard, Jean Hyppolite, Lucien Goldmann, Charles Morazé, Goerges Poulet, Tzvetan Todorov, Jean-Pierre Vernant as speakers, and papers by Deleuze and others read in their absence. The two coordinators, Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato began the conference by situating the *commonality* between these thinkers in an effort to both open the diversified debates and congeal the thematic(s):

> *Nietzsche en est venu à occuper la position centrale qui était depuis les années 1930 celle du Hegel français…les œuvres récentes de Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze […], tout, y compris les ombres, la "généalogie," les espaces vides, y appartient à Nietzsche* (2013: 39-40).

What was supposed to be a conference on structuralism became eventually known as the nascent moment of *post*structuralism, sparked by Derrida's talk "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" (Ratner-Rosenhagen 2012: 266). Consistent with his privileged status in these debates, in 1978 *Semiotext(e)* devoted an entire issue to Nietzsche called "Nietzsche's Return" (vol. 3, n. 1) with texts by Bataille, John Cage, Deleuze, Derrida, Pierre Klossowski, Lyotard etc., where "*tout y est déployé pour faire du philosophe allemand celui qui annonce, célèbre, rend possible les années 1970*" (Cusset 2003: 81). And as retractors of this movement in France were during this period accusatory toward the "*antihumanisme allemand*" of "Nietzsche-Heidegger-Marx-Freud" and what they saw as its disastrous consequences (the view of Luc Ferry among others), by the 1980s we see more clearly how *French Theory* really came to signify "*une interprétation américaine de lectures françaises de philosophes allemands*," rather than being an explicitly *French* phenomenon (2003: 318-9).

A postmodern magazine *boundary 2* released an issue "Why Nietzsche Now?" in 1981, highlighting the impact of his antifoundationalist thought in widespread arenas, in which the editor Daniel T. O'Hara would characterize the three-tiered "postmodern appropriation of Nietzsche" as "Gallic Heideggerian hermeneutics, Derridean

deconstruction, and Foucauldian genealogy of power" (Ratner-Rosenhagen 2012: 269). To stay consistent with the examples we've referred to so far, we can see the impact of this three-tiered formation of thought on art historical discourse until recent years in Preziosi's *The Art of Art History* (2009) (we could've mentioned many other anthologies in its place), with its inclusion of texts by Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault, just as we saw their names (and particularly that of Bataille) continually reappearing on the pages of *October* throughout its first years.

One surprising consequence of this antifoundationalist heritage is its appropriation by queer and gender theorists who used Nietzsche's thought to un-essentialize gender. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick did this in *Epistemology of the Closet* (1992), and Judith Butler (whose text is also found in Preziosi's anthology) in *Gender Trouble* (1990), when she wrote: "We might state as a corollary [to Nietzsche]: There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results" (Butler in Ratner-Rosenhagen 2012: 270). Ratner-Rosenhagen suggests that "to use Nietzsche to challenge false necessities restricting female and sexual liberation" had become commonplace by the 1990s, with no little backlash from conservatives who feared its corrupting force on academic youth (Ratner-Rosenhagen 2012: 271). Among these, Allan Bloom, whose *The Closing of the American Mind* described how a "value relativism" was spreading through academia, revealing a mind not too closed, but too *open* to grasp Nietzsche's thought, a reaction that spurned the "New Nietzsche" of conservatism (2012: 273). Without being able to go into depth about it here, this kind of oscillation in interpretations of Nietzsche's ideas and re-appropriations from otherwise 'opposing' camps is nearly characteristic of his reception.

Gender and Essence

Nowhere is this ambivalence more pronounced than on the issue of gender. Identity theory in terms of gender and sexual orientation has become such a prominent presence in (primarily North American) art history, starting with the propagation of feminist artists in the 1960s, that an exhaustive summary of the various movements, publications and thinkers that have most strongly contributed to this expanded discursive sphere is impossible here.

Griselda Pollock speaks to the impact of these expressions on art history's fundamental impulses:

> Following a worldwide feminist movement in the later 20th century, women became a renewed topic for art and art history, giving rise to gender analysis of both artistic production and art historical discourse. Gender is to be understood as a system of power, named initially patriarchal and also theorized as a phallocentric symbolic order…Gender analysis raises the repressed question of gender (and sexuality) in relation both to creativity itself and to the writing of art's necessarily pluralized histories…The postcolonial critique of Western hegemony and a search for non-Western-centered models of inclusiveness that respect diversity without creating normative relativism are driving the tendency of the research into gender in art history toward an as of yet unrealized inclusiveness regarding gender and difference in general rather than the creation of separate subcategories on the basis of the gender or other qualifying characteristics of the artist. *The objectives of critical art historical practices focusing on gender and related axes of power are to ensure consistent and rigorous research into all artists, irrespective of gender,* for which a specific initiative focusing on women as artists in order to correct a skewed and gender-selective archive has been necessary, and *to expand the paradigm of art historical research in general to ensure that the social, economic, and symbolic functions of gender, sexual, and other social and psycho-symbolic differences are consistently considered as part of the normal procedures of art historical analysis* (my italics) (Pollock 2014: 1-2).

With the citation from Pollock helping us contextualize the importance of gender theory for art history's evolving modus operandi, we still have to determine the complex and conflicting appropriations of Nietzsche's thought by feminist thinkers and gender theorists, with the range of interpretations being typically mangled and contradictory. If feminists had a bone to pick with Nietzsche, it would not be surprising to see why, nor is it hard to find examples to support this reaction. Nietzsche writes in *Beyond Good and Evil,* "When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is usually something wrong with her sexuality. Unfruitfulness itself disposes one to a certain masculinity of taste; for man is, if I may be allowed to say so, 'the unfruitful animal'" (BGE: 101). While at first, this sentence is immediately offensive to politically correct sensibilities whereby women should be free to pursue the same (scholarly) activities as men without it detracting from their other qualities or capacities, he characteristically confuses our perspective with the next phrase (we can note the irony in this context of the very composition of this paper: a female scholar writing about Nietzsche's integration into an academic discipline, despite the latter's resistance to this very idea). While unfruitfulness is here connected to a woman's biological sexuality, reducing her to the ability to seduce and reproduce, the opposite reality – that of a man's – is shown in a context that is equally though more ambiguously derogatory. The dominance of the male subject is complicated by his being animal and less fruitful than woman, which results in the compensatory desire to pursue scholarship. A few aphorisms before, Nietzsche

describes the process through which ideas come to language between individuals (evoking pregnancy, a recurring theme in his thought): "One seeks a midwife for his thoughts, another someone to whom he can be a midwife: thus originates conversation" (BGE: 100). Man is unfruitful, but he can bare thought through language, thus supporting his own inclinations towards feminine reproduction.

We can see how Butler here detected in Nietzsche an *unessentializing* of gender, particularly in her focus on this phrase from *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887), from which she formulated her core idea of gender as performative: "There is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything" (in Ratner-Rosenhagen 2012: 269). This was not the only way Nietzsche entered feminist dialogues however. In *Critical Terms for Art History*, Amelia Jones begins her entry on the "Body" with a quote by Nietzsche: "To all the despisers of the body I will speak my word… Soul is only a word for something about the body. The body is a big sagacity, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a flock and a shepherd" (from *Z* in Nelson & Shiff 2003: 251). Jones explains Nietzsche's contributions to discussions about the body and the 'feminine' thus:

> Nietzsche's proclamation, however, melodramatically relegated Cartesianism to the past, signaling the beginning of the end of its sway over Western conceptions of self…the death of God, which Nietzsche also infamously proposed, pointed as well to the dissolution of the conceptual boundary differentiating body and mind. It was the belief in the singular outside deity that had afforded the mind a transcendent source of identification to project itself outward, as separate from and privileged in relation to the stinking, mortal, weighty flesh of the body. The body had then, been viewed as pure animal, a vessel marking "Man's" immanence and mortality. Notably too, as Simone de Beauvoir pointed out in *The Second Sex*, her 1949 feminist critique of Cartesianism, the body was inexorably marked as feminine… Nietzsche's clear rejection of Cartesianism helped move Western thought toward an understanding of the body as inexorably enmeshed in the mind or soul and vice versa; the soul, "only a word for something about the body" could no longer be unproblematically imagined as transcendent or unbounded by corporeality and the desires and needs it presupposes (2003: 251-2).

Elizabeth Grosz makes a similar use of Nietzsche's thought in *Volatile Bodies*: *Towards a Corporeal Feminism,* where she argues Nietzsche's conception of the body is complex and not *naturalized* by non-historical and biological ideas about the instincts (1994: 129), also referring to his critique of slavish impulses from *Genealogy of Morals* as a rejection of what is outside, different, 'not itself' (1994: 130). Nietzsche begins the preface of *Beyond Good and Evil* with this passage:

> Supposing truth to be a woman – what? Is the suspicion not well founded that all philosophers, when they have been dogmatists, have had little understanding of women? (...) Certainly she has

> not let herself be won – and today every kind of dogmatism stands sad and discouraged. *If* it continues to stand at all! (GM: 31).

Even when discussing his own conceptions of 'woman', Nietzsche is quick to warn us that these ideas not be themselves turned to dogma. When he points to "a few truths about 'woman as such'," he emphatically adds, "assuming it is understood from the outset to how great an extent these are only – *my* truths. – " (BGE: 163). Nietzsche repeatedly refers to truth 'as a woman' throughout his works, and suggests that it is the dogmatic philosophers who seek to pin 'her' down and render what is diverse and nuanced static and dualistic. Derrida expounds on this in *Spurs – Nietzsche's Styles*:

> But on the other hand, the credulous and dogmatic philosopher who *believes* in the truth that is woman, who believes in truth as he believes in woman, this philosopher has understood nothing. He has understood nothing of truth, nor anything of woman. Because, indeed, if woman *is* truth, *she* at least knows that there is no truth, that truth has no place here and that no one has a place for truth. And she is woman precisely because she herself does not believe in truth itself, because she does not believe in what she is, in what she is believed to be, in what she thus is not (1979: 53).

When Nietzsche writes, "What is truth to a woman!" (BGE: 164), he is not suggesting a woman is incapable of reason, but that any truth that believes in itself too much (without considering perspectivism) is a lie, and no lie has been more readily propagated than that of the 'essence of woman' or the 'eternal feminine'. While Nietzsche discusses at length his problems with the latter concept, particularly in relation to Goethe, we cannot elaborate on it here. As evidenced by art history's inclusion of Butler in Preziosi's anthology (among many other critical anthologies) and the omission of her attributions to Nietzsche's thought, perhaps Nietzsche's un-essentializing of gender went too far for art history's more tangible feminist/queer critiques, which looked at manifestations of these ideas in specific art works and artists. It is rather his larger attack on the positivistic dogma that turns ideas into *ideals* or counter-ideals (read: the eternal feminine as either idealized or demonized) that was at play in his thoughts about gender and that is most relevant for us now as we turn to discussions about fascist interpretations of Nietzsche, one more factor that has ridden his interpretive legacy with difficulty and controversy.

The Question of Race and Proto-Fascism

Like the proliferation of texts and theories associated with critiques of gender, sexuality, and identity that we have just referenced, another critical lens through which art historical discourse has accustomed itself to looking through is its critique of fascism. Totalitarianism is usually looked at for its utilisation of the image as a propaganda machine with art increasingly seen and discussed as an embodiment of the political, whatever its accompanying ideology (Toby Clark's *Art and propaganda in the twentieth century: The political image in the age of mass culture*, 1997, Susan Sontag's article "Fascinating Fascism," 1975, Walter Benjamin's discussion of the aestheticization of politics as war in his 1936 essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibilit*y"* (cited in Preziosi, 2009: 441), Mark Antiff's *Avant-Garde Fascism: The Mobilization of Myth, Art, and Culture in France, 1909-1939*, 2007 etc.)

The legacy of Nietzsche's thought being associated with fascist ideologies is a difficult and complicated one. In *Genealogy of Morals*, among other books, Nietzsche notoriously attributes to Judaism the *slave revolt* in morality, where in the face of an aristocratic value system that once believed 'I am good = strong = powerful = noble', the slave reverses this and re-values its own suffering, so that "only those who suffer are good," a perspective that culminates in Christianity and the valorization of humility, self-sacrifice and repentance (2007: 17-8). In the same text he critiques European culture for a movement towards a "new Buddhism" which overvalues compassion and non-attachment and leads to nihilism, he takes an "anti-Christian" stance on priests as the new masters of a slave class (when formerly, the ruling masters were 'blond beasts'), he places Christians (who he also compares to the Chinese) beneath the 'heathen peoples' of East Asia who had much to teach them about tact etc. (GM: 7,10,108). Essentially, no major religion or nationality is left safe from his scathing critiques, though some are certainly more flattered than others (his perhaps most derogatory accusations are reserved for his fellow German compatriots).

Despite the fact that his critiques often alternate with praise - particularly of Jewish peoples, who he credited in *Genealogy* with bringing humanity out of an elementary and unreflective barbarism – his condemnation of anti-Semitism was outspoken and unequivocal, making his appropriation by the Nazis all the more disappointing. Famously,

Nietzsche's sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche took care of him with his mother for the last ten years of his life as an invalid, and as a devout anti-Semite, she encouraged Adolf Hitler's interest in him, inviting him to visit her at the Nietzsche archives long after his death, when she gave Hitler her brother's favourite walking stick. For this, she received praise and adulation from Hitler throughout the early 1930s, which culminated in a photo of him staring into the eyes of Nietzsche's bust with the caption "The Führer before the bust of the German philosopher whose ideas have fertilized two great popular movements: the National Socialist of Germany and the Fascist of Italy" (from Heinrich Hoffmann's Hitler biography *Hitler as Nobody Knows Him* in Sluga 1993: 179). Yet Santaniello argues that "Hitler probably never read a word of Nietzsche" (1994: 41), confirmed at minimum by his ignorance of Nietzsche's repeated condemnation of anti-Semites, including having accused them (along with anarchists) of the most vapid *ressentiment,* as they "try to stir up the bovine elements in the population through the cheapest means of agitating, the moralistic attitude" (GM: 117). The instances of Nietzsche's vehement disgust and hatred for anti-Semites are not only far too numerous to enumerate here but are unique to his philosophy in that they *never* alternate with praise (as he habitually does with almost all those he criticizes).

The most outspoken defendant of Nietzsche against fascist appropriation (which generally focused on Nietzsche as glorifying irrational vitalism and praise of war) was Georges Bataille in his journal, *Acéphale*, co-edited with Pierre Klossowski and Georges Ambrosino. The second issue (January 1937) begins with a long article, "*Nietzsche et les fascistes*," which launches with a tirade against Nietzsche's sister, Elisabeth *Judas*-Förster – the *betrayer* of his legacy (1980: 3).[37] This being a period in which fascism was visibly rising and anti-Semitic movements were arming (or accessorizing) themselves with Nietzsche's texts, Bataille contrasts this on the first page with two quotes in large bold

[37] Nietzsche seemingly anticipated this betrayal as he was already very reticent about his mother and sister in his writings and saw their presence in his life as essentially dangerous: "When I look for my profoundest opposite, the incalculable pettiness of the instincts, I always find my mother and my sister – to be related to such *canaille* would be a blasphemy against my divinity. The treatment I have received from my mother and sister, up to the present moment, fills me with inexplicable horror: there is an absolutely hellish machine at work here, operating with infallible certainty at the precise moment where I am most vulnerable – at my highest moments … for then one needs all one's strength to counter such a poisonous viper… psychological contiguity renders such a *disharmonia praestabilita* possible… But I confess that the deepest objection to the 'Eternal Recurrence', my real idea from the abyss, is always my mother and my sister.- (EH:11).

capital letters from Nietzsche's correspondences (from *œuvres posthumes*, 1934): "*Ne fréquenter personne qui soit impliqué dans cette fumisterie effrontée des races !"* and *"Mais enfin, que croyez-vous que j'éprouve lorsque le nom de Zarathustra sort de la bouche des antisémites*!" (1980: 3). Bataille warns against any *putting to use* of Nietzsche's thought, the latter who had vehemently spoken against setting *causes* as ends to knowledge: "*que ce soit l'antisémitisme, le fascisme, que ce soit le socialisme, il n'y a qu'*utilisation*. Nietzsche s'adressait à des* esprits libres*, incapables de se laisser utiliser*" (1980: 4).

Nietzsche would have been against Hitler's literalist interpretation of his thought, in that those who see in the removal of moral constraints a free-for-all to destroy and annihilate are lesser spirits, for to simply act *immorally* reflects a morally confined state, a reactive position vis-à-vis convention: "Making a whole person of oneself and keeping its highest good in view in everything one does – that takes one further than those stirrings of pity and actions undertaken for the good of others… Even now we wish to work for our fellow men, but only insofar as we find our own highest advantage in this work, neither more nor less. The only question is what one understands by one's advantage; *it is just the immature, undeveloped, crude individual who will understand this most crudely"* (Nietzsche in Bruford 1975: 169). As we have seen so far, precisely *because* of the plasticity of Nietzsche's reception, it is so difficult to link him to any *cause* or end, and as a consequence to any method, doctrine, or single style. It is only a theorem (read Hitler's doctrinal manifesto *Mein Kampf,* 1925, centered around the thesis of "Jewish peril") that wants to annihilate all others and to be the *only truth,* that we can safely suggest missed the point of Nietzsche's philosophy. Continuing our examination of Nietzsche's avenues of reception in art history, we turn to aesthetic philosophy.

Aesthetics and the Grand Style

In *Critical Terms for Art History,* Koerner explains how modern aesthetics "began as a science of *subjective* criticism, of an evaluation of the object not *as it is*, but as it is *for us*," bringing to mind Nietzsche's perspectivism (Nelson & Shiff 2003: 420). He refers to Voltaire's definition of beauty in the *Philosophical Dictionary (*1764), ("ask a toad what is beauty, the Beautiful, *to kalon*, and he will answer that it is his she-toad,") and proposes that

in contemporary art history, 'value' has become a 'critical term' where discussions of beauty are concerned, functioning "to expose [such proposed objective] judgments as projections of the evaluating subject and to ask how, given their relativity, they acquire authority" (2003: 420). Nietzsche had anticipated this: "Man believes that the world itself is filled with beauty – he *forgets* that it is he who created it. He alone has bestowed beauty upon the world – alas! only a very human all too human beauty…" (BGE: 89). This goes against a dominant tradition in aesthetics where discussions of beauty were typically concerned with its universality, so that '*de gustibus non est disputandum*'; Koerner replies:

> Yet in his insistence that judgments of taste are the inheritors of social class, Bourdieu is also heir to Friedrich Nietzsche, who argued in *Genealogy* (1887) that the logical distinctions between true and false, as well as ethical ones between good and evil, are in the end distinctions of taste, which are themselves the results of "genealogy," the consequences, that is, of high and low birth. The foundation of values in aesthetics, and the grounding, in turn, of aesthetics in class, leads Nietzsche not to a sociology of art, however, but to the contrary: an aesthetization of the social. His philosophy, a self-proclaimed "reevaluation of all values" (…) aspires to be a new form of art. *For Nietzsche believed that only art, the most subjective of values, can express the concealed subjectivity of all values.* This had also been the position of the early German romantics who, at c. 1800, argued that the highest form of philosophy was art criticism and that the highest form of art criticism was the artwork (my italics) (Nelson and Schiff: 421-2).

For Nietzsche, an aesthetics that looked to the art object from the standpoint of a 'viewer', titillated or repulsed by what it saw, and that concealed these matters of taste in the guise of reason and philosophical neutrality, missed the grander implications of aesthetic experience. The most explicit unpacking of Nietzsche's critique of 'conventional' aesthetics comes from Heidegger, who "observes that once this "subject-object relation is coupled with the conceptual pair form-matter," and this conceptual matrix is combined with the "rational/irrational" and "logical/illogical" dichotomies, then representation has at its command a conceptual machinery which nothing can stand against [*eine Begriffsmechanik, der Nichts widerstehen kann*]"" (1975: 270. Hegel had dressed up his aesthetic philosophy as prescriptive morality under the sanctity of rationalism when he characterized Beauty as the combination of the good of morality and the truth of reason, as when he said in *The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism*: "I am convinced that the highest act of reason, which, in that it comprises all ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness are united like sisters only in beauty" (cited in Roberts 2011: 42). Transferring questions of beauty to those of taste, Kant had argued in *Critique of Judgment* that we approach the artwork with "disinterested satisfaction," being pleased by it but not entertaining concepts of

its utilitarian value, which indicates an intermediary space between his conceptions of the subjective and objective (2011: 423). “For what taste demonstrated most clearly,” Koerner continues, “was that the source of value lay not in the judged object but in the judging subject” (2011: 419). Still, despite the self-awareness of the viewing subject, taste was still seen in these cases to pertain to what was merely aesthetically *pleasing,* and so in some sense, confined the ‘aesthetic experience’ to one of simply enjoying an (outside) object.

If conventional aesthetics tended to treat the work of art as object and the viewer as a detached subject, positing both polar axes as given, stable categories, and hence resembling the material finitude and formal perfection of the Apolline, “within the context of the Dionysian aesthetic, then, ‘creation’ is liberated, so that the creative impulse, with its destructive element, is not restricted to the work of art, but applies to whatever has value” (Del Caro 1981: 15). Once again art (and taste) is not seen through the lens of objecthood, but reaches to the fundamentals of lived experience. For Nietzsche, it is art that particularly shouldn’t be “measured by the beautiful feelings” [it] arouses” (nor for how much it *pleases*) but by how much it approaches 'the grand style' (WP: n. 842). From “The Will to Power as Art,” Heidegger elaborates on what constitutes Nietzsche’s 'art':

> The artistic state – and that means art – is nothing else than *will to power*. Now we understand Nietzsche’s principle declaration concerning art as the “great stimulant to life.” “Stimulant” means what conducts one into the sphere of command of the grand style (Heidegger 1991: 130).

The 'grand style' is located somewhere between the overlap of the romantic and classical drives in art, the one a creation that is a product of hunger, the other, of fullness, the first reactive, the second active. “The romantic is an artist whose great dissatisfaction with himself makes him creative – who looks away, looks back from himself and from his world” but “to be classical, one must possess *all* the strong, seemingly contradictory gifts and desires… under one yoke” (WP: n.844, 848). The grand style in Nietzsche presents itself once again as an ongoing though *in-tune* engagement between opposing forces, the one pushing the other continually to new ground, without obliterating its other: “Oblivious to the existence of any opposition…neither Dionysian nor Apollonian, … the highest feeling of power and security finds expression in that which possesses *grand style*” (TI: 74). While this concept has to remain enigmatic for us here given the brevity in which we can explore its implications, it helps to reconcile in Nietzsche’s thought the simultaneous praise and scorn for that which is 'classical' and 'romantic' in various instances, the alternating need for a

looking-forward and a looking-back, and to see how subjective and objective yearnings are both constitutive forces of art, whether approached from the standpoint of creation or reception. Aesthetic quality is expressed in every instance of *how one lives* and assigns value, making of one's life an inevitable art form and taste of the most fundamental importance.

Psychoanalysis: Freud, Jung, Lacan

Psychoanalytic theory is positioned right in this intersection between the so-called subjective and objective modes of aesthetic experience. The range of applications of these ideas related to the unconscious and unintentional in human behaviour are diverse and far-reaching, but we do find specific links between psychoanalytic theory and art historical themes that recur with some frequency, such as the idea of the fetish (see William Pietz' *Fetish*, 2003 for one example, in Preziosi 2009: 109-112, and Suzanne Blier's article "Truth and seeing: magic, custom, and fetish in art history," 1993), and also more general chapters devoted to psychology in methodological texts, such as the two chapters devoted to Freud and Winnicott/Lacan respectively in Laurie Adam's *The Methodologies of Art: An Introduction* (2010). Like Marxism, the ideas of Freud, Jung and later, Lacan, are used as ideological frameworks that become methodological devices when applied to particular cases of art historical study. Rather than being used to analyze the psyche of an individual or group, these ideas are translated for use in the realm of objects and theories, artists and artistic movements, and hence offer a set of diagnostic tools that go beyond the realm of 'healing' or therapeutic treatment.

Roberts shows how a "hermeneutics of suspicion," was to define *a posteriori* a movement whose "masters are Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. They seek to decipher the multiple meanings of symbols by unmasking hidden unconscious forces as the true source of meaning. This exercise in suspicion refuses the *intentional structure* of the symbol in favour of a reductionism that ties explanation to *causes* (psychological, social etc.), *genesis* (individual, historical), or *function* (affective, ideological)" (Roberts 2011: 104). Rather than giving causes as explanations for actions, however, positing a rationalized (hindsight) conception of intentionality, Nietzsche sees the competition of multiple desires as the

propelling force behind any action or act of interpretation, a perspectivist prism of drives: "it is our needs that interpret the world; and our drives and their For or Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm" (WP: n. 481). Recalling our recent discussion of beauty and perception, he again reminds us that, "Ultimately one loves one's desires and not that which is desired," so that what one desires from and for the 'object' and one's perception of the object are conflated. Freud once said of Nietzsche, "What troubles us is that Nietzsche transformed being into becoming," removing the security of assigning any teleological purpose or fixed meaning to our experiences and drives (Assoun 1980: 281). Meaning is neither stable nor homogeneous, making clinical distance difficult. The science that looks to interpret the human mind faces a similar predicament as the analyst of the artwork, who struggles both with the intentionality of his or her own interpretive framework, and the one he or she attributes to the artist as a way of fixing meaning in the art object. What is apparent in the artwork is what one sees in *spite* of the intentionality of the artist or viewer, never fully decipherable from either's myriad desires.

Assoun names Freud and Nietzsche the founders of disciplines, the former notoriously of psychoanalysis, the latter of psychology, critique and axiology (the study of value as related to ethics and aesthetics) (1980: 282). Both in some regard had atemporal frameworks in which the past ran through the veins of the present, but Freud was concerned with a "*psychologie abyssale des profondeurs*" where one digs into one's repressed unconscious of past experience to better understand the present, whereas in Nietzsche, "*son art est de saisir la continuité en explorant les surfaces*" (1980: 284). Freud's student and friend Carl Jung also took an interest in Nietzsche and gave a seminar on Zarathustra as part of his psychoanalytic teaching (see Paul Bishop's book on Nietzsche's influence on Jung's thought in *The Dionysian Self: C.G. Jung's Reception of Friedrich Nietzsche*, 1995). Beyond this, there is extensive literature of the impact of Nietzsche on early psychoanalysis and his being credited with developing one of the earliest in-depth structures of thought on the unconscious, with a decided impact on Freud, Jung, Adler, Lacan and the list goes on. We cannot delve into the diverse cases of reception of Nietzsche's thought in psychological theory, but we have briefly shown the key role Nietzsche played in the development of some

of the earliest and most influential founders of this area of study, one so importantly entwined with that of art history.

Given our need for brevity in summarizing these larger histories of reception, much is left to be said on the potential mediators of Nietzsche's thought in art history: full examinations could be devoted to his impact on the field of semiotics, the philosophers of intuition and creativity (Bergson), his influence on Walter Benjamin, one of the most frequently mentioned names in anglophone art historical curricula, his prominent role in poststructuralist thought, to say no less of the enumerable offshoots of French Theory, which we have unfortunately only treated from a distance as a falsely unified category. Without being able to offer this elaborated analysis on the latter, there are some texts worth noting in that respect, many of which have informed this study without being referred to directly: Heidegger's *Nietzsche* (particularly Volume 1: "The Will to Power as Art," 1998), Jacques Derrida's *Spurs, Nietzsche's Styles* (1979), Gilles Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (2005a), the 1964 Colloque de Royaumont on Nietzsche (Deleuze 1967), Bataille's *Sur Nietzsche : volonté de chance* (1945), Foucault's *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History* (1977) etc. This is not so as to pose Nietzsche as the *origo* and *fons* of all poststructuralist, postmodern, and deconstructionist thought; rather, it is a reminder that when we see these names in art historical survey texts, we remember much of their thought has been devoted to Nietzsche. The largest omission that remains from our discussion of Nietzsche's impact in art historical forums remains his influence on artists, leading to a potential discussion of what works of art and artistic movements could be shown in relation to him both as a personal figure and as a thinker. Due to the scope of this thesis, we can only refer to art in its more general terms, as a term that we struggle to define but that in any case manifest in artists and the works of art they create.

Conclusion

The Art History Anthology: Theory, Criticism, and Method

The impetus for this thesis came from a firsthand experience of methodological survey texts used in an undergraduate (Anglo-Canadian) art history program. It is through a familiarity with the concepts and debates that frequently arose in these critical anthologies that Nietzsche's ambivalent role in these discussions became apparent. We will now refer to a list of these recurring ideas and investigations taken from four popular reference books used in art historical (North American) curricula as a reminder of the topics we have touched on so far in relation to Nietzsche's veiled legacy in art history: Eric Fernie's *Art History and Its Methods* (1995), Donald Preziosi's *Art of Art History* (2009), Laurie Schneider Adams' *The Methodologies of Art: An Introduction* (2009), and Nelson and Shiff's *Critical Terms for Art History* (2010). Looking at the table of contents of these books, there are several 'groupings' that emerge that may help us narrow our tracks, which I will list along with their recurring contributors, cited in each category: the issue of biography and artist/author identity (Vasari, Foucault), classical idealism and connoisseurship (Winckelmann, Goethe), cultural history (Burckhardt, Gombrich), the issue of artistic revival (William Morris), formalism, critique of iconology and *Kunstwollen* (Riegl), style and classification (Wölfflin, Henri Focillon, Alfred H. Barr, David Summers), humanism and iconography (Panofsky, Hubert Damisch), philosophy and sociology of art history (Arnold Hauser), analysis, interpretation and meaning (Susan Sontag, William Fagg, Svetlana Alpers, Stephen Melville, Heidegger, Meyer Schapiro, Satya P. Mohanty, Stephen Bann), artistic creation (T. J. Clark), art history as *Kunstgeschichte* or *Kulturwissenschaft* (John Onians, Hans Belting, Edgar Wind, Giovanni Morelli), feminism and queer studies (Griselda Pollack, Whitney Davis, Judith Butler, Amelia Jones), primitivism and orientalism (Olu Oguibe, Timothy Mitchell, Mark Antliff, Patricia Leighten), anthropology (Aby Warburg), beauty and the sublime[38] (Ivan Gaskell, Edmund Burke), dialectical progression (Hegel, Marx), modernism (Charles Harrison), postmodernism (Craig Owens, Rey Chow), postcolonialism (Homi K.

[38] See Roberts (2011: 202-3) for a detailed analysis of Nietzsche's conception of beauty and the sublime in comparison to that of dominant interpretations following Kant.

Bhabha), social history of art (Craig Clunas), poststructuralism (Derrida), psychology and psychoanalysis (William Pietz), quality and value (Joseph L. Koerner), representation, semiotics (Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson), teleology, interdisciplinarity, reception theory and aesthetics (Kant, D.N Rodowick), institutionalization (Carol Duncan, Donald Preziosi), technology (Walter Benjamin, Maria Fernandez), text/image (W.J.T. Mitchell), originality/Avant-Garde (Ann Gibson, Richard Shiff), memory/monument (James E. Young), body/performance (Kristine Stiles) etc.

It is worth reproducing this tiresome list because it shows the range of art history's manifold applications and interpretive paradigms, while simultaneously retrieving how many of these topics we have already touched on through our exploration of Nietzsche's heterogeneous influence. Nietzsche's pluralistic philosophy seems to demand this abundance of interpretive contexts in order for the depth and elasticity of his corpus to be grasped, but these multiple entry points into art history are also symptomatic, as we've seen, of his transmission having occurred through such diverse mediators of his work. Having so far broadly summarized the potential motivators for a more affirmed inclusion of his contributions to the disciplinary frameworks of art history, we may now briefly turn to the question of *why* restraint has been placed on an overt acknowledgment of his impact. For that we must examine (unfortunately only very briefly in the conclusion) the potential inhibitors to Nietzsche's absorption into art historical discourse such as we find it evidenced in the above scholarly publications, in order to situate potential directions for further research.

If we begin with the issue of controversy, we are presented with the problem of a double standard. Let's refer to the posthumous assimilation of his legacy by Fascist and Nazi ideology: if, as we've already seen, Nietzsche was fiercely *anti*-anti-Semitic, (even if many could still argue his larger philosophy could lend itself to *amoralized* behavior- something he addresses and defends himself against in his own thought)[39], and that philosophers who *actually* allied themselves with National Socialism (Heidegger) are *still* embraced in art historical/academic circles despite their controversial status – does this remain a sufficient explanation for his occlusion? Heidegger's *Origin of the Work of Art* (1935) and its critique

[39] "Whether we immoralists do virtue any *harm?* – As little as anarchists do princes. Only since they have been shot at do they again sit firmly on their thrones. Moral: one must shoot at morals" (TI: 36).

by Meyer Schapiro in *The Still Life as Personal Object: A Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh* (1968), followed by a book response by Derrida, *Restitutions to the Truth in Pointing* (1978), is an intertextual exchange that has received extensive attention and analysis in particularly Anglophone art histories, evidenced by the inclusion of excerpts of the three texts in Preziosi's anthology. Seemingly, Heidegger's confirmed alliance with Nazism and Derrida's defense of his philosophy are not untouchable for art history, despite the ethical problems they pose; but their respective books on Nietzsche in relation to art are never mentioned.[40]

The same goes with Nietzsche's comments about women and race; chauvinistic and western-centric attitudes are riddled everywhere in continental philosophy, and much more potently so than in Nietzsche, as we find in Plato and Hegel, for example. This has not prevented a thorough analysis and application of their philosophies in art history. The philosophy/art history divide is also untenable as an explanation for his exclusion as we've seen with the nearly central role that has been played by the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Deleuze and Guattari, and Derrida in these anthologies. It would also be inaccurate, as we've seen, to suggest that art history is concerned with the specific, and philosophy the general. The history of art historical methods is one in which 'principles' are continually being revised, renewed and altered to suit to the changing tides of the discipline, and in the last few decades a growing self-consciousness about the bias of the scholar has made central for art historians the question of meaning-attribution. The issue of value (Nietzsche's primary question) is now unavoidable: "In sum," Koerner writes, "assumptions about value are inescapable in the study of art. Even the most iconoclastic traditions and histories, which expose as fictive the intrinsic worth of their object, art, presume the value of iconoclasm itself" (Nelson & Shiff 2003: 433). Investigations into value lie at the heart of what may be considered the 'abstract' thinking of philosophers, yet here figure directly into art history's most pressing problems.

[40] Heidegger's 'Black Notebooks' were published in 2014, revealing more explicit condemnation of Jewish peoples and refueling the debate of what to do with his philosophy in the context of his Nazi sympathies. The status of his reception in academia has become increasingly problematized as a result (as evidenced in some cases by altered university curricula), which will likely continue as wider access is granted to these writings. For one commentary, see: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/19/heidegger-german-philosopher-black-books-not-surprising-nazi, accessed August 4, 2015.

Nietzsche's critique of disciplinary logic and academia may also provide a potential explanation for his omission, for a thinker who actively embraced contradiction and fluidity in his own thought is not easy to confine into a doctrine or 'theory'. With that, we return to the question of method. Despite the comparably complex legibility of the texts of Kant, Hegel, Freud, Marx and even Derrida and Lacan – often a comingling of heterogeneous positions and statements that are certainly not 'transparent' or easily reduced to theoretical equations – art history has not ceased to draw on their interpretive frameworks to yield their own methodological paradigms. Why, then, is a Nietzschean method seemingly an impossibility? Is it perhaps his self-identification as artist, with writings that resemble "musical combinations" more than doctrines, that makes him untouchable, as if an artist could not also assume the role of art historian (Conway 1998: 2)? This however conflicts with the earliest art historians like Vasari and Alberti who were foremost artists, as when Falconet (1716-1791) defended himself against Winckelmann's critiques by discrediting his authority on the basis of his not being an artist (Lamoureux & Preziosi, 2006: 151). Should we perhaps question whether there is rather something that may be *intentionally irreducible* to method in Nietzsche's work, a suggestion that in some way has been made throughout this paper…?

The Artist/Historian

This brings us to an interesting reflection about what constitutes valid methodological sources for art history. There are many significant texts in literature and other domains that touch on similar area of discussions as art history, but are not considered 'academic'. In *Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man* (1918), James Joyce speaks through the character of his younger alias, Stephen Dedalus, and discusses various contemporary issues in aesthetics (taken from two main passages in the book) (2000):

> —In so far as it is apprehended by the sight, which I suppose means here esthetic intellection, it will be beautiful. But Aquinas also says *bonum est in quod tendit appetitus*. In so far as it satisfies the animal craving for warmth fire is a good. In hell, however, it is an evil… (215)
>
> —In the same way, said Stephen, your flesh responded to the stimulus of a naked statue, but it was, I say, simply a reflex action of the nerves. Beauty expressed by the artist cannot awaken in us an emotion which is kinetic or a sensation which is purely physical. It awakens, or ought to awaken, or induces, or ought to induce, an esthetic stasis, an ideal pity or an ideal terror, a stasis called forth, prolonged, and at last dissolved by what I call the rhythm of beauty…

> —The tragic emotion, in fact, is a face looking two ways, towards terror and towards pity, both of which are phases of it. You see I use the word *arrest*. I mean that the tragic emotion is static. Or rather the dramatic emotion is. The feelings excited by improper art are kinetic, desire or loathing. Desire urges us to possess, to go to something; loathing urges us to abandon, to go from something. The arts which excite them, pornographical or didactic, are therefore improper arts. The esthetic emotion (I used the general term) is therefore static. The mind is arrested and raised above desire and loathing.
>
> —What is that exactly? asked Lynch.
>
> —Rhythm, said Stephen, is the first formal esthetic relation of part to part in any esthetic whole or of an esthetic whole to its part or parts or of any part to the esthetic whole of which it is a part.
>
> —If that is rhythm, said Lynch, let me hear what you call beauty; and, please remember, though I did eat a cake of cowdung once, that I admire only beauty.
>
> Stephen raised his cap as if in greeting. Then, blushing slightly, he laid his hand on Lynch's thick tweed sleeve.
>
> —We are right, he said, and the others are wrong. To speak of these things and to try to understand their nature and, having understood it, to try slowly and humbly and constantly to express, to press out again, from the gross earth or what it brings forth, from sound and shape and colour which are the prison gates of our soul, an image of the beauty we have come to understand—that is art.
>
> They had reached the canal bridge and, turning from their course, went on by the trees. A crude grey light, mirrored in the sluggish water and a smell of wet branches over their heads seemed to war against the course of Stephen's thought (2005: 237-239).

It is striking that such passages in literature, similarly found with other authors, like in Oscar Wilde's *The Decay of Lying* (1889), broach so many of the subjects that recur in aesthetic theory, art theory and art history, yet are contextualized as fiction and so not looked at as valid sources. As we have seen with Burckhardt and Nietzsche, a fictionalized account is no less 'actual' than another historical source, both being active forms of interpretation and hence, information. One attempt to integrate these two domains has been undertaken by Daniella Gallo in *Stendhal: historien de l'art* (2012), in which Stendhal's extensive treatment of art (as a subject and in terms of specific monuments etc.) is treated within the context of the discipline of art history. With the precedent having already been set to include work by authors into art history (though usually with authors who are also theorists like Bataille, Kristeva and Sontag), the time is perhaps coming when art history will make use of its full range of potential contributors, among them, the artists themselves, which has already begun to happen with many contemporary artists who double as theorists and curators (see "Artists as Theorists," in Graham Sullivan's *Art Practice as Research,* 2010), mirroring their earliest art historical precedents (Vasari etc.).

Still, it is perhaps not coincidental that the primary mediators of Nietzsche's thought in art history are themselves in a nearly ambivalent relationship to the discipline, as we discussed earlier with Georges Didi-Huberman (page 12, n. 1). This recalls the case of classical theorist Marcel Detienne, whose work on ancient polytheistic theology was controversial for its positing the gods as in some way 'alive and present' (a Nietzschean angle to antiquity), for which he faced the same criticism encountered by Nietzsche by the philologists of his time for being *unwissenschaftlich*, so that unable to get an academic position in his home country of France, he accepted a professorship at John Hopkins University in the United States (Sollers 2007). We saw a similar suppression of Nietzsche's thought in the legacy of Aby Warburg, whose popularity has however since surged in the 'postmodern' phase of art history, while failing to trigger a corresponding surge of interest in Nietzsche's work. It is no wonder that in seeing how many of those who embrace Nietzsche's ideas in their own methodological paradigms (or show a kinship to his manner of expression) are themselves problematic in several academic contexts, the conundrum of Nietzsche's legacy is exacerbated. Yet in North American university curricula, his presence *is* found – though typically in the programs of economics, political science, sociology etc. Undoubtedly Nietzsche discusses these topics, but never with the same breadth and enthusiasm as he does art. Furthermore, these disciplines are arguably more pragmatic, consistent and/or precise than the discursively variegated and intricate art history, with its more speculative approach to theory; why, then, are these disciplines more apt to cite his influence? Shouldn't Nietzsche's flamboyantly self-styling tone and self proclamation as artist be harder to digest for empirical fields that do not take art (as object, expression or experience) as their subject, but refer to more standardized forms of information? Seemingly, this is not the case; it can be argued that perhaps it is *precisely* because an art historian takes art as *its object* that the divisions between artistry and analysis must be so harshly differentiated.

Conversely, another problematic aspect of Nietzsche's reception is his status as intellectual celebrity, arguably an inhibitor to nuanced interpretations rather than a benefit. Many of his concepts have become 'catchphrases' or 'magic words' that are colloquially familiar, though rarely taken in their literary/philosophical context: will to power, death of god, eternal return of the same, "what doesn't kill you makes you stronger," etc. (TI:

Maxims and Arrows 8, 1889). Thus we get the sense that we can rest on his thought, that it has been sufficiently elaborated upon and has had its due impact. But as we have seen with so many of the inappropriate re-appropriations of his texts, it is too easy to assume that what one hears about Nietzsche has anything to do with his actual corpus. In *The Cult of the Avant-Garde*, Donald Kuspit discusses how the 'persona' of the thinker or artist and the 'drift of amplification it receives' (see page 37) can come to subsume the work itself, as if one could be read from and without the other: "Correlate with this the belief that the artist's charismatic publicity image is more important than his actual work (which borrows its charisma from the publicity image), to the extent that the image has come to be regarded cynically – without moral embarrassment or intellectual irony – as 'the central document' of his career" (1993: 20). Take, for instance, Nietzsche's reputation as a ruthless critic of Christian values, and the harsh amoral announcer of the death of God; this definitely corresponds to reflections in his books – but it does not give the same impression as reading this passage:

> - My practice in warfare care be reduced to four propositions. Firstly: I attack only causes that are victorious – under certain circumstances, I wait until they are victorious. Secondly: I attack only causes against which I would find no allies, where I stand alone – where I compromise only myself…I have never taken a step in public which was not compromising: that is *my* criterion of right action. Thirdly: I never attack persons – I only employ the person as a strong magnifying glass with which one can make visible a general but furtive state of distress which is hard to get hold of. That was how I attacked David Strauss, more precisely the *success* with German 'culture' of a senile book – I thus caught that culture red-handed… That was how I attacked Wagner, more precisely the falseness, the hybrid instincts of our 'culture' which confuses the artful with the rich, the late with the great. Fourthly: I attack only things where any kind of personal difference is excluded, where there is no background of bad experience. On the contrary, the attack is with me a proof of good will, under certain circumstances, of gratitude. I do honour, I confer distinction when I associate my name with a cause, a person: for or against – that is in this regard a matter of indifference to me. If I wage war on Christianity I have a right to do so, because I have never experienced anything disagreeable or frustrating from that direction – the most serious Christians have always been well disposed towards me. I myself, an opponent of Christianity *de rigueur*, am far from bearing a grudge against the individual for what is the fatality of millennia – (EH: 17-8).

This passage gives a very different impression of Nietzsche than we get from normalized conceptions of his persona as a war-loving antichrist who ruthlessly attacks any idea of virtue and the good. If nuance is everywhere important in interpretation, it is, as we've seen, an utterly crucial exertion in the case of Nietzsche. What his philosophy reminds us about interpretation is that it is *active* – one has to *displace* oneself (see Michaud on page 37) to peer at (an) idea(s) from many angles, and see how one's vision changes. As a discipline that is both scholarly and centered on *artistic* practice, it seems art history has

much to benefit from the study of nuance that Nietzsche's work has provided – *if* it hasn't been doing so already.

While we have only briefly laid out the many permutations that exist in terms of Nietzsche's influence on art history's manifold tendencies and approaches, further elaboration is needed to really tease out these relationships in their full vigour. As we alluded to briefly, one avenue left completely unexplored by us was Nietzsche's presence as mediated by the artist, hence through the artwork, subsequently digested into art history (one example: Nietzsche's alleged influence on Picasso, and the potential ties between perspectivism and cubism, an investigation already begun by Jose Ortega y Gasset, as discussed in Astráður and Liska, 2007). Still, perhaps the most interesting consequence of this current reflection, which may provide a springboard for further study, is the examination of the subterranean recurring and altering values that underlie the art historical discipline, which exist as a conglomerate of its diverse aims and applications. Where does one draw the boundaries in order to ascertain which sources are valid for furthering art history as a domain of study? What forms of knowledge contribute to a field that is defined both by the creativity of individuals and the standardized forms of evaluation required by academic and theoretical reasoning? Hopefully, this examination of Nietzsche's masked presence has stimulated such an inquiry, providing new questions to answer it terms of contextualizing the reception of this thinker but also more broadly, to understanding the drives and a dynamics that make of art history something of a living and complex disciplinary ecosystem. The variegated and layered priorities of art history are no doubt what is challenging but also unique to its disciplinary framework, also true, as it happens, of Nietzsche's philosophy.

APPENDIX: Christ and Dionysus: an exercise in archetypal iconography[41]

A1. *Dionysus: the Multiple God*

Dionysus has several names (Bromius, Bacchus, Dionysos) and is born of many origins both mythological and hereditary: there are varying accounts of his parental and geographical provenance, and many ancient and modern commentators suggest he was originally many characters that were later fused into one. The common story is that Zeus impregnated a mortal Semele causing a jealous Hera to scheme her death by suggesting that she ask Zeus to reveal himself to her in all his splendour, leading his expressive lightning bolts to kill her. Zeus saves the foetal Dionysus by sowing him into his thigh until maturation. At Hera's request, as an infant he is dismembered, boiled and roasted by the Olympian gods and is secretly re-formed from his intact heart by Athena. He then had to take on many guises to conceal himself (for years he lived as a goat) and came to be symbolized by the mask, as well as being characterized by many attributes (bull, serpent, leopards, panthers, figs, satyrs and their erect phalluses, sileni, centaurs, ivy, grapevines, the *kantharos* wine cup, etc.). Still, despite the consensus on the pluralism of his attributes, some consider certain animals or plants more indicative of him than others: "Il est multiforme, taureau, lion, léopard, son animal indicatif étant la panthère" (Sollers 2007: 212).

Being a symbol of both the cultures of 'classical' Western Greece (the last born of the Olympian gods) and the 'Barbarian' East/Asia, he wandered many years through Egypt, Syria, Phrygia, and India, before returning to native Thrace. He is simultaneously a symbol of masculine virility and potency, and female sensuality and fertility: he leads his followers of male satyrs (*Σατυροι*) and female maenads (μαινάδες) into orgiastic and melodic trances, and rituals of intoxication and hunting (men arguably become feminized as passive receptors of his sensual trances, and women take on the masculine trope of hunters). And despite always being surrounded by a retinue of adoring women, he himself is always described for

[41] Philippe Morel's recent publication, *Renaissance dionysiaque – inspiration bachique, imaginaire du vin et de la vigne dans l'art européen (1430-1630),* published in 2015, was unfortunately too recent to include in this study. However his preliminary article appears in this text (page 70-1), as well as in Appendix 4, as the initial reflections that led to the chapter in the current publication, "Le christianisme dionysiaque."

his youthfully and seductively effeminate features, residue from the many years he was concealed from Hera's wrath by dressing as a girl. In Euripides' *Bacchae,* when he returns to his birth town, he is tried and arrested by King Pentheus (nephew of Semele) for his claims of divinity, much as Christ was interrogated in the New Testament by Pilate for the same claims, despite each already having many followers; he is therefore both human and god.

A2. *Hölderlin, "Brod und Wein"*

Hölderlin, who had named Dionysus the *den kommenden Gott* (the coming god) (2003), personalized the identification of Christ and Dionysus further in this poem when he referred to poets as the "holy priests of the wine god":

> Some time ago — to us it seems like a long time —
> All those who made our lives happy climbed upwards.
> The Father turned his face away from people,
> And sorrow came rightly upon the earth.
> Finally a quiet genius appeared, comforting in a god-like
> Way, who announced the end of the day, and disappeared.
> The choir of gods left some gifts behind, as a sign
> Of their presence and eventual return, which we
> May appreciate in our human fashion, as we used to.
> That which is superior had grown too great for pleasure
> With spirit among men. And to this day no one's strong enough
> For the highest joys, although some gratitude survives quietly.
> *Bread is the fruit of the earth, yet it's blessed also by light.*
> *The pleasure of wine comes from the thundering god.*
> We remember the gods thereby, those who were once
> With us, and who'll return when the time is right.
> *Thus poets sing of the wine god in earnest, and the*
> *Ringing praises of the old one aren't devised in vain.*
> (my italics)
>
> (Cited from: https://sites.google.com/site/germanliterature/19th-century/hoelderlin/brot-und-wein-bread-and-wine).

Hölderlin's poets are those waiting and singing for the return of the Bacchus so that divinity may again fill the earth with its enhanced possibilities of joy, the praises having not been sung in vain; the genius too is able to provide comfort after the gods' disappearance by having knowledge of their coming and goings. Humanity in the absence of the gods is still responsible in some manner for holding a space for them through reverence and remembrance of their gifts as signs of their 'presence and eventual return', such as taking

pleasure in Dionysus' wine (also referring to bread as the body of Christ). The thinker – like the poet – reveres the withdrawn gods by participating in their act of creation and 'daring honesty'; the artist/genius has multiple potentials for becoming and preserves the space of the absent divine by sharing in its ability to give-form.

A3. *Pop Cultural Example of Christ/Dionysus Iconography: James Franco Gucci Ad*

The portrayal of Dionysus as a transfigured returning Christ is still a widespread image in art and popular culture today. One example is a 2013 Gucci campaign video, released online, directed and starring actor (and poetry PhD candidate) James Franco who is driving and looks at the Jesus figure hanging from the rearview mirror, then enters a church, and in place of an altar, finds a frenzied Bacchic group dancing sensually. Based on a Brian de Palmas 1970 recording called *Dionysus in 69* of an enactment of Euripides' *Bacchae* by the Performance Group (1969), the film shows Franco being birthed through multiple pairs of legs of dancing Maenads (suggesting repeated passages through the birth canal of his mother and then the thigh of father Zeus), before he encounters King Pentheus, who incites him to battle, and against whom he leads his frenzied maenads, who tear off and present his head, then celebrate in a Dionysiac procession laughing, dancing, holding thyrsus wands and leaves, and drinking vessels of wine. The final shot is Franco having usurped the throne, with presumably Ariadne approaching him (not from the original play) with the crown of thyrsus on his head, producing a shadow not unlike a crown of thorns (for key iconographic moments, see film stills in Figure 8).

A4. *Brief Iconographic Comparison: Boltraffio*

The young man in the drawing has long wavy hair with effeminate/boyish features and a stern gaze, and is somewhere midway between calmer more meditative portraits of Christ (Figure 9) in a crown of thorns and puerile representations of Bacchus, such as Caravaggio's Dionysus as ephebe (ἔφηβος) which represents the eroticized youth typically taken under the wing of a wise philosopher or mentor in ancient Greece (Figure 10). The latter is in contrast to a large majority of the portraits of Christ in the crown, particularly in the Renaissance, where he is shown with blood streaming down his face or streaked and

dried all over his body, almost always looking up towards the heavens ("God, why have you forsaken me?") or sullenly looking down out of frame. In the Boltraffio painting, both Christ and Dionysus are represented in their softer more youthfully handsome depictions: Christ seems inspired by depictions where his androgyny and youth are emphasized (perhaps even with seductive coyness) such as Albrecht Dürer's young Jesus in *Christ among Doctors* (Figure 11), and Dionysus approximates his boyish, serene and alluring manifestations rather than popular 17th century representations of him as middle aged, extravagantly drunk and reclining, unflatteringly corpulent, pulled by a tiger-drawn carriage amidst a chaotic and orgiastic frenzy (Figure 12). The explicit visual evidence of the synthesis of Christ and Dionysus is the figure's crown of thorns, here wreathed in the ivy leaves of the wine god.

Figures

Figure 1 – Raffaello Sanzio da Urbino, *The Transfiguration,* 1516-1520.



Figure 2 – Niccolo Fiorentino, *The Three Graces* and *Venus Virgo*, c. 1485.

Figure 3 – Sandro Botticelli, *Nymph of Achelous* (or: *Allegory of Abundance)*, 1480-85.

Figure 4 – Albrecht Dürer, *Melencolia I*, 1514, engraving B. 74.

Figure 5 – Jean de Gourmont, *Danseuses* (image section), approximately 1525-1540.

Figure 6 – *Laocoön and his Sons,* early 1st century BC.



Figure 7 – Giovanni Antonio Boltraffio, *Head of a Young Man with a Crown of Thorns and Ivy*, c. 1495-97.

Figure 9 (right) (Figure 8: next page) – Fra Bartolomeo, *Christ Crowned with Thorns*, n.d.

Figure 10 – Michelangelo Caravaggio, *Bacchus*, c. 1595.

Figure 11 – Albrecht Dürer, *Christ among the Doctors*, 1506.



Figure 8 – James Franco (director, actor), *Gucci Bacchae,* screenshots from film, 2013.

Figure 12 – Cornelis de Vos, *Triumph of Bacchus*, 17th century.

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